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ABSTRACT 
 
 And I gave my heart to know wisdom, and to know madness and folly: I 
 perceived that this also is vexation of spirit. 
 (KJV, Ecclesiastes, 1. 17) 
 
This thesis argues that folly is central to Shakespeare’s philosophical vision. As I 
establish in the introductory chapter, Shakespeare’s fascination with folly runs 
throughout his career and is apparent in his comedies, histories and tragedies. 
Because of its paradoxical nature, the wisdom of folly exists in a state of 
irresolvable contradiction. But since this contradiction generates a productive 
tension that takes us to the core of Shakespeare’s philosophical vision, thinking 
about wise folly is far from a fool’s errand, a ‘vexation of spirit’. Wise folly, it 
transpires, is a crucial function of the negative potential of Shakespeare’s drama: its 
capacity to give the lie to an intolerable reality, without dogmatically asserting the 
veracity of its own claims.  
 In the second chapter, I contend that Shakespeare’s foolosophy finds its 
antecedents in three seminal early modern texts: Erasmus’ Praise of Folly, Thomas 
More’s Utopia and Michel de Montaigne’s Essays. As well as situating 
Shakespearean folly in a European humanist milieu saturated with Erasmian ideas, 
this chapter shows how Shakespeare’s philosophy of folly implicitly prefigures 
concepts more explicitly formulated in mid–late twentieth century by T. W. Adorno 
and Michel Foucault, whose theoretical concerns provide a lens through which to 
view more clearly Shakespeare’s prescient critique of bourgeois reason. Chapter 3 
traces the afterlife of Alcibiades’ emblem of the wisdom of folly, the Silenus head, 
from the Symposium through to Erasmus, Montaigne and The Merchant of Venice. 
For Shakespeare, this image epitomises the impossibility of establishing hard and 
fast truths and is used to suggest that philosophical wonder can be experienced, 
paradoxically, only through reflection on aesthetic semblance.  
 Chapter 4 analyses Shakespeare’s critique of historiography in the Second 
Tetralogy, where the paradoxical wisdom of folly is employed to expose the 
misapprehensions and falsehoods that warp the accounts of history transmitted by 
his chronicle and dramatic sources. Chapter 5 examines Shakespeare’s techniques of 
ironic estrangement in As You Like It, Twelfth Night and The Winter’s Tale. 
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Employing the kind of Socratic irony described by Friedrich Schlegel as ‘playful 
and serious, guilelessly open and deeply hidden’,1 these plays use the discourse of 
folly to dramatize a sceptical attitude to knowledge even more radical than Nicholas 
of Cusa’s docta ignorantia. The final chapter of this thesis is devoted to Hamlet and 
King Lear. In these tragedies, I argue, Shakespeare fashions an anti-aesthetics of 
disfigurement and derangement, an aesthetics that refuses to gloss over human 
suffering.  
 This thesis breaks new ground by arguing that the paradoxical wisdom of 
folly in Shakespeare is not the sole preserve of professional wise fools such as 
Touchstone. Wise folly is central to his philosophical—or rather anti-
philosophical—vision; and the paradoxical wisdom of folly is apparent on a 
thematic, conceptual and formal level in virtually every play he wrote. To 
understand the wisdom of folly is to understand how Shakespeare’s plays 
comprehend their world. It is to understand how Shakespeare philosophises.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Philosophical Fragments, trans. by Peter Firchow (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991), p. 13. 
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A NOTE ON REFERENCES 
 
All quotations from Shakespeare are from The Norton Shakespeare, ed. by Stephen 
Greenblatt and others, first edition (New York: Norton, 1997) and are cited, as per 
the MHRA handbook, in the body of the text and in following manner: (Cymbeline, 
V. 5. 238–41). References to Hamlet and King Lear are to the Arden Third Series.   
 
When the available translation is adequate, quotations from Adorno are cited in the 
following manner: (MM, p. 192)—with the italicised abbreviation referring to the 
English version. If the available translation is inadequate, then I retranslate or 
modify the existing translation, citing the German text first with the English version 
in square brackets thus: (MM, p. 218; [MM, 192]). Occasionally, for the sake of 
clarity, I quote the German next to existing translations, in which case I provide the 
translation first, followed by the German: (MM, p. 192; MM, p. 218). 
 
The German edition of Adorno’s works used is his Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by 
Rolf Tiedemann and others, 20 vols (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2003). Unless otherwise 
stated, quotations from German books and articles are my own translations. German 
poetry is quoted in the original and a translation is given in a footnote.   
 
Abbreviations 
 
Primary Sources 
 
CWE  The Collected Works of Erasmus, trans. and ed. by various, 89 Vols 
 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972–). The title of the work 
 discussed, volume number and page number are given in the text. Since 
 this edition provides references to the major Latin editions on every page,  it 
 would be otiose to include references to the Latin, unless, of course, I am 
 citing the original.  
 
CWM The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, trans. and ed. by various, 15 
 vols (London: Yale University Press, 1976–1997). The title of the work 
 discussed, volume number and page number are given in the text. 
 
E Essays vvritten in French by Michael Lord of Montaigne, Knight of the 
 Order of S. Michael, gentleman of the French Kings chamber: done 
 into English, according to the last French edition, by Iohn Florio reader of 
 the Italian tongue vnto the Soueraigne Maiestie of Anna, Queene of England, 
 Scotland, France and Ireland, &c. And one of the gentlemen of hir  royall 
 priuie chamber, trans. by John Florio (London: Melch. Bradwood, 1613). 
 This text is preferred, unless I am referring to the ‘C-Text’ of the Essays or if 
 Florio’s translation is unclear. The book, chapter and page numbers are given 
 in the text. 
 
F The Essays of Montaigne, trans. by Donald M. Frame (London: Everyman, 
 2003). The book, chapter and page numbers are given in the text. 
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Geneva The Byble that is to say all the holy Scripture: in whych are co[n]tayned the 
 Olde and New Testamente, truly [and] purely tra[n]slated into English, 
 [and] nowe lately with greate industry [and] dilige[n]ce recognised, trans. 
 by William Tyndale and others (London: S. Mierdman, 1549). Book, 
 chapter, and verse are cited. This edition is used in discussions of 
 Shakespeare’s biblical references.   
 
GP Gargantua and Pantagruel, trans. by Sir Thomas Urquhart and Pierre Le 
 Motteux (London: Everyman, 1994). The book, chapter and page numbers 
 are given in the text. 
 
KJV The Bible: Authorized King James Version with Apocrypha, ed. by Robert 
 Carroll and Stephen Prickett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Book, 
 chapter and verse are cited.  
 
NDSS The Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare, ed. by Geoffrey 
 Bullough, 8 vols (London: Routledge, 1957–75). The volume number and 
 page number are given in the text. 
 
PF The Praise of Folie, trans. by Sir Thomas Chaloner, ed. by Clarence H. 
 Miller,  Early English Text Society, 257 (London: Oxford University 
 Press, 1965). The page number is provided in the text.  
 
U Utopia: With Erasmus’ The Sileni of Alcibiades, ed. and trans. by David 
 Wootton (Cambridge: Hackett, 1999). The book and page numbers are 
 given in the text. 
 
Vulgate Biblia Sacra Vulgata: Holy Bible in Latin, ed. by Rodger Gryson and  
    others, 4th rev. edn (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994). Book, chapter and   
    verse are cited.  
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 Philosophische Fragmente (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1969; repr. 2010). 
 
DE Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. by Gunzelin 
 Schmid Noerr, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford CA: Stanford 
 University Press, 2002). 
 
LHF History and Freedom: Lectures 1964–5 ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, trans by. 
 Rodney Livingstone (Maldon: Polity, 2008). 
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CHAPTER 1 
SHAKESPEARE’S FOLLY 
 
 Nur Narr, Nur Dichter!  
 Nur Buntes redend. 
 aus Narrenlarven blunt herausredend.  
 herumsteigend auf lügnerischen Wortbrücken.  
 auf Lügen-Regenbogen  
 zwischen falschen Himmeln 
 herumschweifend, herumschleichend— 
 nur Narr! nur Dichter! 
—Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Dionysos-Dithyramben’2 
 
The fool is akin to the poet insofar as he ‘nothing affirms and therefore never 
lieth’.3 Liberated from telling the truth in a straightforward manner, fools and poets 
alike revel in the possibilities that the counterfactual realm of play affords them to 
expose the absurdities and contradictions of the serious world. The notion that 
donning a jester’s cap enables one to critique prevalent ways of understanding and 
arguing, without dogmatically asserting the veracity of one’s own claims, is 
implicitly formulated in Cymbeline. Baffled by Jupiter’s riddling prophecy, 
Posthumous refers to it as: 
 
  […] still a dream, or else such stuff as madmen 
 Tongue, and brain not; either both, or nothing, 
 Or senseless speaking, or a speaking such 
 As sense cannot untie. 
(V. 5. 238–41) 
 
‘Or senseless speaking, or a speaking such | As sense cannot untie’: this thesis takes 
as its basis the paradox that finds compressed expression in these remarkable lines. 
Sense and nonsense are locked in a mutually defining relationship: ‘senseless’ 
utterance cannot be explained, categorised and incorporated into reason’s domain, 
                                                
2 Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Kritische Studienausgabe, 6 vols 
(Munich and Berlin: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag/de Gruyter, 1988), VI, p. 378: ‘Only fool! Only 
poet! | Only colourful speech. | speaking through fool’s masks. | climbing around on bridges of lying 
words, | on rainbows of lies | between false heavens | wandering about, prowling about— | only fool, 
only poet’! The emphases and irregular punctuation are original.    
3 Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry: or the Defence of Poesy, ed. by R. W. Maslen (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 103.  
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but such speech could not come into being without reason’s classification of it as 
something peculiar, something beyond its remit, ‘a speaking such as sense cannot 
untie’.  
 Perceiving the limitations of sense, however, is an act of reason. As Walter 
Kaiser writes in his seminal interpretation of the paradoxical wisdom of folly in 
Erasmus, Rabelais, Shakespeare and Cervantes, ‘The ability of reason to question 
itself and yet emerge with wisdom is key for these great Renaissance writers’.4 In 
Shakespeare’s drama, folly does not offer blithe relief from the tyranny of good 
sense. Rather, many of his most profound philosophical ideas stem from the 
discourse of folly’s lighthearted critique of dominant modes of reason. The witty 
wordplay, jubilant ironies and vertiginous paradoxes intrinsic to this discourse offer 
alternatives to the instrumental ways of understanding that dominate serious 
philosophy. 
  The philosophical potential of the paradoxical wisdom of folly in 
Shakespeare’s plays has been examined in individual essays and articles,5 but 
extended studies of folly have—despite the fool’s manifestly critical function within 
the plays—all but ignored his philosophical implications. For example, although it 
provides a detailed taxonomy of Shakespeare’s gulls, melancholics, lunatics, lovers, 
verbose clowns and fully paid-up wise fools,6 Robert Bell’s recent study, 
Shakespeare’s Great Stage of Fools, is content to assert that folly can constitute a 
sort of wisdom, without elucidating why this is the case. Bell states: ‘The 
postmodern decentring project has reconstructed our sense of folly as wisdom’,7 but 
                                                
4 Praisers of Folly: Erasmus, Rabelais and Shakespeare (London: Gollancz, 1964), p. 10. 
5 Jonathan Bate reads folly in King Lear in the light of Montaigne’s ‘Apologie of Raymond Sebond’ and 
the Praise. Bate argues that all three texts share a comparable anti-stoical standpoint; see 
‘Shakespeare’s Foolosophy’, in Shakespeare Performed: Essays in Honor of R. A. Foakes, ed. by 
Grace Ioppolo (Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 2000), pp. 17–33. Donald Wehrs draws 
intriguing parallels between the suspicions about ‘cool reason’ (A Midsummer Night’s Dream, V. 1. 6) 
apparent in Erasmus’s theology, Shakespearean comedy, ‘contemporary cognitive science, Levinasian 
ethics and Kristevan psychoanalysis, which conceives of subject formation in terms of a mutually 
modifying dialogue between the body and discourse, nature and culture’; see ‘Touching Words: 
Embodying Ethics in Erasmus, Shakespearean Comedy, and Contemporary Theory’, Modern 
Philology, 104 (2006), 1–33 (p. 2).  
6 See Shakespeare’s Great Stage of Fools (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011). For a more succinct taxonomy 
of fools in Shakespeare, see Diminter Daphinoff, ‘Shakespeares Narren’ in Der Narr: Beiträge zu 
einem Interdisziplinären Gespräch (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1991), pp. 57–71.  
7 Shakespeare’s Great Stage of Fools, p. 6.  
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he establishes neither how that ‘project’ has achieved this, nor what exactly the 
‘project’ is.  
 This thesis redefines the paradoxical wisdom of folly in Shakespeare’s 
drama. Folly, I argue, is of key structural, aesthetic and philosophical importance to 
the plays; and for this reason, fools cannot be analysed in isolation from the plays 
that they inhabit, as is the case in the studies of Enid Welsford, William Willeford,8 
Kaiser, Bell, Dimiter Daphinoff and Robert Goldsmith, who wrote the only study 
devoted solely to Shakespeare’s professional jesters.9  Not least because many works 
consider the socio-historical formation of the fool, the most significant of which are 
Karl Friedrich Flögel’s and Welsford’s,10 I do not examine the social function of 
early modern fools and clowns. Nor do I propose to build on the work of C. L. 
Barber,11 Robert Weimann,12 Françoise Laroque,13 Sandra Billington,14 Phoebe 
Jenson15 and Michael Bristol,16 who analyse the role of fools and jesters in early 
modern drama in connection with the stage’s transmission of popular customs.  
                                                
8 See The Fool and His Sceptre: A Study in Clowns and Jesters and Their Audience (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1969). 
9 See Wise Fools in Shakespeare (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1955; repr. 1977). 
10 Flögel’s expansive study, which M. M. Bakhtin repeatedly cites, examines the role that the grotesque 
comic had in the formation of various societies from Ancient Greece to Imperial China; see 
Geschichte des Grotesk-Komischen: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Menschheit, ed. by Max Bauer, 2 
vols (Munich: Georg Müller, 1914 [1788]). In terms of the sheer breadth of her research, Welsford’s 
work remains unsurpassed; she provides a typology that traces the development of the fool in culture 
and literature from Greece, via Persia, through Shakespeare, Erasmus, Lodge and Jonson to Charlie 
Chaplin and the Marx brothers. Her study places fools firmly in a history of ludic customs and it 
emphasizes the fool’s ability to mediate between ‘the world of fact and the world of imagination’. See 
The Fool: His Social and Literary History (London: Faber and Faber, 1935; repr. 1968), p. 29.  
11 See Shakespeare’s Festive Comedy: A Study of Dramatic Form and its Relation to Social Custom 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959; repr. 1990). 
12 See Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater, trans. by Robert Schwartz (Baltimore, ML: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). 
13 See Shakespeare’s Festive World, trans. by Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993). 
14 See Mock Kings in Medieval Society and Renaissance Drama (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
15 See Religion and Revelry in Shakespeare’s Festive World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008; repr, 2010). 
16 Bristol uses Bakhtin’s theories to emphasize the social and political resonances of Shakespeare’s unique 
engagement with fools, folly and the ludic; see ‘In Search of the Bear: Spatiotemporal Form and the 
Heterogeneity of Economies in The Winter’s Tale’, SQ, 42 (1991), 145–67; ‘Charivari and the 
Comedy of Abjection in Othello’, in True Rites and Maimed Rites: Ritual and Anti-Ritual in 
Shakespeare and his Age, ed. by Linda Woodbridge and Edward Berry (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1992), pp. 207–24. Manfred Pfister provides an alternative reading of Bakhtin, which pays 
particular attention to the subversive function of the fool in literature; see ‘Comic Subversion: A 
Bakhtinian View of the Comic in Shakespeare’, Deutsche Shakespeare Gesellschaft Jahrbuch, (1987), 
27–43. 
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 Whereas many of these studies argue that, in Barber’s words, ‘a Saturnalian 
reversal of social roles need not threaten the social structure, but can serve instead to 
consolidate it’,17 Sandra Billington and Robert Hornback argue convincingly against 
the subversion/containment theory of festive customs in Elizabethan drama; 
Billington sets out to disprove it,18 while Hornback problematises it. After the 
Reformation, he contends, clowning was used by the state for specific ideological 
purposes. Building on the subversive potential of boy bishops and mock sermons, 
Elizabeth’s government employed festive traditions in less-than-subtle anti-Catholic 
satire and anti-Puritan polemics.19 Hornback’s emphasis on Shakespeare’s 
transformation, rather than passive transmission, of existing theatrical practices is 
commendable,20 since many historical studies and theatre histories downplay 
Shakespeare’s theatrical, symbolic and metaphorical adaptations of existing ideas, 
preferring to focus on the way his works transmit established modes of foolery.    
 On the face of it, it may seem that the emphasis this thesis places on the 
critical function of wise folly in Shakespeare’s drama is an extended endorsement of 
the notion that there is indeed ‘slander’ or subversive potential in the raillery of an 
‘allowed fool’ (Twelfth Night, I. 5. 80), despite Olivia’s suggestion to the contrary. 
                                                
17 Barber, p. 245. Laroque argues that festive customs increased social cohesion; see Shakespeare’s 
Festive World, pp. 1–16. Following Welsford’s contention that ‘there is nothing essentially subversive, 
immoral, blasphemous or rebellious about clownage’ (The Fool, p. 8), Willeford (The Fool and his 
Sceptre, p. 135), Goldsmith (Wise Fools in Shakespeare, p. 99) and Bente Videbæk (The Stage Clown 
in Shakespeare’s Theatre, Contributions to Drama and Theatre Studies, 69 (Westport, CN: 
Greenwood, 1996), p. 15) argue that foolery ultimately consolidates the dominant order. 
18 Billington, p. 1.  
19 Much of the humour generated by Shakespeare’s hapless sleuth, Dogberry, Hornback shows, depends 
upon the original audiences’ familiarity with the ‘notable clown type’ of the 1590s: ‘the stupid or 
ignorant puritan, a religious zealot typed by his rusticity, misspeaking and inane logic’. Hornback 
contends that Dogberry is used as a ‘super subtle satiric rebuttal of the Ramist method’—a method that 
reduced complex philosophical problems to numbered lists and confused understanding with 
memorization (The English Clown Tradition from the Middle Ages to Shakespeare, Studies in 
Renaissance Literature, 26 (Cambridge: Brewer, 2009), p. 102, p. 138).  
20 In Othello, Hornback demonstrates, Shakespeare uses emblems of natural folly, and the assumptions 
that underlie the blackface theatrical tradition, to produce the unsettling mixture of comic and tragic 
elements that is characteristic of this play. Elsewhere, Hornback shows how this association of 
blackness with irrationality contributed to the pseudo-scientific theories of race of the nineteenth 
century. Strikingly, the discourse of eugenics, which held sway in the ‘sensible’ world for nearly a 
century, has some of its roots in medieval and early modern fictions. See ‘Emblems of Folly in the 
First Othello: Renaissance Blackface, Moor’s Coat, and Muckender’, Comparative Drama, 35 (2002), 
69–99; ‘Blackfaced Fools, Black-Headed Birds, Fool Synonyms, and Shakespearean Allusions to 
Renaissance Blackface Folly’, NQ, 55 (2008), 215–219; ‘Black Shakespeareans vs. Minstrel 
Burlesques: ‘Proper’ English, Racist Blackface Dialect, and the Contest for Representing Blackness, 
1821–1844’, ShakS, 38 (2010), 125–160 and “Extravagant and Wheeling Strangers’: Early Blackface 
Dancing Fools, Racial Representation, and the Limits of Identification’, Exemplaria, 20 (2008), 197–
223.  
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However, this thesis seeks to overcome the staid dichotomy between those who 
consider folly and comedy to offer a meaningful subversion of the status quo and 
those who argue for the containment theory. Rather than seeking the subversion of 
the powers that be, the paradoxical wisdom of folly offers a determinate negation of 
it. Although folly does not function according to the rules of intentional reason, it 
does take the prevalence of this mode of reasoning into account. Not only is one 
conditioned by custom into believing certain things to be the case, but the way that 
one thinks, argues and writes is also shaped by the powers that be; far from simply 
subverting the dominant order of things, folly offers an alternative way of 
philosophising: a way of understanding that lies outside the values, ideas and 
interests of the order it ostensibly subverts. 
 Wise folly is central to the elusive philosophical vision of Shakespeare’s 
plays, a vision that is inseparable from the forms in which it is expressed; this 
philosophy, by which I mean Shakespeare’s sustained critical, reflexive and 
aesthetic thought, is recurrently expressed through the discourse of folly. After 
clarifying the scope and aims of this thesis, this chapter offers a descriptive 
conspectus of Shakespeare’s wise fools, clowns and witty servants, which 
establishes the ubiquity of these fascinating characters. I then justify the theoretical 
position of this thesis, its anti-methodological methodology. Through his use of 
folly, Shakespeare shares an intellectual affinity with a strand of western 
philosophy, which includes Socrates, St Paul, Montaigne, Nietzsche, Foucault and 
Adorno. To throw into relief the epistemic implications of Shakespearean foolery, I 
employ these thinkers, all of whom are deeply sceptical both about the efficacy of 
man’s theories and about their own sceptical take on the power and utility of 
theoretical knowledge. Like Shakespeare, these philosophers retain a playful 
awareness of their own folly and of the potential fallibility of their ideas.  
 In order to justify my approach in the extended analysis of the intellectual 
context of Shakespeare’s folly in Chapters 2 and 3, the third and final section of this 
chapter offers a critical model of this thesis’ historical method. While the question 
of the exact nature of Erasmus’ and Montaigne’s influence on Shakespeare is far 
from inconsequential, this thesis is concerned not so much with ascertaining the 
direct influence of these humanists on Shakespeare’s drama, as with illustrating 
their shared tendency to think about and through the paradoxical mode of wise folly. 
Throughout this thesis, the discourse of folly is read in the context of and as 
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informed by contemporary humanism—especially Erasmus’ Praise of Folly (1515) 
and Montaigne’s Essays (1580). This has not been hitherto attempted in a full-
length study of Shakespearean foolery. Furthermore, it is in the figure of 
Montaigne—a self-professed ‘unpremeditated and accidental philosopher’ (F, Book 
2, Chapter 7, p. 487)—that the theoretical standpoint of the thesis and the historical 
context of Shakespeare’s plays coincide. In order to draw into sharper focus the 
significance of Shakespeare’s philosophy of folly, I recurrently employ Montaigne’s 
philosophical specualation, which proceeds both without a methodology and 
without a set of aims.  
 Through close readings of Praise of Folly, Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) 
and a selection of Montaigne’s Essays, Chapter 2 establishes both the significance 
of wise folly within the intellectual milieu from which Shakespeare sprang and the 
shared philosophical preoccupations of Erasmus, More, Montaigne and 
Shakespeare. These include a suspicion of the dogma that arises from sincerely held 
convictions; an awareness of the power of custom to blind people to their better 
natures; and a critique of man’s tendency to create nature in his own image. This 
chapter concludes by illustrating the parallels between Adorno’s critique of 
‘identity-thinking’ (ND, p. 149 et passim) and Montaigne’s sceptical estimation of 
the capacity of man’s theories to get to the bottom of things, which reaches its 
zenith in his Pyrrhonist essay, ‘An Apologie of Raymond Sebond’.  
 It is important to stress, however, that the intention of this thesis is neither to 
apply theory to early modern texts, nor to imply that twentieth century critical 
theory ‘got it all’ from Renaissance humanism. Rather, I establish that certain 
speculative correspondences between these historically and culturally disparate 
thinkers enable an analysis of the central concepts and problems inherent in 
Shakespeare’s foolosophy, an analysis that does not attempt to petrify it under the 
medusan gaze of analytical classification. Whereas Chapter 2 is concerned with the 
shared philosophical preoccupations of Shakespeare and his humanist 
contemporaries, the thesis as a whole is more interested in the modes of speculation 
shared by Shakespeare, the Renaissance humanists and the twentieth-century critical 
theorists, whose ideas help me to elucidate what the philosophical import of 
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Shakespearean foolery is today. Andy Mousley,21 Hugh Grady22 and Gerhard 
Schweppenhäuser23 have, in different ways, submitted the intriguing 
correspondences between Renaissance humanism and twentieth-century critical 
theory to close scrutiny.   
 Chapter 3 moves away from considering the themes shared by these writers. 
It illustrates the different ways in which Erasmus, Montaigne and Shakespeare 
engage with the concept of the ‘Sileni of Alcibiades’, a concept that hails from 
Plato’s Symposium and is used to describe the paradoxical wisdom of folly: the 
contrast between the philosopher-fool Socrates’ ridiculous appearance and his 
beautiful mind. Because it encapsulates the disjunction between appearance and 
essence, between the Father and the Son, for Erasmus, the philosophical 
implications of this image are enormous. Montaigne, in contrast, develops a self-
effacing, demotic or Silenic register, a low register with a kernel of philosophical 
insight. This chapter concludes with a re-reading of the casket plot of The Merchant 
of Venice. When Shakespeare dramatises the consequences of choosing the 
outwardly unpromising lead casket with the beautiful picture of Portia inside it, he 
evokes the idea of the Silenus figurine—an outwardly grotesque case that contained 
a beautiful gold statuette. Rather than using reason in a quixotic attempt to get to the 
essence of things and establish certainties, in The Merchant of Venice, Shakespeare 
                                                
21 Mousley seeks to create a ‘new literary humanism’ that is derived partly from the ideas of Renaissance 
humanism rather than from the more conservative agenda of liberal humanism, and partly from the 
ideas of first and Second Generation Frankfurt School thinkers. Mousley argues that philosophical 
wisdom is encrypted in the speech of characters on the margins of society: ‘Literary humanist wisdom 
often comes from below rather than above, in the shape of women or wise fools or designated 
individuals, such as Shylock […], who speak back to the dominant culture about its inhumanity, its 
dehumanizing instrumentalism or its deficient versions of humanism’ (Re-Humanising Shakespeare: 
Literary Humanism, Wisdom and Modernity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p. 141); 
see also, ‘The New Literary Humanism: Towards a Critical Vocabulary’, TPr, 24 (2010), 819–39.  
22 Grady attempts to reconstruct an ‘alternative Montaignean theory of early modern subjectivity’ that 
uses ‘Adorno, Horkheimer [and] Lacan […] rather than the Machiavellian French post-structuralism 
that has set the agenda for cultural materialism’ (Shakespeare, Machiavelli and Montaigne: Power and 
Subjectivity from Richard III to Hamlet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 24); this argument 
develops those initially made in Shakespeare’s Universal Wolf: Studies in Early Modern Reification 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), p. 9. For a thoroughgoing consideration of Shakespeare’s influence on 
German thought after Hegel, see Christian Smith: ‘Shakespeare’s Influence on Marx, Freud and the 
Frankfurt School Critical Theorists’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Warwick, 2013).   
23 Schweppenhäuser argues that a prototypical form of what might be called critical theory is identifiable, 
for the first time in western literature, in Erasmus’ Praise of Folly: see ‘Narrenschelte und Pathos der 
Vernunft. Zum Narrenmotiv bei Sebastian Brandt und Erasmus von Rotterdam’, Neophilologus, 71 
(1987), 559–574 (p. 570).  
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implies that it is through reflection on aesthetic semblance that philosophical 
wonder may be experienced.     
 With the theoretical position and historical context in place and brought into 
dialogue with each other, I then analyse Shakespeare’s Second Tetralogy, a group of 
plays that are overtly concerned with the relationship of theoretical knowledge to 
history. In these plays, Shakespeare casts himself as a Cretan Liar. He is a historian 
who, through the discourse of folly, boldly declares: “All historians are liars!” The 
philosophical power of Shakespeare’s dramatisation of the past is to be found in the 
ways in which it gives the lie to the dominant accounts of history. Paradoxically, he 
uses an intrinsically mendacious form, aesthetic semblance, to reflect upon the 
fictions that constitute historical fact.  
 Moving from the folly of lying to that of self-delusion, Chapter 5 argues that 
in As You Like It, Twelfth Night and The Winter’s Tale the characters, who declare 
themselves to be wise on the grounds that they are free of the sway of love, are 
actually indulging in a form of self-love, which is every bit as foolish as the 
tribulations of lovers embroiled in the comic action. All three plays imply that one 
should, paradoxically, hope for an utterly unexpected future. But these plays also 
make clear the extreme unlikelihood of such a future occurring, a future in which 
Viola’s injunction—‘Prove true, imagination, O prove true’ (Twelfth Night, III. 4. 
340–341)—is fulfilled. These three plays, furthermore, lay bare the tyranny of a 
melancholic mindset, for which there is nothing new under the sun.  
 Shakespeare’s melancholics perceive contingent events as mere examples of 
predetermined facts and general categories. As Orlando puts it when he attacks 
Jaques, the melancholic has ‘studied’ his ‘questions’ from ‘a painted cloth’ (As You 
Like It, III. 2. 251–252). For this reason, Shakespeare’s melancholics are often 
unable or unwilling to hope for unexpected, radically new experiences, preferring to 
stay captive to the past. This has near-tragic consequences in The Winter’s Tale. 
Leontes is all too ready to perceive his wife as another faithless woman—another 
Cressida. It is crucial that he—like Jaques and Malvolio—remains, if not an 
obdurate fool, at least comparatively unenlightened by the comic action. At the 
close of the play, he still espouses an idealising aesthetic, of which Montaigne and 
Erasmus’ Stultitia are devoutly critical, an aesthetic that makes the inhuman demand 
of formal perfection on human beings: ‘Hermione was not so much wrinkled, 
nothing | So agèd as this seems’ (V. 3. 27–28).  
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 The final chapter argues that Hamlet and King Lear offer Shakespeare’s most 
extensive thinking-through of the paradoxical wisdom of folly. By employing 
Socratic irony and critiquing predetermined values and ideas, these tragedies 
fashion a self-critical aesthetics. Hamlet and King Lear craft an aesthetics of 
deformity and derangement in order to illustrate the complicity of ‘neat and cleanly’ 
(1 Henry IV, II. 5. 415) artworks in muting the privations of the world from which 
they sprang. Far from imposing order upon chaos as one might imagine aesthetic 
form to do, these plays turn order into chaos. In other words, they dramatise the 
dangers inherent in the dominant, instrumental ways of thinking; to measure and 
categorise an object, person or discourse, these plays imply, is in no way the same 
as understanding it. As Adorno writes, ‘[the] irrationality in the principle of reason 
is unmasked by the avowedly rational irrationality of art’ (AT, p. 54). These 
tragedies use the purposeful purposelessness of aesthetic semblance to critique the 
orthodox category of the beautiful and to expose the dangers inherent in purposeful 
ways of thinking and communicating. Whereas, for Hal, ‘in everything, the purpose 
must weigh with the folly’ (2 Henry IV, 153–4)—that is, ‘folly’ is only justifiable if 
it has a ‘purpose’—Shakespeare’s philosophy of folly is at pains to show that the 
folly must also weigh with the purpose, for the discourse of folly puts the serious 
world’s ways of understanding on trial and frequently finds them wanting.  
 
A Conspectus of Shakespearean Fools and Folly  
         
‘Foolery, sir, does walk about the orb like the sun, it shines everywhere’ (Twelfth 
Night, III. 1. 33–4). As Feste’s characteristically shrewd adaptation of Cicero’s 
famous aphorism suggests, folly is ubiquitous. Indeed, Shakespeare’s drama 
includes a host of covert fools, most of whom have yet to receive extensive 
analysis.24 These include Hal and his fellow drinkers, who engage in scurrilously 
digressive badinage while playing ‘the fools with the time’ (2 Henry IV, II. 2. 120); 
the aristocrats and their servants in Love’s Labour’s Lost, whose love of role-
playing, logic-chopping and the double entendres of their repartee clearly recall the 
language of the fool; and Hamlet, who appropriates the grotesque bodily imagery 
                                                
24 Bente Videbæk mentions Shakespeare’s covert fools, but only analyses Hamlet and Phillip 
Falconbridge; see The Stage Clown in Shakespeare’s Theatre, esp. pp.1–16.   
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and nonsensical speech of the jester in order to craft his ‘antic disposition’ (I. 5. 
170).  
 If one extends the notion of the Shakespearean fool to include the traditional 
negative connotations of the word,25 as someone duped, suffering under 
misapprehension, or an unbeliever—as in Psalm 53, ‘The fool hath said in his heart, 
| There is no God’ (KJV, 1–2 [emphasis original])—then it becomes clear that in 
Shakespeare’s drama, ‘Stultorum infinitus est numerus’ (Vulgate, Ecclesiastes, 1. 
15): the number of fools is infinite. From the early knockabout farce, The Comedy of 
Errors, the very title of which attests to the dramatic and humorous potential of 
mistaken identity, to King Lear, which wrings pathos from both the king’s initial 
mistake—to divide his kingdom—and his subsequent insanity, which mutates into 
‘matter and impertinency mixed, | Reason in madness’ (Lear, IV. 6. 170–171), 
Shakespeare unflinchingly dramatizes errors. His tragedies commonly hinge on 
misapprehension. Be it Macbeth’s failure to interpret the witches’ equivocations 
correctly or Othello’s ‘jealous confirmations strong’ due to ‘Trifles’—
inconsequential follies—‘as light as air’ (Othello, III. 3. 326, 325), the protagonists 
of a Shakespearean tragedy suffer acutely as a result of their own folly. ‘Men’, 
writes Montaigne, ‘are tormented by the opinions they have of things, and not by 
things themselves’ (E, Book 1, Chapter 40, p. 127).  
 Comedy relies on misunderstanding followed by a timely clarification and 
recognition, whereas in tragedy this recognition happens too late. This human 
propensity to err does not escape explicit comment: Mariana in Measure for 
Measure defends Angelo’s lustful machinations on the grounds that ‘They say best 
men are moulded out of faults’ (V. 1. 431); and Falstaff, in a typically incongruous 
allusion to Genesis, contends that man is but ‘foolish-compounded clay’ (2 Henry 
IV, I. 2. 6). The exposition of the role of misapprehension in Shakespeare’s drama, 
however, is not the primary concern of this thesis, which focuses instead on the 
concept of wise folly.   
                                                
25 See OED, definition no. 1; M. A. Screech points out that ‘In the Old Testament, “fool” often implies 
sinner; folly and “foolishness”, sinfulness’. He adds, ‘the principal Hebrew words translated as “fool” 
in the Authorised Version are halal (boaster), evil (fool), nabal (an empty or vile person), sakal (a 
thick-head)’ (Laughter at the Foot of the Cross (London: Penguin, 1997), p. 81).  
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 What G. K. Chesterton brilliantly describes as Shakespeare’s ‘thoughtless 
wisdom’26 is a philosophy of folly that manifests itself most explicitly in the wise 
fools: Touchstone in As You Like It; the enigmatic Feste in Twelfth Night; Lavatch 
in All’s Well That Ends Well; and the Fool in King Lear. These jesters claim the 
privilege of the licensed fool to speak profound, subversive or intolerable truths in 
the guise of gratuitous nonsense. Lear’s Fool’s allegory, for example, sets an 
ominous tone for the approaching cataclysm:  
 
 The hedge-sparrow fed the cuckoo so long,  
 That it had it head bit off by it young.  
 So out went the candle, and we were left darkling. 
 (Lear, I. 4. 190–3) 
  
While retaining a beguiling surreal obscurity, the Fool moves from a reductive 
allegory, which compares the tribulations of the royal family to those of sparrows, 
to insinuating that Goneril is illegitimate, and finally leaps to an evocation of 
darkness.  
 Wise fools combine ‘mangled forms’ (As You Like It, II. 7. 41–2) of 
utterance with a riddling linguistic exuberance. They use ‘tricksy word[s]’ to 
consistently ‘defy the matter’ (The Merchant of Venice, III. 5. 59–60), putting the 
serious world on hold by rehearsing a dizzying array of counterfactual possibilities. 
Because they inhabit little fictions with which they lay bare the absurdities of the 
workaday world, fools are proudly perched, as Nietzsche puts it in his ‘Dionysos-
Dithyramben’, ‘auf Lügen-Regenbogen’: ‘on rainbows of lies’. To limit the analysis 
of wise folly in Shakespeare, however, to jesters and clowns as previous studies 
have done is to fail to perceive the vital structural and thematic significance of folly, 
with which this study primarily is concerned. To be sure, folly is not a facet of the 
plays. Rather, it is what constitutes their ironic detachment from the values of the 
early modern age and, more importantly, what accounts for their continued capacity 
to estrange their audiences and readers from the doxa that mediate their respective 
presents.  
 Despite Bell’s contention that until the advent of Shakespeare’s professional 
jesters, clowning in the plays ‘is comparatively circumscribed, relatively 
                                                
26 G. K. Chesterton, ‘A Midsummer Night’s Dream’, in On Lying in Bed and Other Essays, ed. by Alberto 
Manguel (Calgary: Bayeux Arts, 2000), pp. 193–204 (p. 200).  
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unthreatening and unenlightening’,27 a glance at some of Shakespeare’s early 
comedies shows that his professional jesters have a genealogy that stretches back to 
the earliest plays—clowns of one sort or another can be identified in almost all the 
plays.28 In The Two Gentlemen of Verona, possibly Shakespeare’s first play, Lance, 
his early experiment with the intriguing figure of the stage clown, is given the play’s 
most memorable moment, a set-piece tirade against his incontinent and coldly 
stoical dog (II. 3. 1–29). Lance’s loyalty to ‘the sourest-natured dog that lives’ (5) 
burlesques the acts of devotion, often to equally unresponsive recipients, committed 
by the eponymous gentlemen. Although this clown overflows with a travesty of 
Christian compassion—‘I have sat in the stocks for puddings he [Crab] hath stolen’ 
(IV. 4. 26), the hapless manservant complains, and this certainly does makes him 
appear foolish⎯he is wise enough to know the true nature of his master, the self-
serving would-be rapist, Proteus: ‘I am but a fool, look you, and yet I have the wit to 
think my master is a kind of knave’ (III. 1. 263). As Shakespeare’s fools never tire 
of reminding their audiences, onstage and off, the ‘wise man knows himself to be a 
fool’ (As You Like It, V. 1. 29–30); and for Indira Ghose, the key question posed by 
fools is “Who is the real fool”?29 This sort of reflexivity distinguishes Lance from 
non-Shakespearean clowns, such as Wagner in Christopher Marlowe’s Dr Faustus, 
who like Lance burlesques his master’s actions, but unlike Lance lacks the 
Shakespearean clown’s combination of dry irony, humility and insight.  
 This topsy-turvy logic is also found in the poignant conclusion of the knock-
about farce The Comedy of Errors. In order to multiply the possibilities for 
misunderstanding, Shakespeare added to his source, Plautus’ Menaechmi, a pair of 
identical twin servants, the Dromios. These twins may have been beaten black and 
blue through the course of the play, but it is they who offer at the close a utopian 
glimpse of a world organised according to empathy rather than the strictures of 
                                                
27 Shakespeare’s Great Stage of Fools, p. 12.  
28 There are a greater number of ‘Clowne’ roles in the Folio and the Quarto editions of Shakespeare’s 
plays than any other type of character. The precise significance of them, however, varies significantly 
from play to play. Despite their different roles in their respective plays, both Feste and the prolix 
Gravedigger in Hamlet are given the speech prefix, ‘Clowne’. In the Folio, 20 separate characters are 
given this speech prefix, whereas 7 are in the Quarto; see Helge Kokeritz, ed., Mr William 
Shakespeares Comedies, Histories and Tragedies (London: Oxford University Press, 1955) and 
Michael B. Allen and Kenneth Muir, eds., Shakespeare’s Plays in Quarto: A Facsimile Edition from 
the Henry E. Huntington Library (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981).  
29 ‘Jesting with Death: Hamlet in the Graveyard’, TPr, 24 (2010), 1003–1018 (p. 1008).  
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primogeniture. As they enter the abbey, the site of comic anagnorisis, Dromio of 
Ephesus refuses to calculate who should take precedence and step through the door 
first. He states: ‘We came into the world like brother and brother, | And now let’s go 
hand in hand, not one before another’ (V. 1. 425–6). The Dromios transcend their 
situation, achieving a level of philosophical suggestion beyond their ken.  
 However, the desire called utopia in Shakespeare’s drama not only dovetails 
with the historical situation in which it was conceived, but it is also undermined by 
structural and dramatic ironies, which ultimately thwart the construction of any 
castles in the sky. Consider Jack Cade’s nonsensical manifesto to the rebelling 
artisans in 2 Henry VI:  
 
 CADE  There shall be seven half-penny loaves, sold for a penny. I  
  will make it a felony to drink small beer. All the realm shall be held 
  in common […] there shall be no money. All shall eat and drink on 
  my score, and I will apparel them in one livery that they shall agree 
  like brothers.  
 (IV. 2. 60–61, 64–66) 
 
Cade’s Land of Cokaygne is clearly stuck in Southwark. The grip of commodity 
capitalism is evident from the fact that the notion of cheaper bread can be posited 
only within the framework of finance, despite Cade’s decrees to abolish money. The 
subversive political potential of his manifesto is curbed both because he remains a 
pawn in York’s game and because the characterization of this medieval rebel, with 
his ‘anti-intellectualism and promotion of irrationality’, evokes the early modern 
satirical type of the clownishly ignorant Puritan.30  
 Cade’s egalitarian aims, which are mingled with clownish physical desires 
for cheap beer and food, are also present, albeit in a different form, in the old fool 
Gonzalo’s utopian vision in The Tempest: 
 
 GONZALO I’th’commonwealth I would by contraries  
  Execute all things. For no kind of traffic 
  Would I admit, no name of magistrate; 
  Letters should not be known […] 
  No occupation, all men idle, all; 
  And women too […]. 
       (II. 1. 147–150, 154–55) 
 
                                                
30 Hornback, The English Clown Tradition, p. 112.  
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This enchanted vision of how things could be in a ‘brave new world’ (V. 1. 186) if 
they were set topsy-turvy and executed by ‘contraries’ is as at odds with how things 
are on the island as Cade’s vision is disengaged from the realities of medieval (or 
early modern) London. Prospero demonizes Caliban as a ‘thing of darkness’ (V. 1. 
279) and administers regular physical abuse to his slave; Gonzalo is laughed to 
scorn by his companions, who see the island as a potential site of domination, 
something to be owned and used. Indeed, the deformed Caliban has theatrical credit: 
Trinculo observes that in England ‘this monster [would] make a man’ (II. 2. 28–9). 
But the similarities between Cade’s rabble-rousing and Gonzalo’s ideal 
‘commonwealth’ are manifest. They both argue for common ownership, no 
commerce, no law, no writing and no wage-labour.  
 In his transformation of the sources of these two statements—one is drawn 
from the age-old popular dream of the Isles of Plenty and one from Montaigne’s ‘Of 
the Cannibals’—Shakespeare offers not only a kind of ‘utopian realism’,31 a sort of 
speculation that is orientated towards the future, while nonetheless tempered by 
present realities, but he also provides a realistic appraisal of the utopian impulse. 
Shakespeare neither affirms the radical reforms, endorsed both by popular culture 
and Montaigne’s sceptical humanism, nor does he wholly censure them. What these 
ironies do suggest, however, is that Shakespeare baulks at concrete blueprints of 
utopia. This is because they are bound to reflect the world as it is—in the manner of 
Cade’s longings for a cornucopia—and because they remain as hopelessly out of 
sync with the current situation as Gonzalo’s fantasy.     
 Although, like the Dromios, the Porter in Macbeth is a servant, is implicated 
in folly, mediates between characters and only appears in one scene, he is 
nonetheless a ‘great clown’.32 His speech offers a hermeneutic key with which to 
unlock significant events, themes and images in the rest of the play; his very identity 
as a ‘devil porter’ (II. 3. 16) clearly resonates with the infernal imagery that runs 
through the play. After welcoming to ‘th’everlasting bonfire’ (19–20) a host of 
over-reachers, including an ‘equivocator […] who committed treason enough, for 
God’s sake, yet could not equivocate to heaven’ (7–10) and a ‘farmer who hanged 
                                                
31 See Kiernan Ryan, Shakespeare’s Universality: Here’s Fine Revolution (London: Bloomsbury, 2015) 
[forthcoming]. 
32 Bell, p. 236.  
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himself on th’expectation of plenty’ (4–5), the Porter quibbles about the 
anaphrodisiac effects that the excessive consumption of alcohol can have: 
 
 PORTER  […] drink, sir, is a great provoker of three things. 
 MACDUFF  What three things does drink especially provoke? 
 PORTER  Marry, sir, nose-painting, sleep, and urine. Lechery, sir, it  
  provokes and unprovokes: it provokes the desire but it takes away the 
  performance. Therefore, much drink may be  said to be an equivocator 
  with lechery: it makes him and it mars him; it sets him on, and it takes 
  him off; it persuades him, and it disheartens him, makes him stand to, 
  and not stand to; in conclusion, equivocates him in a sleep, and,  
  giving him the lie, leaves him.       
(II. 3. 25–33) 
 
Equivocation, bending the truth through deliberately ambiguous statements, is also 
of manifest importance to the tragedy as a whole. What Macbeth calls the witches’ 
‘double sense’ (V. 8. 20), the crafty ambiguities that lace their nonsense rhymes, is 
what undoes him. Although their comment that he should ‘laugh to scorn | The 
power of man, for none of woman born | Shall harm Macbeth’ (79–81) appears 
unambiguous, it transpires, of course, that Macduff, who sends the usurper to meet 
his maker, was delivered by Caesarean section, ‘from his mother’s womb | Untimely 
ripp’d’ (15–16). Moreover, the disjunction between ‘desire’ and ‘performance’, on 
which the Porter’s lewd gag is based, is the very disjunction pondered by Macbeth 
in the opening scenes of the play. Does he dare to enact his desires and commit 
regicide? He reflects on the painful gap between ‘desire’ and ‘performance’ through 
something of a self-equivocation:  
  
 If it were done when ’tis done, then ’twere well  
 It were done quickly: if th’assassination  
 Could trammel up the consequence, and catch 
 With his surcease success […]. 
 (I. 7. 1–4) 
 
As Frank Kermode writes, Macbeth’s language here enacts the ‘dizzying gap 
between thought and deed’,33 or that between desire and performance; the repetition 
of the past tense, ‘done’, implies that he has already made up his mind.   
 It could be argued that this is a case of the hungover clown’s patter 
undermining the seriousness of the main action by travestying its concerns—
                                                
33 Shakespeare’s Language (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2000), p. 206.  
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perhaps the play is, after all, merely letting off steam through the safety valve of 
comedy. But this is not the case, because the play’s main concerns are themselves 
recurrently expressed, implicitly and explicitly, though the phallic imagery and 
metaphors that also find expression in the Porter’s extemporisation. Consider 
Macbeth’s reflection: 
      I have no spur  
  To prick the sides of my intent, but only  
 Vaulting ambition, which o’erleaps itself  
  And falls on th’other.  
(I. 7. 25–28)  
 
When Lady Macbeth goads her husband to murder Duncan—‘When you durst do 
it, then you were a man; | And, to be more than what you were, you would | Be so 
much more the man’ (I. 7. 49–51)—she connects virility with Macbeth’s notable 
capacity for atrocious violence. Elsewhere in the play, she needles him by 
suggestively eliding social ‘ambition’ (I. 5. 19) with his physical strength and 
virility. In fact, it is Lady Macbeth who sets up the disjunction between ‘desire’ and 
‘performance’ that the Porter will later play on. ‘Art thou afeard | To be the same in 
thine own act and valour | As thou art in desire?’ (I. 7. 39–41), she asks her husband. 
When, moments before the ‘Porter of Hell Gate’ scene, she accuses Macbeth of 
being flaccid, ‘infirm of purpose’ (II. 7. 51) for feeling remorse at killing Duncan, 
the dramatic relevance of the Porter’s digressive improvisation is immediately 
apparent.  
 Since the term did not come into being until 1825, it is hardly surprising that 
this play fails to conform to the theory of comic relief.34 Far from offering relief 
from its central concerns and obsessive imagery, the Porter’s demotic patter 
reiterates them in such a way as to imply that the concerns of the serious world are 
themselves risible. Shakespeare uses the Porter’s brand of black comedy to provide 
a commentary on the dangerous desires and fatal misconceptions that govern the 
behaviour of the play’s protagonists. The serious point of this humour is that it 
exposes the absurdity of such desires and conceptions; to borrow a phrase from the 
Porter’s speech, comic interludes in Shakespeare give ‘the lie’ to the serious world.  
 Wise fools, in contrast, commonly offer a critique of their world that has 
resonances far beyond it; consider Touchstone’s digressive aria in response to 
                                                
34 OED, quoted in Hornback, The English Clown Tradition, pp. 12–13. 
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Corin’s simple question: ‘And how like you this shepherd’s life, Master 
Touchstone?’ (As You Like It, III. 2. 11–12), which confounds reason even as it 
offers a ‘philosophy’ of sorts: 
 
 TOUCHSTONE Truly, shepherd, in respect of itself, it is a good life; 
  but in respect that it is a shepherd’s life, it is naught. In respect that it 
  is solitary, I like it very well; but in respect that it is private, it is a  
  very vile life. Now in  respect it is in the fields, it pleaseth me well; 
  but in respect it is not in court, it is tedious. As a spare life, look you, 
  it fits my humour well; but as there is no more plenty in it, it goes  
  much against my stomach. Hast any philosophy in thee, shepherd?  
(12–20)  
 
This exuberant nonsense perhaps recalls the mock-philosophical dialogues between 
Strepsiades and a travesty of Socrates in Aristophanes’ The Clouds, a comedy in 
which a farcical philosopher attempts to educate a rustic in the subtleties of natural 
philosophy, poetry and law. While Touchstone may fail to answer Corin clearly, he 
wastes time brilliantly, liberating the audience on stage and off from the ‘briers’ by 
which, as Rosalind accurately remarks, life in the ‘working-day world’ (As You Like 
It, I. 3. 9–10) is beset.  
 Touchstone’s inspired gibberish parodies the relativism that is inherent in 
attempts at precise definition. It is a deft sideswipe at dogmatic philosophers of all 
times. Sebastian Brandt, Erasmus and Sidney, in his seriocomic masterpiece of 
literary theory, An Apology for Poetry,35 all ridicule philosophy’s tendency towards 
conceptually arid formalism, and I shall return to Shakespeare’s critique of such 
formalism in my reading of Hamlet. Because Touchstone’s opinion, what he is 
‘truly’ stating, is obfuscated by his attempt to achieve clarity through definition, and 
because this ‘parody appears to make distinctions where none really exist and 
exaggerates their number’,36 this spate of quibbling makes a mockery of definition. 
Its humour lies in the incongruity between the response’s spurious pseudo-scholastic 
form and the simplicity of the question posed.  
 This wise fool’s ironic relativism, moreover, hints at his role within the play. 
A touchstone, as Kiernan Ryan explains, is ‘a substance used to test the quality of 
gold and silver alloys rubbed upon it, and the fool in As You Like It serves 
                                                
35 See The Shyppe of Fooles, trans. by Alexander Barclay (London: Wynky[n] de Worde, 1509), pp. 4–5 
(et passim); PF, p. 10; An Apology for Poetry, pp. 89–90. 
36 Peter Mack, Reading and Rhetoric in Montaigne and Shakespeare (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), p. 86. 
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figuratively as a touchstone for the credibility and values of the diverse viewpoints 
the play presents us with’.37 Touchstone’s tireless shifting of perspectives 
epitomises the polyphonic interplay of antithetical intentions and opinions voiced by 
the protagonists and antagonists in Shakespeare’s drama. The myth that 
Touchstone’s critical quibbling humorously disenchants is the myth of the 
significance and necessity of philosophical method: the punchline of his mockery of 
man’s drive for absolute conceptual clarity though rigorous definition is: ‘Hast any 
philosophy in thee, shepherd?’ 
 In fact, the discourse of folly recurrently employs the foolish citation of 
authoritative authors or discourses to make a mockery of them; Rabelais’ 
Gargantua and Pantagruel furnishes the reader with an illuminating example of 
this. At a stroke, Rabelais scatologically debases Scholastic seriousness and, with it, 
the profundity of Scholastic philosophy as a discourse. Concluding his cod-
academic discussion about the youthful Gargantua’s precise experimentation with 
the best thing to wipe one’s arse on, which, it transpires, is ‘the neck of a goose’ 
(GP, Book 1, Chapter, XIII, p. 57), the narrator bolsters the Prince’s scientific 
findings by commenting: ‘such is the opinion of Master John of Scotland, aliàs 
Scotus’ (GP, Book 1, Chapter, XIII, p. 57).  
Theoretical Introduction 
 
 This thesis is not the only study to hinge on the idea implicit in Posthumous’ 
epanalepsis: ‘Or senseless speaking, or a speaking such | As sense cannot untie’. 
After all, it is the very ‘stuff’ that ‘madmen | Tongue and brain not’—or at least, the 
‘experience’ (HM, p. xxx) thereof—that Foucault attempts to reconstruct in his 1961 
study, History of Madness (Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique), which is premised 
on the notion that ‘there can be no reason without madness’ (HM, p. xxv), no 
reasonable utterance without ‘senseless speaking’. While Erasmus, Montaigne and 
Shakespeare are all at pains to point out that there is nothing more foolish than 
considering oneself wise, Foucault’s study argues that the assertion of one’s sanity 
always reveals a trace of insanity. With reference to Pascal, he concerns himself with 
‘that “other trick” that madness plays—that “other trick” through which men, in a 
gesture of sovereign reason […] lock up their neighbour [and] communicate and 
                                                
37 Shakespeare’s Comedies (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), p. 213.  
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recognize each other in the merciless language of non-madness’ (HM., p. xxvii). 
Like any act of categorisation, identifying someone as insane is, in a sense, 
irrational. Not only does it place an absolute faith in the powers of ‘sense’ to gain 
mastery over that which, by definition, it cannot understand, but it also fails to 
recognise that, as Montaigne reflects in the opening pages of his Essays, ‘man is a 
wonderful, vaine, divers, and wavering subject: it is very hard to ground any 
directly-constant and uniforme judgement upon him’ (E, Book 1, Chapter 1, p. 2). 
Absolute standards are at odds with the intermittency of being.  
 At its core, Shakespeare’s interest in the paradoxical wisdom of folly, which 
is evident from the earliest plays to the last, is based on the idea that putting one’s 
faith in the certainties, categories and fictions of unitary identity, which it is in 
authority’s best interest to maintain, is an act of folie—a word with a semantic range 
that encompasses both madness and folly. The political and philosophical clout of 
Shakespeare’s ‘witless wisdom’38 lies in its capacity to estrange the everyday world 
by exposing the serious as ridiculous, the sincere as insincere, and laughter as a very 
important matter indeed:  
 
 The philosophy of Clowns is the philosophy that in every epoch shows up as 
 doubtful: what has been regarded as most certain; it reveals the contradictions 
 inherent in what seems to have been proved by visual experience; it holds up 
 to ridicule what seems obvious common sense, and discovers truth in the 
 absurd.39  
 
Shakespeare’s representation of folly does not simply turn the rational world topsy-
turvy, as is commonly assumed. Rather, by breaking causal patterns and 
interrogating the formation of meaning, it furnishes the reader with perspectives that 
tear holes in the fabric of the wisdom of the world.  
 In order to fathom the philosophical vision of a writer, who reflects with his 
tongue in his cheek: ‘Alas, ’tis true I have gone here and there, | And made myself a 
motley to the view’ (‘Sonnet 110’, 1–2), this thesis brings Renaissance folly into 
dialogue with a subterranean tradition of western thought that has, hitherto, neither 
been the subject of philosophical analysis, nor brought into dialogue with 
Shakespeare’s philosophy. This way of thinking runs from the philosopher-fool, 
                                                
38 Ryan, Shakespeare’s Comedies, p. 94.  
39 Leszek Kołakowski, quoted in Jan Kott, Shakespeare Our Contemporary (New York: Norton, 1974), p. 
165. 
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Socrates, through to Montaigne and on to Nietzsche, but it ultimately finds its most 
sustained expression in the anti-theoretical philosophies of Foucault and Adorno. 
Far from fashioning watertight theoretical systems, these thinkers share a playful 
and paradoxical awareness that ‘the truth of ideas is bound up with the possibility of 
their being wrong, the possibility of their failure’ (M, p. 144).  This diverse group of 
thinkers shares a striking capacity for a sort of negative capability; the condition of 
being in uncertainty, they suggest, is philosophically valid, whereas insisting on the 
universality of one’s systems, categories and identities is intellectually indefensible.    
 In Minima Moralia: Reflections on Damaged Life, the fragmented, aphoristic 
form of which embodies its suspicion of totalising philosophies, Adorno suggests 
that it is the dialectician’s role to enable the expression of the disquieting ideas 
latent in the fool’s loquacious utterance, an utterance that picks up on the 
nonsensical elements in the serious world’s assumptions, cherished discourses, 
concepts and institutions: 
 
 The dialectic cannot stop short before the concepts of health and sickness, 
 nor indeed before their siblings, reason and unreason. Once it has recognised 
 the universal ruling order and its proportions as sick […] then it can see as 
 healing cells only what appears, by the measures of that order, as itself sick, 
 eccentric, paranoid—indeed, ‘mad’ [verrückt]; it is true today, as in the 
 Middle Ages, that only fools tell their masters the truth. The dialectician’s 
 duty is thus to  help this fool’s truth to attain its own reason, without which it 
 will freely succumb to the abyss of sickness implacably dictated by the 
 healthy common sense of the rest.  
       (MM, pp. 81–82; [MM, p. 73])  
 
Folly refuses to operate according to norms. Rather, as Adorno writes in Negative 
Dialectics: ‘Folly is truth in the form by which people are struck when, in the midst 
of untruth, they will not abandon truth’ (ND, p. 396 [ND, p. 404]). In other words, 
the paradoxical wisdom of folly expresses a negative truth, exposing the untruths 
that constitute the wholesome certainties upon which the workaday world depends.  
 The significance of Adorno’s claim should not be underestimated. The fool’s 
truth recalls the critical, rather than systematising, impulse of ‘modern philosophy’, 
a ‘practice which’, for Foucault, ‘finds its function of truth in the criticism of 
illusion, deception, trickery and flattery’ (GSO, pp. 353–354). The dialectics to 
which Adorno alludes are, of course, the negative dialectics with which his name is 
associated. In contrast to traditional dialectics, negative dialectics does not attempt 
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to subsume two discrete identities into a larger one. Instead, it discovers the inner 
contradictions of supposedly stable identities and immutable categories. Negative 
dialectics provides a way of understanding the peculiar philosophical movement of 
the paradoxical wisdom of folly, a way of understanding how the wisdom of folly 
lies primarily in its capacity to expose the contradictions inherent in the concepts, 
ideas and values of the prevailing order.   
 Characterising the fool as a critical theorist avant la lettre, however, is not 
unproblematic. As Jan Kott reflects: 
 
 The position of a jester is ambiguous and abounds in internal contradictions 
 arising out of the discrepancy between his profession and his philosophy. The 
 profession of a jester, like that of an intellectual, consists in providing 
 entertainment. His philosophy demands of him that he tell the truth and 
 abolish myths.40  
 
Standing outside of the pseudo-truths of everyday life, which continue to blinker 
the wise and the foolish alike, fools and poets neither peddle enduring, metaphysical 
truths, nor expound their ideas in humourless treatises. Rather, as Foucault writes, 
the ‘words of the poet’ are akin to those of the ‘madman’ because they ‘unceasingly 
renew the power of their strangeness and the strength of their contestation’; they 
inhabit an area ‘on the outer edge of our culture and at the point nearest its essential 
divisions’.41 The poet and the fool reside on the extreme edge of reason’s domain. 
They are outsiders looking in: ‘The lunatic, the lover, and the poet | Are of 
imagination all compact’ (A Midsummer Night’s Dream, V. 1. 7–8).  
 Since it refuses to make claims to authority, Shakespeare’s foolery offers a 
passive resistance to the powers that be. As Tim Prentki writes, ‘In Foucauldian 
terms, [fools] are not seeking an authority for their position and therefore are not 
concerned with the discourses of power through which human life is conducted’.42 
Put simply, folly undoes the logic of mastery that is implicit in any claim to 
certainty. A ‘fool’s truth’ is, after all, spoken by a fool and, concomitantly, retains a 
playful awareness that it might be wrong. Richard Wilson is correct, therefore, to 
                                                
40 Kott, p. 119.  
41 The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. by anon. (Basingstoke: Routledge, 
2002; repr. 2012), p. 55.  
42 The Fool in European Theatre: Stages of Folly (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), p. 1.  
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detect a ‘radical passivity’ at work in ‘Shakespearean fooling’.43 Indeed, as the 
readings of the plays in the second half of this thesis illustrate, the purposeful 
purposelessness of the fool’s utterance stages within the plays something of the 
critical capacity of representation: ‘full oft we see | Cold wisdom waiting on 
superfluous folly’ (All’s Well that Ends Well, I. 1. 99–100 [my emphasis]). What is 
philosophically important about the critical capacity of representation is its refusal 
to assert its authority. It does not declare that it is right or true. As Chapter 2 shows, 
literature’s disinclination to tell anything other than a fool’s truth is of considerable 
importance to More’s Utopia and Erasmus’ Praise of Folly. While these works 
manifestly attack the dubious truths of the serious world, two fools, Raphael 
Hythloday and Stultitia, voice More’s and Erasmus’ sustained critical and reflexive 
thought.    
Erasmian Roots? A Critical Model 
 
For Claudia Corti, Shakespeare’s interest in folly is of a specifically Erasmian 
provenance:  
 
 It is widely known that the figure of the Fool dominates Shakespeare’s 
 theatre, in a measure unknown in other Elizabethan or Jacobean dramatists, 
 and that the nature of folly lies at the heart of Shakespeare’s message. Yet, 
 the source of Shakespearean folly is to be found not in the plangent laments 
 or angry denunciations of foolishness made ready by a notable series of 
 sixteenth and seventeenth-century serious writers and pamphleteers, but the 
 lambent ironies […] with which Erasmus’ Moria and Chaloner’s Folie 
 describe their own true nature.44   
 
The Dutchman has a much greater role in Shakespeare’s drama than merely a bit 
part in Sir Thomas More. Although the influence of Erasmus’ Praise, Adages and 
Colloquies on Shakespeare’s plays warrants further study, in this thesis I concern 
myself with fathoming the intellectual kinship of the Renaissance’s greatest 
playwright with its greatest humanists, Erasmus and Montaigne. The ways of 
understanding the world and expressing their sceptical wisdom that these thinkers 
share is considered at length in Chapters 2 and 3.  
                                                
43 Free Will: Art and Power on Shakespeare’s Stage (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), p. 
11.  
44 ‘Erasmus’ Folly and Shakespeare’s Fools’, in Silenos: Erasmus in Elizabethan Literature, ed. by 
Claudia Corti, Studi di Letterature Moderne e Comparate, 1 (Pisa: Pancini, 1998), pp. 13–31 (p. 25).  
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 However, in order to clarify the way that the multifaceted concept of folly 
provides these humanists with a position from which they can philosophise without 
asserting their own authority, it is necessary to provide a working model of how this 
thesis views Shakespeare’s intellectual affinities with Erasmus and Montaigne. In 
‘That A Man Should not Communicate his Glorie’, the latter writes: 
 
 Of all the follies of the world, the most universall, and of most men received, 
 is the care of reputation and study of glorie, to which we are so wedded that 
 we neglect and cast-off riches, friends, repose, life and health (goods 
 effectuall and substantiall), to follow that vaine image, and idlie-simple 
 voice, which hath neither body nor hold-fast. 
       (E, Book 1, Chapter 41, p. 137) 
 
For Montaigne, in Florio’s rendering, concern for one’s glory is the greatest of all 
the ‘follies of the world’. What is significant about this use of the word is that he is 
effectively using folly as a synonym for ideology—an illusion that compels people 
into action; and as Chapter 2 establishes, this is what the word stultitia comes to 
signify in the satirical second section of Praise of Folly.  
 Although it is not included in Geoffrey Bullough’s compendious collection 
of sources and analogues for 1&2 Henry IV, Erasmus’ colloquy, ‘A Knight Without 
a Horse, or Faked Nobility’, not only ‘provides a paradigm for Falstaff’s nature’45 
and is, perhaps, directly evoked when Hal describes him as ‘uncolted’ (1 Henry IV, 
II. 2. 35), but it also uses irony to question the concept of honour in a manner not 
dissimilar to Shakespeare. In any case, this intertextuality is a striking example of 
Erasmus’ and Shakespeare’s sceptical detachment from passive and dogmatic 
adherence to the values of the past.  
 ‘A Knight Without a Horse’ takes the form of a playful discussion. Nestor 
will tell Harpalus how to simulate being a knight so long as the former will tell him 
why he wants to be a knight in the first place. The reason he gives is ‘Simply that 
knights do as they please and get away with it’ (CWE, 40, p. 887). The satire in this 
piece operates on two levels. First and foremost, it is a satire on what passes for 
nobility: ‘Unless you’re a good dicer, a skilful card player, an infamous 
whoremonger, a heavy drinker, a reckless spendthrift, a wastrel, heavily in debt, 
decorated with the French pox, hardly anyone will believe you are a knight’ (CWE, 
40, p. 884), advises Nestor.  
                                                
45 Kaiser, p. 210. 
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 Falstaff’s tongue-in-cheek reflections about his virtue echo this comment 
quite closely: 
 
  I was as virtuously given as a gentleman need to be: virtuous enough; swore 
 little; diced not—above seven times a week; went to a bawdy-house—not 
 above once in a quarter—of an hour; paid money that I borrowed—three or 
 four times; lived well, and in good compass. And now I live out of all order, 
 out of all compass. 
(1 Henry IV, III. 3. 12–17) 
 
While he pays lip-service to some sort of ‘order’, the qualifications attached to each 
statement ensure this ‘order’ is that of the mundus inversus. In this period, the word 
‘compass’ was polysemous. It signified the mariner’s compass and thus, 
metonymically, the instrumental rationality that sought to control nature;46 the 
‘circuit’ or ‘revolution’ of time, which is clearly a concern of Shakespeare’s 
histories;47 man’s limitations; and ‘a crafty artifice or design’.48 In the latter usage, it 
primarily signifies something within a reasonable measure or of ‘proper 
proportion’.49 It expresses an aesthetic concern with ‘proper proportion’ and links it 
with the domination of the world. As I shall argue at length in Chapter 4, Falstaff’s 
conception of proportion, which is based on his reprobate life, makes a mockery of 
the concepts of ‘compass’ and ‘order’.  
 Erasmus’ second satirical technique in this colloquy, which inverts ‘the 
doctrines of the courtesy books’ (‘Introduction’, CWE, 40, pp. 880–881 [p. 881]), is 
to use the structures of an unreflexive, ideologically passive genre ironically. Any 
wastrel can emulate this depleted form of nobility. To do so is desirable, because it 
enables one to live outside the very social conventions that chivalry is supposed to 
support. The modern knight wrongs rights, rather than righting wrongs. Harpalus is 
proud that he can ‘change’ his ‘countenance as easily as a mask’ (CWE, 40, p. 883) 
and realizes—like Falstaff, Prince Hal and his father—that ‘Reputation is the best 
substitute for reality’ (CWE, 40, p. 881). This has a decidedly comic aspect, since 
                                                
46 OED., definition no. 4a. 
47 Ibid., definition nos. 3a, b. 
48 Ibid., definition nos. 9a,  2a, b.  
49 Ibid., definition no. 1.  
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‘The exchange of identity is easy for the clown because he refuses to take seriously 
any discriminations of rank, status or individuality’.50  
 Combining an image of agrarian labour with one of atrocity, Harpalus 
designs an heraldic symbol based on his cutting of geese’s throats and even 
composes his own Falstaffian motto: ‘Cast all the dice’ (CWE, 40, p. 883). Nestor 
reflects that ‘the fundamental principle of knighthood must always be maintained: 
  
 For a knight to relieve a common traveller of his money is both just and right. 
 What’s more outrageous than for a vulgar trader to be rich while a knight 
 hasn’t enough to spend on whores and dice? 
 (CWE, 40, p. 885) 
 
Insofar as it consists of members of the nobility robbing the upwardly mobile, the 
robbery in 1 Henry IV follows the logic of this comment.  
 In ‘A Knight Without a Horse’, honour is pervasively associated with a 
calculable kind of debt. Indeed, this colloquy is the main source of Rabelais’ 
trickster Panurge’s famous praise of debt, in which debt is viewed as the basis of 
human existence and the essential principle of the universe (see GP, Book 3, 
Chapter 3, pp. 309–313). When Hal asks Falstaff, ‘Sirrah, do I owe you a thousand 
pound?’, Falstaff shamelessly invokes man’s debt to God, responding: ‘A thousand 
pound, Hal? A million! Thy love is worth a million; thou owest me thy love’ (III. 3. 
125–26), a comment that echoes St. Paul’s injunction: ‘Owe nothing to any man, but 
to love one another; for he that loveth another, hath fulfilled the Law’ (Geneva, 
Romans, 13. 8). While Falstaff’s comment reminds one that ‘Neither men nor their 
lives are measured by the Ell’ (E, Book 1, Chapter, 19, p. 39), his evocation of 
Paul’s authoritative discourse undermines it.  
 Elsewhere in the plays, Shakespeare assaults the petrified ideal of honour by 
linking it to the inglorious world of exchange. Hal aims to have Hotspur’s honour 
transferred to him:  
 
 For every honour sitting on his helm,  
 Would they were multitudes, and on my head  
 My shames redoubled; for the time will come  
 That I shall make this northern youth exchange  
 His glorious deeds for my indignities.  
                                                
50 Bristol, Carnival and Theater: Plebeian Culture and the Structure of Authority in Renaissance England 
(New York: Methuen, 1985), p. 140.  
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 Percy is but my factor, good my lord, 
 To engross up glorious deeds on my behalf;  
 And I will call him to so strict account, 
 That he shall render every glory up. 
(1 Henry IV, III. 2. 142–150) 
 
Because of his dissembled illness, Northumberland considers his ‘honour is at 
pawn’ (2 Henry IV, II. 3. 7); Morton describes the Archbishop of York as ‘a man | 
Who with double surety binds his followers’ (I. 1. 189–90), since the Archbishop is 
‘followed both with body and with mind’ (202). His vocation is significant only in 
so far as it gives him credit with those he commands. Even Henry’s crusade is not a 
battle to win back the ‘Holy Land’ from the infidel, but a cynical strategy with a 
specific aim: ‘Be it thy course to busy giddy minds | With foreign quarrels, that 
action hence borne out | May waste the memory of former days’ (2 Henry IV, IV. 3. 
338, 341–3).  
 Something approaching a genuinely honourable intention in the play comes 
from a surprising source, the outwardly unpromising Feeble: 
 
            FEEBLE       By my troth, I care not. A man can die but once. We owe God 
  a death. I’ll ne’er bear a base mind. An’t be my destiny, so; an’t be  
  not, so. No man’s too good to serve’s prince. And let it go which way 
  it will, he that dies this year is quit for the next. 
(2 Henry IV, III. 2. 216–20) 
 
While voicing a conventional fatalism, the quiet fortitude of this marginal plebeian 
character contrasts favourably with the ruling elite’s instrumental use of honour. 
Although he anticipates Hamlet’s philosophical resolution—‘We defy augury. 
There is special providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be, ’tis not to come. If it be 
not to come, it will be now. If not now, yet it will come. The readiness is all […]’ 
(V. 2. 197–200)—Feeble’s comment has been ignored. This replicates a 
misapprehension Shakespeare seeks to disabuse his audience of: namely, the 
association of honour almost exclusively with the ruling classes. Feeble’s statement 
is at odds with the temporality of the rest of the play, which lies in the ‘hollow of 
history: a time predominantly of recollection and anticipation’.51 With something of 
Pyrrho’s pig about him, Feeble is neither haunted by illusions of past honours, nor 
                                                
51 Jonathan Baldo, Memory in Shakespeare’s Histories: Stages of Forgetting in Early Modern England 
(London: Routledge, 2012), p. 74.  
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perplexed by worries about his future as the princes and the rebels of the Second 
Tetralogy are.  
 It is through the discourse of folly that what is elsewhere implied about the 
idea of honour is made explicit. The estranged and estranging perspective of the 
utterly unheroic and anti-heroic Falstaff conspicuously lacks Feeble’s resolution: 
 
 FALSTAFF I would ’twere bed-time, Hal, and all well.  
 PRINCE HARRY Why, thou owest God a death.  
    [Exit] 
 FALSTAFF  ’Tis not due yet. I would be loath to pay him before his day.  
  What need I be so forward with him that calls not on me? Well, ’tis 
  no matter; honour pricks me on. Yea, but how if honour prick me off 
  when I come on? How then? Can honour set to a leg? No. Or an arm? 
  No. Or take away the grief of a wound? No. Honour hath no skill in 
  surgery, then? No. What is honour? A word. What is in that  
  word ‘honour’? What is that ‘honour’? Air. A trim reckoning! Who 
  hath it? He that died o’Wednesday. Doth he feel it? No. Doth he hear 
  it? No ’Tis insensible then. Yea, to the dead. But will it not live with 
  the living? No. Why? Detraction will not suffer it. Therefore I’ll none 
  of it. Honour is a mere scutcheon. And so ends my catechism. 
          (1 Henry IV, V. 1. 126–139)
   
Falstaff’s mastery of language illustrates language’s mastery over us. Having 
exposed the history of honour’s significance, Falstaff’s ‘catechism’ reveals how 
suffering is caused by ossified ideals, ideals that have become so debased through 
exchange that they are mere ‘air’. Like other abstract concepts, honour lacks, as 
Montaigne puts it, ‘a hold fast’ or a concrete referent. Because it is based on the 
shifting sands of opinion, and contingent upon an account of events penned by the 
winner, there is no such thing as ‘undying honour’. It is clear from their attitudes 
towards honour that Falstaff, Erasmus and Montaigne share ‘an exceptional ability 
to tell truths that others deny—or ignore’;52 and as the following chapters illustrate, 
the philosophical significance of foolosophy—its peculiar rationality—lies in its 
critical capacity to tell the truth about the identities, values, concepts and categories 
that received wisdom takes for granted. In this respect, the paradoxical wisdom of 
folly disenchants the ‘falschen Himmeln’ or ‘false heavens’ that good sense 
fashions.  
 
                                                
52 Herbert Weil, ‘Montaigne and Falstaff’, Shakespeare Newsletter, 58 (2008), 49–70 (p. 49).  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT OF SHAKESPEARE’S FOLLY 
 
 There is in human nature generally more of the fool than of the wise; and 
 therefore those faculties by which the foolish part of men’s minds is taken are 
 most potent. 
       —Francis Bacon53 
 
 The riddles of God are more satisfying than the solutions of man. 
         —G. K. Chesterton54 
 
Not least because of the generative constraints of his dramatic form, Shakespeare 
seldom seems to explicitly endorse one worldview over another. The ideas and 
assumptions that tacitly govern each play are accessible not so much through what 
certain characters say, but more through the cracks in meaning, the ironies, 
paradoxes and riddling ambiguities that occur in dialogue. It is no accident that the 
discourse of folly is vitally attuned to this play of ideas, since it is through this 
discourse that Shakespeare exposes the mutability of the way things are. In this 
respect, ‘He uses his folly like a stalking-horse, and under the presentation of that he 
shoots his wit’ (As You Like It, V. 4. 95–6). This ‘wit’ lies, primarily, in how he 
suggests that the way things are could be more accurately understood as the way 
they seem to be. He does so both through the dazzling techniques of explicit foolery 
considered in Chapter 1 and through various strategies of ironic subversion that are 
best perceived in the context of comparable techniques of estrangement that 
Erasmus, More and Montaigne employ. Owing to their intrinsically playful 
character, the great texts of Renaissance folly generate mesmerizing unresolved 
ironies and ambiguities that continue to baffle dominant constructions of reason, 
custom and identity.  
 One example that clarifies the way that governing assumptions come to the 
fore through cracks in meaning is furnished by an exchange between a servant and 
her mistress in The Merchant of Venice:  
                                                
53 ‘Of Boldness’, in The Major Works, ed. by Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 
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54 ‘The Book of Job’, in On Lying in Bed and Other Essays, ed. by Alberto Manguel (Calgary: Bayeux 
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39 
 
 PORTIA By my troth, Nerissa, my little body is aweary of this  
  great world. 
 NERISSA You would be, sweet madam, if your miseries were in the  
  same abundance as your good fortunes are; and yet, for aught I see, 
  they are as sick that surfeit with too much as they that starve with  
  nothing. It is no mean happiness, therefore, to be seated in the mean. 
  Superfluity comes sooner by white hairs, but competency lives  
  longer. 
          (I. 2. 1–8) 
 
Like the psychic tribulations of some modern starlet, Portia’s fashionable ennui is a 
consequence of her over-privileged life. Nerissa points this out through a paradox: 
‘they are as sick that surfeit with too much as they that starve with nothing’. This 
rephrases Portia’s listless depression in physical terms, implying that she is absurdly 
pretentious by pointing out that there are plenty of people in the world who have the 
real problem of survival to contend with.  
 However, this is more than clownish backchat. The servant’s comment—‘It 
is no mean happiness to be seated in the mean’— invokes the concept of the ‘golden 
mean, without which there can be nothing in human affairs that is honorable, or 
enjoyable, or admirable’ (CWE, 32, p. 230), a concept that originates in Aristotle, 
and was appropriated by humanists like Erasmus. The wisdom of this exchange is 
dissonant. On the one hand, it offers a social critique, implying that melancholy is a 
sickness of ‘surfeit’. As Robert Burton puts it: ‘Nothing begets’ melancholy 
‘sooner, increaseth it and continueth it oftener than idleness’.55 On the other, it 
affirms the customary wisdom about the ‘golden mean’, but a marginal character 
cites this received wisdom for the express purpose of debunking her mistress’s self-
obsession.     
 In Shakespeare’s works, the dynamic, dialectical play of complex opinions 
and worldviews is never forced into a coherent synthesis. Many studies of 
Shakespeare’s engagement with the philosophies of his time, however, emphasize 
one tacit philosophical stance within a work at the expense of other, often 
contradictory, ideas apparent in the same play—a study concerned with 
Shakespeare’s stoicism, for instance, is unlikely to give much credence to his 
epicurean views. Such approaches are liable to stultify the drama’s innate dynamism 
by extracting, isolating and imposing a synthesis on its ephemeral movements, 
                                                
55 The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. by Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicholas K. Kiessling and Rhonda L. Blair, 3 
vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989–1994), I, p. 243.  
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movements in which a philosophical standpoint becomes apparent within the play’s 
composite interplay of ideas, opinions and ironies. To wrest one voice from a play’s 
dialogue, petrify this opinion, and suggest that it encapsulates the philosophical 
standpoint of the play as a whole is akin to reducing an orchestral symphony to the 
horn line alone. ‘We murder to dissect’.56   
 Needless to say, my study is guilty of over-emphasizing its topic too. This 
could perhaps be excused, however, on the grounds that hitherto Shakespeare’s folly 
has been regarded as philosophically insignificant, despite its evident centrality to 
the philosophical vision of other Renaissance writers. A better apology for this, 
however, can be offered on the grounds that folly is not simply a theme in the plays, 
or a worldview that occasionally comes to the fore and challenges the dominance of 
reason. Rather, what Shakespeare and his fellow philosophers of folly—Erasmus, 
More, Rabelais, Montaigne, Jonson and Cervantes—found intriguing about it was 
how it made certain modes of thinking and forms of writing possible. The 
paradoxical wisdom of folly is, after all, the possibility of the impossible.  
 Surprisingly, there has hitherto been no comprehensive comparative study of 
Erasmus’ Praise and Shakespeare’s works. This chapter opens by contending that 
the best way of grasping Shakespeare’s philosophy of folly is to enlist the help of 
Erasmus’ Stultitia; moreover, this thesis as a whole examines her role in 
Shakespeare’s comedies, histories and tragedies as both a direct influence on his 
drama and as an embodiment of a mode of thought that Erasmus and Shakespeare 
share. When we trace the metamorphosis of this character, we find that her three 
avatars correspond, albeit roughly, with the three main ways in which Shakespeare’s 
dramatization of folly offers philosophical insights, which have retained their 
piquancy for over four hundred years. Through a reading of Thomas More’s Utopia, 
I consider a tension at the heart of the discourse of folly: between a worldly 
pragmatism that punctures pretensions—such as Nerissa’s—and the kind of 
idealism that refuses to sully itself by involvement in the absurdities of the sane 
world, a disinterested stance advocated by medieval mystics, Pico and Erasmus’ 
holy fools. The chapter ends with an extended analysis of how Erasmian themes and 
theories of writing are expressed in Montaigne’s Essays—in particular, his 
                                                
56 William Wordsworth, ‘The Tables Turned’, in William Wordsworth: Poetical Works, ed. by Thomas 
Hutchinson, rev. ed. by Ernest de Selincourt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 377.  
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‘Apologie of Raymond Sebond’, ‘Of Custom’, ‘Of Canniballs’ and ‘Of 
Experience’—and can be discerned in Shakespeare. Unlike Erasmus’ considerable 
effect on Shakespeare’s friend and collaborator, Ben Jonson,57 his influence on 
Shakespeare is far from clear. 
Stultitia’s Metamorphosis 
 
There are three avatars of Erasmus’ Stultitia. In the first section of the Praise of 
Folly (1511), she undertakes a carnivalesque levelling of the differences that divide 
humanity by pointing out the physical nature its members share before arguing to 
the end that: ‘No profit grows where is no pleasure ta’en’ (The Taming of the Shrew, 
I. 1. 38). In the second, she caustically attacks the hypocrisy and venality of the 
powers that be. In the third, she morphs into a Christian fool, extolling the folly of 
the cross. Her first avatar turns ‘diseases to commodity’ (2 Henry IV, I. 2. 243), 
suggesting that were it not for humanity’s universal folly, life would not be worth 
living.58  
 She celebrates mankind’s shared corporeality and flaws, beginning by asking 
her audience to give her the licence speak freely: ‘bestowe on me your eares […] 
not those eares that ye carie to sermons, but those ye geue to plaiers, to iesters, and 
to fools’ (PF, p. 8); she contends that she is ‘the distraibtrix and dealer of all 
felicitee’ (PF, p. 8). Launching into a mock genealogy, she contends that her father 
is Plutus, the ‘golden god of riches […] at whose onely becke as aforetymes, so now 
also, bothe holy and vnholy thynges be tourned topset turuie’ (PF, p. 11): 
unsurprisingly the events of Jonson’s satire Volpone, which is indebted to the Praise 
of Folly and was performed by the King’s Men in 1605, revolve around mankind’s 
insatiable desire for gold, ‘the world’s soul’ (I. 1. 3). But the tantalizing dance of 
capital is not the only thing that beguiles humankind. So too do Stultita’s 
‘handmaides’, who include ‘Selfeloue’,59  ‘Voluptuousnes’ and ‘Dronkenes’ (PF, p. 
                                                
57 Jonson’s most obvious engagement with the Praise of Folly occurs in Volpone. The trickster Mosca 
sumuarises it in his song, which starts: ‘Fools, they are the only nation | Worth men’s envy or 
admiration’ (Volpone, I. 2. 66–67). See Ben Jonson, The Alchemist and Other Plays, ed. by Gordon 
Campbell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; repr. 2008); subsequent quotations are given in the 
text. See also Peter G. Bietenholz, Encounters with a Radical Erasmus: Erasmus’ Work as a Source of 
Radical Thought in Early Modern Europe (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 116–122.  
58 Ibid., pp. 51–84.   
59 ‘Selfloue’ is the foremost of Stultitia’s ‘handmaides’. In his adage, ‘Philautoi’, Erasmus observes: ‘it 
[self-love] is a deeply rooted fault which makes people approve of everything belonging to 
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11). By her own estimation at least, she is ‘the geuer of all thynges to all men’ (PF, 
p.14)—a comment that recalls Paul’s observation that God ‘giveth to all life, and 
breath, and all things’ (KJV, Acts 17. 25). In discussing the universal illusion in 
which mankind is duped by Stultitia, she evokes what, for Erasmus and for 
Christians of all times, is the necessary condition for the existence of reality, God’s 
Grace. In copious style, she delineates the ways in which all actions, institutions and 
ideologies are beholden to her. They are all premised on the illusion that man 
possesses control of things, that he has the power to act independently, and that 
what he does is cosmically significant.   
 The truth, according to Stultita in the first part of her sermon joyeux, is quite 
the contrary: from birth to death, life consists of the flourishing of certain follies. 
Childhood is foolish, as is adolescence, and so too is manhood. The wiser a man 
becomes, ‘the lesse and lesse he liveth’ (PF, p. 15). Too much reading, she suggests, 
is liable to make one repress the bodily drives that make everyone tick. Old age, 
during which man becomes ‘vrksome to others […] and hateful also to hym selfe’ 
(PF, p. 15), follows this decline; and no one could bear this, were it not for folly. It 
is only by ‘becom[ing] childisshe again’ that the elderly can face ‘Obliuion’ with a 
‘dronken longe forgetfulnesse of thynges passed’, without fear of what is to come 
(PF, p. 17).60 The illusion of love enables men and women to ‘take into [their] 
mouthe the snaffle of wedlocke’ (PF, p. 15)—what right-thinking woman would 
                                                                                                                                     
themselves’ (CWE, 31, p. 311). The irony at work in the Praise is that by praising herself Stultitia is 
committing an act of self-love, which, in her second guise, she later bitterly attacks as a vice.   
60 Echoes and correspondences between Shakespeare and Erasmus have received some critical attention, 
most notably from John Evans (‘Erasmus’ Folly and Shakespeare’s King Lear: A Study in Humanist 
Intertextuality’, Moreana, 27 (1990), 3–23) and Claudia Corti (‘Erasmus’ Folly and Shakespeare’s 
Fools’, Silenos: Erasmus in Elizabethan Literature, ed. by Claudia Corti, Studi di Letterature Moderne 
e Comparate, 1 (Pisa: Pancini, 1998), pp. 13–36). Although the spirit of Erasmus’s Praise haunts the 
tone and key ideas of these plays, the only scene in which a direct influence can be discerned with 
some degree of certainty is when Falstaff attempts to divert the Lord Justice’s attention from his 
misdemeanours.  Echoing Ecclesiastes (1. 18), Falstaff claims that Hal has a ‘perturbation of the brain’ 
(2 Henry IV, I. 2. 106), caused by ‘much grief from study’ (105). The prince has ‘a kind of sleeping in 
the blood’ (102). This recalls the stultified philosophers and theologians—ironic self-representations 
in Erasmus’ satire; they waste their youthful years on abstractions and grow old before their time: the 
‘sharp ‘truailing of the braine’ is responsible for the ‘little by little sokying vp the liuely iuice of the 
spirits’ (p. 19). Furthermore, the Lord Chief Justice’s characterization of Falstaff as the epitome of old 
age—‘Have you not a moist eye, a dry hand, a yellow cheek, a white beard, a decreasing leg, an 
increasing belly? Is not your wind short, your voice broken and your wit single, and every part of you 
blasted with antiquity?’ (165–9)—echoes Folly’s memorable anatomy of aging discussed in Chapter 4; 
see also Roy Battenhouse, ‘Falstaff as Parodist and Perhaps Holy Fool’, PMLA, 90 (1975), 32–52 (p. 
35); this article also appears in Christian Irony in Shakespeare’s Histories, ed. by Peter Milward, 2 
vols, Renaissance Monographs, 37–8 (Tokyo: Renaissance Institute Sophia University, 2009), I, pp. 
107–145.
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venture to undergo the ‘perillous throwes of childbearing, or trauaile of their 
bringing vp’ (PF, p. 16)? Folly uses the levelling potential of the human body when 
she points out that the organ that ‘engendre[s] gods and men’ is but a ‘silie membre 
[…] so foolishe as maie not without laughter be spoken of’ (PF, p. 15). While 
Bakhtin is quite right to consider the Praise to be ‘one of the greatest expressions of 
carnival laughter in world literature’,61 critics interested in the corporeal elements of 
the Praise have over-emphasized the importance of Stultitia’s first persona.62  
 The insights of Stultitia’s first avatar correspond with those of Shakespeare’s 
discourse of folly in two ways. First, they remind the reader that, from cradle to 
grave, the aspirations, achievements and sorrows of the serious world are simply 
scenes in a ‘great plaie of follie’ (PF, p. 36), or as Lear has it—possibly quoting 
Chaloner’s 1549 translation of the Moriae Encomium—scenes on a ‘great stage of 
fools’ (Lear, IV. 6. 87). The second main type of philosophical insight that 
Shakespeare’s discourse of folly furnishes us with is a sense of man’s shared 
corporeal nature, in all its absurdity, with all its unpleasant abjections. Needless to 
say, the adepts of the discourse of folly, such as Pantagruel or Falstaff, are attuned 
to the body. Bodily processes are shared by the philosophically and non-
philosophically minded and by rich and poor alike. For this reason, Terence Cave 
sees them as key to the ‘non-transcendent humanity’ of Erasmus’, Ronsard’s, 
                                                
61 Rabelais and His World, trans. by Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press, 1984), 
p. 14.  
62 Donald Gwynn Watson concludes his reading of the role of the carnivalesque in the Praise by 
conflating Folly’s first and third avatars: ‘Erasmus has incorporated the spirit of Carnival into the 
meaning and philosophical celebration of Christ’ (‘The Praise of Folly and the Spirit of Carnival’ 
Renaissance Quarterly, 32 (1979), 333–353 (p. 353)); Claudia Corti argues that Erasmus displays a 
‘fondness for the overthrow of accepted values that characterizes carnival’ (‘Introduction’, in Silenos: 
Erasmus in Elizabethan Literature, pp. 5–13). However, this line of argument is untenable for three 
reasons. First, these interpretations estimate the significance of Praise as a whole purely in the terms 
of folly’s first persona. Second, in several places, Erasmus appears to oppose carnivals; in his 
colloquy, ‘A Fish Diet’, the Butcher describes with horror the grotesque hedonism of ‘revels’ in a 
nearby town, which would not be out of place in Rabelais: ‘an old fellow […] carried head down to 
prevent his choking on vomit […] he was vomiting wretchedly on the legs and feet of the hindmost 
carriers. Most were laughing, but in such a way as you would say without hesitation they were crazy’ 
(CWE, 40, p. 707); likewise, in his adage, ‘For sluggards it is always a holiday’, he sees holidays as 
having become irreligious: ‘For a true Christian every day is a holy day; while to the bad Christians 
who form the great majority, holy days are not so much holy as profane’ (CWE, 33, p. 296). Third, as 
he repeatedly emphasizes in his later letters, Erasmus is against the wholesale “overthrow of 
traditional values”, since he desires reform, not reformation (see J. A. Fronde, Life and Letters of 
Erasmus: Lectures Delivered at Oxford 1893–4 (New York: Scribner’s, 1912), pp. 359–417; Roland 
H. Bainton, Erasmus of Christendom (London: Collins, 1969), pp. 298–337; Cornelius Augustijn, 
Erasmus: His Life, Work and Influence, trans. by J. C. Grayson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1991), pp. 147–61).  
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Rabelais’ and Montaigne’s works.63 After all, when the latter writes in ‘Of 
Experience’ that ‘on the loftiest throne in the world we are sitting only on our rump’ 
(F, Book III, Chapter XIII, p. 1044), he almost appropriates the court fool’s role of 
deflating his master’s grandeur by reminding him of his physicality.  
 In Erasmus’ case, however, his interest in the body as a stubbornly pre-
philosophical addendum springs from his concern that the subtlety of contemporary 
theologians’ arguments, along with their asceticism, negates the key role that the 
body plays in Christianity—a role manifest from the doctrines of the Incarnation 
and the Resurrection and the sacraments of communion and marriage. In 
Shakespeare, however, such comments serve to scupper the pretentions of 
speculation that regards itself as having transcended the body. The most remarkable 
instance of this is found in Shylock’s famous plea for racial equality: ‘Hath not a 
Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions; 
[…] if you prick us do we not bleed? If you tickle us do we not laugh?’ (The 
Merchant of Venice, III. 1. 50–54). Everyone shares similar bodily features, physical 
vulnerability and the same ability to transcend this vulnerability through that 
involuntary physical response of laughter, which Rabelais considers to be the 
unique, ‘proper’, feature of man (GP, Book 1, ‘Prologue’, p. 23).  
  About one third of the way through, Stultitia’s oration changes tone. It slides 
away from pointing out the ways in which man lives a life unknowingly dedicated 
to folly, to a caustic critique of the hypocrisies of the powers that be. The biting 
quips of Shakespeare’s wise fools and the satiric railing of characters such as 
Thersites or Timon plainly resonate with this critique of authority. In fact, Erasmus 
can get away with it only because he has donned the persona of Stultitia: ‘what 
worde comying out of a wyseman’s mouthe were a hangying mattier, the same yet 
spoken by a foole shall muche delight euin hym that is touched therewith’ (PF, p. 
50).  
 Despite his deliberate disengagement from direct critique by using a persona, 
Erasmus’ enemies still managed to wrest Stultitia’s critique out of context and 
accuse him of heresy.64 Her erudite attack on human vanity encompasses all estates 
of man, from judges to priests and from mercenaries to philosophers, but with the 
                                                
63 Cave, p. 327.  
64 See Fronde, p. 309–38; Bainton, pp. 209–241.   
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exception of the poor and despised. Her bêtes noires, however, are Doctors of 
Divinity and theologians. They are ‘a neste of men […] crabbed and waspelyke’ 
(PF, p. 78): 
 […] propped vp with theyr owne Arrogance and Selflikyng, as if they 
 dwelled amonges the sterres, or loked downe from aloft, and in a manner 
 toke compassion vppon other seely men lyke wormes crepyng by the 
 grounde. Namely whiles thei are hedged in on all sides, with such a gard of 
 Magistral deffinicions, conclusions, corollaries, explicite and implicite 
 propositions […]. 
  (PF, p. 78) 
 
This brand of theology misconceives the egalitarian simplicity of the teachings of 
the New Testament; the apostles, Stultitia comments, ‘had need to be enstructed by 
a new spirite, in case vpon these matters they were compelled to argue with this new 
kynde of doctors’ (PF, p. 80). What is more, such abstruse and self-satisfied 
speculation fails to grasp the fact that Christian faith is manifested through deeds, 
not through words.65 The theologians, mendicants and priests whom Erasmus 
attacks are, in the words of Lear’s fool: ‘more in word than matter’ (Lear, III. 2. 81). 
Stultitia is attacking Scholasticism, the theoretical core of the Catholic Church in the 
early sixteenth century, which employed Aristotelian dialectics to resolve Scriptural 
ambiguities. Critics interested in the role of Erasmus’ works in the Reformation 
have tended to emphasize this section of the Praise of Folly, since it attacks the 
superstition and corruption of the church just as much as the fruitless subtleties of 
scholasticism.66  
 More important for our purposes, however, is how Stultitia debunks self-
satisfied modes of speculation, which, peering down from abstract heights on the 
vast majority of humankind, view laymen as though they were ‘wormes crepyng by 
                                                
65 This belief is by no means unique to Erasmus. The Brethren of the Common Life, by whom Erasmus 
was brought up, practiced the Devotio Moderna, which combined monastic devotion with practical 
works, such as treating the sick and educating the young (see Bainton, pp. 8–25). Attacking 
theological jargon in a different context, towards the end of his life Erasmus writes to John Carondelet 
in 1523: ‘You will not be damned if you do not know whether the Spirit proceeding from the Father 
and the Son has a single or a double principle, but you will not escape perdition unless you see to it in 
the mean time that you have the fruits of the Spirit, which are charity, joy, peace, patience, kindness, 
goodness, forbearance, gentleness, faith, moderation, self-control, and chastity’ (CWE, 9, p. 252).   
66 Marc Lienhard provides a cogent examination of all the critical work on Erasmus’ ambivalent 
relationship with the radical sects, especially the Anabaptists, in Germany during the reformation. He 
argues that Erasmus’ ‘Philosophy of Christ’ is the part of his thought that has the greatest affinity with 
radical ideas, but Erasmus’ conception of Christian simplicity is far more tolerant; see ‘Die Radikalen 
des 16 Jahrhunderts und Erasmus’ in M. Mout, H. Smolinsky and J. Trapman, eds., Erasmianism: Idea 
and Reality (Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences: Amsterdam, 1997), pp. 91–105.  
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the grounde’. Indeed, such anti-intellectualism is apparent in the canon of folly 
before Erasmus’ genius for irony transformed it. After the author himself, the first 
fools aboard Sebastian Brandt’s Narrenschiff are the learned, ‘douctures’ and 
‘clerkes’, who are exhorted to: 
   Consyder our olde faders: note wel theyr diligence: 
  Ensue ye theyr steppes: obtayne ye such fame, 
  As they dyd lyuynge: and that by true Prudence. 
  Within theyr hartys they planted theyr scyence 
  And nat in plesaunt bokes.67  
  
In both books, ‘Laughter purifies from dogmatism, from the intolerant and 
petrified; it liberates from fear and intimidation’:68 the power of the church, which 
underwrote intellectual endeavour until the Reformation, is rendered risible by 
evoking the disjunction between lived faith apparent in the teachings of the 
Patriarchs and Apostles and the book-learning of modern doctors of divinity. In this 
connection, something of the anti-systematic impulse that Catherine Bates detects in 
Nietzsche can be discerned in Stultitia’s seriocomic invective and Brandt’s didactic 
satire: 
 Any presumption of mastery or control over nature on the part of human 
 beings was utterly vain—an absurd grandiosity based on nothing more 
 substantial than the intellect’s own flattering and entirely self-generated 
 estimate of itself. The human mind didn’t deliver truth so much as illusions 
 that were structured to look like truths. It surveyed the surface of things and 
 gave the name reality to what was no more than its own particular way of 
 seeing.69     
 
The crucial difference between the two works, however, is the claims to authority 
that they make: ‘What Brandt, with the whole authority of the author of the 
Narrenschiff, proclaims as a vain outrage to be fought against, Erasmus lets Stultitia 
say’.70  
 That pretentious ratiocination and jargon-addled specialism obscure what 
they purport to explain is an anti-philosophical insight common in Shakespeare’s 
dramatization of folly—both of the wise and credulous sorts. When he speciously 
                                                
67 The Shyppe of Fooles, trans. by Alexander Barclay (London: Wynky[n] de worde, 1509), p. 11.  
68 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 123.  
69 Play in a Godless World: The Theory and Practice of Play in Shakespeare, Nietzsche and Freud 
(London: Open Gate Press, 1999), p. 47.  
70 Gerhard Schweppenhäuser, ‘Narrenschelte und Pathos der Vernunft. Zum Narrenmotiv bei Sebastian 
Brandt und Erasmus von Rotterdam’, Neophilologus, 71 (1987), 559–574 (p. 570).  
47 
 
cites a pseudo-religious, fictional authority’s pedantic insight, which is anything but 
insightful, and appropriates it as a syllogistic justification of his sacrilegious 
impersonation, Feste makes a mockery of such sophistry:  
 
 FESTE […] as the old hermit of Prague, that never saw pen and ink, very  
  wittily said to a niece of King Gorboduc, ‘that that is, is.’ So I being 
  Master Parson, am Master Parson; for what is ‘that’ but ‘that’ […]?  
       (Twelfth Night, IV. 2. 11–14)   
 
This inspired perversion of philosophical doctrine is not that far removed from the 
discourse of the self-serving theologians, whom Stultitia inveighs against for 
bending scripture to justify war, or to have heretics burnt at the stake (see PF, p. 89–
90). As Gerhard Schweppenhäuser contends, beneath Erasmus’ satire, there 
‘implicitly appears humanistic pathos [about] the suffering and violence stupidity 
causes’,71 a pathos that is clearly discernable in Shakespeare’s plays.   
 Early in his career, in Love’s Labour’s Lost, Shakespeare experiments, both 
formally and thematically, with the idea that philosophy is utterly removed from the 
drives and desires of everyday existence. The arrival of the Princess and her ladies 
causes the self-denying intentions of students at the King’s ‘little academe’ (I. 1. 13) 
to fall at the first hurdle. The antithesis of the nonsense spoken by the old hermit of 
Prague and the schoolmen derided by Stultita’s second persona is a philosophy of 
the sort espoused by her first persona, a philosophy that is sensitive to man’s 
embodied nature, a kind of thinking that Montaigne memorably describes as 
‘intellectually sensible and sensibly-intellectuall’ (E, Book 3, Chapter 13, p. 625).  
 Stultitia’s self-reflexive critique of Grammarians like Erasmus, philosophers, 
theologians and scholars is founded on the idea that ‘in all humaine thynges there is 
so great darkness and diuersnesse as nothing maie be clearly knowne out nor 
discouered’ (PF, p. 63). Anybody who claims to know the true nature of things with 
any degree of certainty is at best deluded and at worst a hypocrite—like the venal 
lawyers, pardoners and kings whom she vehemently attacks. The three avatars of 
Stultitia are not separate entities. After all, her critical attack on the vanity of the 
sciences paves the way for the third part of her oration, where she morphs into a 
Christian fool, extolling the paradoxical wisdom of holy folly. The argument of the 
Praise is bound up with its movement, which Roland Bainton summarizes with 
                                                
71 Ibid., p. 569. 
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admirable clarity:  
 
 The irrational is shown to be the rational. Yes, but the irrational is shown to 
 be the rational only because the rational is shown to be irrational and all 
 those disciplines so neatly reduced by men to order are but striving after the 
 wind.72  
 
The final section is based on the idea that folly is the only attribute that the finite 
and the infinite, human and divine, share:  
 Now all these texts that I have alleaged, doe thei not plainly testifie, that 
 mortall men beyng fooles, are godly also? And that Christ hym selfe mindying 
 the relefe and redempcion of mankyndes folie, although he was the ineffable 
 wisdome of the father, became yet a manner foole?  
         (PF, p. 118)  
 
God’s primary folly is the incarnation, in which He ‘clothed Himself in vile man’s 
flesh | So that he might be weak enough to suffer woe’.73 By the standards of 
worldly logic, this action, through which the immortal became mortal, is foolish or 
even mad. It is in this connection that Paul comments: ‘the foolishness of God is 
wiser than man; and the weakness of God is stronger than man’ (I Corinthians, 1. 
25).  
 As Nicholas Cusanus, whom Erasmus and Montaigne both read, explains in 
De docta ignorantia (1440), what reason can positively know can consist only of 
‘measurement’ and this is ‘limited to the reality it has in a finite mind’.74 Reason 
cannot fathom the ‘infinite’ or ‘maximum’, since ‘in every inquiry men judge of the 
uncertain by comparing it with an object presupposed certain, and their judgement is 
always approximate; every inquiry is, therefore, comparative and uses the method of 
analogy’.75 The relative nature of all human sciences comes to the fore in Cusanus’ 
contribution to the canon of folly, De idiota (1450), which contains perhaps the 
earliest example of a fool giving the lie to the values of the marketplace. Citing holy 
writ, the Idiot deflates man’s pretensions to knowledge:   
 
 IDIOT  Because I told thee that wisedome cries out  in the    
  streets, and her cry is, that she dwells in the most high places,  
                                                
72 Bainton, p. 123.  
73 ‘Holy Sonnet XI’, in John Donne’s Poetry, ed. by Arthur L. Clements, 2nd edn. (New York: Norton, 
1992), p. 114.  
74 Of Learned Ignorance, trans. by Germain Heron (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2007), p. 2, p. 7. 
75 Ibid., p. 8 
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  this now will I endeavour to shew thee. And first tell me what  
  doest thou see here done in the Marketplace? 
 ORATOR I see in one place moneyes telling, in another wares a   
    weighing, and over against us, oyle a measuring. […] 
  IDIOT These are the workes of that reason, by which men    
  excell beasts; for bruit beasts can neither number, weigh, nor  
  measure.76  
 
When the archetypal fool for love, Antony, reflects that ‘there’s beggary in the love 
that can be reckoned’ (Antony and Cleopatra, I. 1.  15), he too suggests that what 
really matters cannot be calculated or measured.  
 Likewise, in ‘The Phoenix and the Turtle’, Shakespeare’s neo-platonic 
evocation of romantic ecstasy, ‘Reason’ is ‘in itself confounded’ (41) by the fact 
that:  
 
 Property was thus appalled  
 That the self was not the same.  
 Single nature’s double name  
 Neither two nor one was called. 
 (37–40) 
 
 At a stroke, an individual’s identity, the most basic predicate of calibrating reason 
not to mention a good deal of philosophy, is destroyed. Reason’s capacity to 
measure is voided: ‘Number there in love was slain’ (28), and thus ‘Love hath 
reason, reason none’ (47).    
 For Erasmus, the true Christian imitates in their worship and their acts God’s 
self-bankrupting love as best they can:77   
 
 […] no maner fooles are in apparence more ideotelike, than suche as are totally 
 rauisshed, and enflamed with the ardent zeale of Christian charitee. So laueshly 
 thei deale their goodes abrode, forgette all iniuries doen vnto theim, suffer 
 theim selues to be decieued, put no difference between friends and foes, 
 abhorre all  pleasures and delites of the bodie […]. Briefely, [they] seme to be 
                                                
76 The idiot in four books. The first and second of wisdome. The third of the minde. The fourth of statick 
experiments, or experiments of the ballance. By the famous and learned C. Cusanus, trans. by John 
Everard (London: William Leak, 1650), p. 5; idiota, incidentally, is how the Vulgate translates Paul’s 
self-deprecating description of himself as moros or fool. In early modern English ‘idiot’ signified both 
a ‘a simple or ordinary person’ and a natural fool or ‘A person so profoundly disabled in mental 
function or intellect as to be incapable of ordinary acts of reasoning or rational conduct’ (OED, 
definition nos. 1a and 2a).  
77 For a detailed analysis of this paradox, see M. A. Screech, Laughter at the Foot of the Cross (London: 
Duckworth, 1999), pp. 1–28; Ecstasy and the Praise of Folly (London: Duckworth, 1980), esp. pp. 
36–42 and pp. 63–91; Walter M. Gordon, Humanist Play and Belief: The Seriocomic Art of Desiderius 
Erasmus (Tornoto and London: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 6; Augustijn, pp. 20–50.  
50 
 
 so astonned and past all commen senses, which men liue by, as if their soules 
 dwelled not in those bodies thei beare about with theim, but rather in some 
 other mansion place […] to the common iudgement of men [they] appeere to 
 be [in] a verie madnesse, or rauying of the wittes […] the apostles were iudged 
 by the wicked Ethnikes to be drunkards […] and Paul likewise was holden 
 for madde, of Festus. 
(PF, p. 121) 
 
By pointing out that the apostles also appeared ridiculous, Stultitia praises the 
foolish appearance and selfless behaviour of ‘fools for Christ’s sake’ (I Corinthians, 
4. 10). Shakespeare and his collaborators have Thomas More confess that he is ‘a 
very unthrift’ because he has ‘purchased […] strange commodities’ of ‘Crutches 
[…] and bare cloaks, | For halting soldiers and poor needy scholars’, making himself 
‘the poorest chancellor | That ever was in England’ (Sir Thomas More, V. 3. 64, 52, 
57–58, 47–48).78 Conversely, the motivations of worldly fools, dedicated merely to 
getting by in the sublunary world, are rendered incomprehensible, even irrational.  
 Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel, on which the influence of Erasmus is 
well chronicled,79 expounds the same paradox with such brilliance as to warrant 
extensive quotation. Pantagruel, the foolosopher Prince, persuades Panurge to take 
the advice of a fool, Triboulet, by making the following argument: 
 
 [H]e who narrowly takes heed to what concerns the dexterous Management of 
 his private Affairs, domestick Businesses and those Adoes which are confined 
 within the streight-lac’d compass of one Family: who is attentive, vigilant, and 
 active in the oeconomik Rule of his own house […] and who knows warily 
 how to prevent the Inconveinces of Poverty, is a called a worldly Wise Man, 
 though perhaps in the second Judgment of the Intelligences which are above, 
 he is esteemed a Fool. So on the contary, is he most like […] to be not only 
 sage,  but to presage Events to come by Divine Inspiration, who laying aside 
 those cares which are conduciable to his body or his fortunes, and as it were 
 rids all his senses of Terrene Affections […]. All which neglects of Sublunary 
 Things are vulgarly imputed Folly.  
(GP, Book 3, Chapter 37, p. 446) 
 
Without wealth, the capacity to dissimulate, or scholastic arguments, these fools 
live their faith, embodying the radical egalitarian kernel of the New Testament, 
                                                
78 Sir Thomas More in Shakespeare and Others: Collaborative Plays, ed. by Jonathan Bate and others 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), pp. 349–421 (p. 414–415).  
79 Rabelais wrote to Erasmus, referring to him as his spiritual ‘father and mother’; for a recent overview of 
the critical work on this and the question of influence, see Paul J. Smith, (‘Jean Thenaud and François 
Rabelais: Some Hypotheses on the Early Reception of Erasmus in French Vernacular Literature’, in 
Karl A. E. Enkel, ed., The Reception of Erasmus in the Early Modern Period (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 
211–237).   
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particularly apparent in the ‘Sermon on the Mount’ and Paul’s writings. As 
Schweppenhäuser shows, the Praise uses irony to critique the emergent conceptions 
of bourgeois reason, whereas Brandt’s Narrenschiff  (1494) exonerates forward 
planning from charges of folly, and—in absolute contrast to Erasmus—associates 
thriftiness with godliness.80  
 Those interested in Erasmus’ ‘theology of ecstasy’ have tended to emphasize 
the role of this final section of the Praise at the expense of the others;81 but this 
description of holy fools lies in juxtaposition to Stultitia’s attack on the learned, 
which, in turn, is connected to the bodily follies of the first section: ‘Only through 
insight into the ambivalence between self-praise and self-denunciation can the 
paradoxical form of folly, and with it the organizing principle of the work, be 
unlocked’.82 Rabelais employs his grotesque characters in a seriocomic exploration 
of the self-abnegating generosity of ‘fools for Christ’s sake’ and of God himself. 
When the prodigal trickster Panurge is made ‘Laird of Sulmygourdin in Dyposidie’ 
by Pantagruel, he ‘wastes’ his substantial income: 
 
 Now his Worship, the new Laird, husbanded this his Estate so providently 
 well and prudently, that in less than fourteen days he wasted and dilapidated 
 all the certain and uncertain Revenue of his Lairdship for three whole years: 
 Yet he did not properly dilapidate it […] in founding monastrays, building of 
 churches […] but spent it in a thousend little Banquets and jolly collations, 
 keeping an open house for all Comers and Goers […] borrowing money 
 before-hand, buying dear, selling cheap, and eating corn (as it were) whilst it 
 was but grass.  
(GP, Book 3, Chapter 2, p. 305)  
 
Because he borrows with high interest and sells for cash, what Rabelais fallaciously 
terms the ‘Mysteries of Practical Arithmetick’ are evidently lost on this imprudent 
trickster. He lives for the moment, entertaining ‘good fellows’ and ‘pretty wenches’ 
(GP, Book 3, Chapter 2, p. 305) regardless of the cost. Enacting something of the 
boundless generosity at the core of the New Testament for himself, the Prince is ‘in 
no way offended at the matter, angry, nor sorry’ by his friend’s ‘Lavishness’ (GP, 
Book 3, Chapter 2, p. 305). 
 Erasmus emphasizes that although holy fools appear foolish in the eyes of the 
                                                
80 ‘Narrenschelte und Pathos der Vernunft’, p. 567.  
81 Screech, Ecstasy and the Praise of Folly, p. 3; Gordon, pp. 223–253.   
82 Schweppenhäuser, p. 568.  
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world, they are, like the lovers in ‘The Phoenix and the Turtle’, experiencing a 
tantalizing  
  
 [F]oretaste of future blessedness, by which we are totally absorbed into God 
 and shall live in future more in him than in ourselves. […] what Plato calls 
 madness, being rapt out of himself; he exists in the object of his love […] he is 
 brought in to a new kind of teaching, very different from all the current 
 convictions of the wise and foolish alike.  
     (CWE, 3, p. 127) 
 
This passage, from his ‘Letter to Maarten van Dorp’ (May 1515), succinctly 
reiterates his argument from the final pages of the Praise (see PF, pp. 126–9). 
Referring to Plato’s conception of poetic rapture, a state in which poets ‘are seized 
by a divine spirit, which inspires them to rise above human limitations’,83 Erasmus 
suggests that fools offer a radical third way of knowing that goes beyond sublunary 
categories. He conceives of Greek philosophy as something that foreshadows 
Christian theology; texts from a pagan prehistory prefigure the teaching of the 
Gospel. While it would demand a full-length study in its own right, the 
anachronistic significance of Greek thought in Christianity had a considerable 
impact on the early modern mindset. A hundred years after the Dutchman’s death, 
John Donne, for instance, argues along strikingly similar lines: ‘it is evident, that in 
Trismegistus, and in Zoroaster, and in Plato and some other Authors of that Ayre, 
there seem to be clearer, and more literall expressings of the Trinity, than are in all 
the prophets of the old Testament’.84  
 Shakespeare, however, goes a step further than Erasmus in his use of the 
ironies it is possible to generate from the supra-rational wisdom of God’s folly. In 
the Praise, a fool, who makes only spurious claims to authority, extols the 
paradoxical wisdom of folly, whereas in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Bottom 
brilliantly bungles St Paul’s description of the ineffable joys of Salvation—‘But as it 
is written, The things which eye hath not seen, neither ear hath heard, neither came 
into man’s heart, are, which God hath prepared for them that love him’ (Geneva, I 
Corinthians 2. 9)—when he expresses his ostensibly inexpressible dream: 
   
                                                
83 M. A. Screech, Montaigne and Melancholy (London: Duckworth, 1983; repr. 2000), p. 60.  
84 The Sermons of John Donne, ed. by George R. Porter and Evelyn M. Simpson, 10 vols (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1953–62), VII, p. 57.  
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 BOTTOM […] I have had a most rare vision. I have had a dream past  
  the wit of man to say what dream it was. Man is but an ass, if he go 
  about t’expound this dream. Methought I was—there is no man can 
  tell what. Methought I was, and methought I had—but man is but a 
  patched fool if he will offer to say what methought I had. The eye of 
  man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen, man's hand is not 
  able to taste, his tongue to conceive, nor his heart to report, what my 
  dream was. I will get Peter Quince to write a ballad of this dream. It 
  shall be called Bottom’s Dream, because it hath no bottom, and I will 
  sing it in the latter end of a play, before the duke. Peradventure, to  
  make it the more gracious, I shall sing it at her death. 
(IV. 1. 196–211[my emphasis]) 
 
For several reasons, Bottom’s nonsense is astonishing. Awakening from his dream, 
in which he has fulfilled that age-old human fantasy of inhabiting an alternative 
body, but nonetheless remained steadfastly himself, Bottom travesties Paul’s 
memorable evocation of how man cannot grasp the joys of heaven—accidentally 
performing the limitations of human knowledge even as he describes them. As in 
Erasmus, a manifest fool, albeit not one who openly admits to being such, points out 
the absurdities of attempting to know the unknowable.85  
 In this respect, Bottom’s inspired gibberish implies something similar to 
what Theseus, with characteristic self-assurance, formulates towards the end of the 
play: there are states of being, including dreaming, the lover’s infatuation and poetic 
inspiration, that ‘apprehend | More than cool reason ever comprehends’ (V. 1. 5–6). 
Because of Bottom’s malapropisms, however, even the doctrine of learned 
ignorance is submitted to the play’s jubilant irony; this is not to say, however, that 
irony negates the concepts it evokes. Rather, in Shakespeare’s drama, irony liberates 
concepts, rendering absurd any claims to authority that may exist in connection with 
them; Shakespeare’s seriously funny irony transmutes the building blocks of dogma 
into playthings.   
 Bottom’s fears of idiotically endeavouring to explain away the 
unexplainable—‘man is but an ass, if he go about to expound this dream’—are 
                                                
85  The influence of the Praise on A Midsummer Night’s Dream in general and Bottom’s in particular is 
discussed by Thelma N. Greenfield in ‘A Midsummer Night’s Dream and Praise of Folly’, 
Comparative Literature, 20 (1968), 236–244, and Catharine Birkenshaw in “Past the wit of man’: A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream’s Debt to Praise of Folly’, Shakespeare in Southern Africa, 5 (1992), 43–
58. For Emily Stockard, however, these studies underestimate the crucial role of holy folly in the play; 
she contends that ‘Titania’s foolish love for Bottom mirrors God’s foolish love for mankind’: see 
‘Christian Folly and the Subversion of Hierarchy in A Midsummer Night's Dream’, R&L, 29 (1997), 
1–20 (p. 2).  
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undermined by the simple structural irony that Bottom has, quite literally, just been 
an ‘ass’. Nonetheless, this sentiment foreshadows Shakespeare’s closing act of 
authorial disavowal:  
 
 PUCK If we shadows have offended, 
  Think but this, and all is mended: 
  That you have but slumbered here, 
  While these visions did appear; 
  And this weak and idle theme, 
  No more yielding but a dream, 
  Gentles do not reprehend.  
 (‘Epilogue’, 1–6)  
 
Man is an ass, Shakespeare implies, if he takes umbrage at A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream, since drama seldom unequivocally affirms any one position. In fact, the way 
that the play idles away the time helps to constitute its philosophical vantage point, 
its otherness to the ideals of the waking world. Although Bottom considers it 
impossible to ‘expound’ the significance of his dream, he nonetheless sees its 
literary potential. However, the song he envisages, which is the ballad of ‘Bottom’s 
Dream’ to being sung after the death of Thisbe, flagrantly violates theatrical 
decorum. While the performance of it remains an unrealized possibility in A 
Midsummer’s Night’s Dream, the mere mention of this ballad makes a mockery 
both of the high seriousness of Ovid’s original, and that of Romeo and Juliet, 
Shakespeare’s tragedy of the same year based on the same tale.   
 
The Dialectics of Utopian Enlightenment 
 
More’s Utopia, one of the canonical texts of Renaissance folly and a possible 
influence on The Tempest,86 Shakespeare’s own deeply ambivalent comment on 
utopia, confronts the order of things considered rational today, almost as much as it 
tested the mores of Tudor England. At first glance, however, the satire of Book One 
has lost its topical resonance, its power to alarm and offend. When Hythloday 
reflects that ‘Normally sheep are placid and eat very little, but now I hear that they 
                                                
86 Recognizing Shakespeare’s debt to contemporary utopias, Thomas Bulger goes so far as to contend that 
‘The Tempest directly and fully examines Utopian ideas current at the time of the play’s composition’ 
and that it does so both thematically and formally (‘The Utopic Structure of the Tempest’, Utopian 
Studies, 5 (1994), 38–47 (p. 38). 
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have become so voracious and fierce that they have started eating men’ (U, Book I, 
p. 66), the significance of this topical attack on the enclosures dictated by the 
burgeoning wool trade could easily be overlooked. 
 For two reasons, however, this is not the case. First, by employing the 
memorable image of ravenously carnivorous sheep, Hythloday uses the kind of 
seriocomic sugar-coating that Erasmus defends in his famous letter to Dorp. The 
object of the Praise of Folly is ‘to teach and delight’,87 since ‘truth by itself is a 
trifle astringent, and thus when made palatable finds an easier entrance into the 
minds of men’ (CWE, 3, p. 113). Second, this image epitomises the self-destructive 
impulse at the heart of early modern (and present-day) capitalism. ‘England’, 
Hythloday comments, ‘used to seem exceptionally prosperous; now the unchecked 
greed of a few is destroying that prosperity’ (U, Book I, p. 67). This self-destruction 
is caught up with the kind of rationality that is premised on self-preservation at all 
costs. As Horkheimer and Adorno note, ‘the not merely theoretical [ideelle] but 
practical tendency towards self-annihilation has been inherent in rationality from the 
start’ (DA, p. 7; [DE, p. xix]).  
 As Alain Badiou’s and Slavoj Žižek’s recent studies show,88 such rationality 
finds its antithesis in the communism and pacifism of Jesus’ and St. Paul’s 
teachings, which, as we have seen, are also central to Erasmus’ understanding of 
Christian folly. The image of voracious ‘sheep’ is clearly ironic, since sheep are 
commonly used as a metaphor for the Christian faithful. It encapsulates what R. W. 
Chambers long ago considered to be the formula at work in Utopia as a whole: 
‘With nothing save Reason to guide them, the Utopians do this; and yet we 
Christian Englishmen, we Christian Europeans, do this’.89 That reason has the 
paradoxical ability to create the ‘instruments’ (CWE, 36, p. 402) of its own 
annihilation is, in fact, pointed out by Erasmus in his long pacifist essay, ‘Dulce 
Bellum Inexpertis’ (CWE, 36, p. 399–440), which is one of Utopia’s sources.90 
                                                
87 Sidney, p. 86. 
88 See Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. by Ray Brassier (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003 [1997]), and The Fragile Absolute—or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth 
Fighting for? (London: Verso, 2000).  
89 ‘The Meaning of Utopia’, in Sir Thomas More, Utopia: A Revised Translation, Backgrounds, Criticism, 
ed. and trans. by Robert M. Adams (New York: Norton, 1992), pp. 137–147 (p. 139). 
90 John C. Olin, ‘Erasmus’ Adagia and More’s Utopia’, Moreana, 100 (1989), 127–36. Wootton discerns 
the influence of Erasmus’ adage ‘Among friends all is in common’ at work in Hythloday’s 
56 
 
 Insofar as it presages much of what has still to be openly acknowledged, 
More’s text looks back on the present day from its position somewhere in the future. 
This becomes clear when Utopia is considered in relation to the thesis of 
Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment: ‘Myth is already 
enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology [schon der Mythos ist 
Aufklärung, und: Aufklärung schlägt in Mythologie zurück]’ (DE, p. xviii; DA, p. 
6)—a comment that puts paid to the simplistic, linear account of history derided by 
Žižek as ‘evolutionist historicism’.91 This is not to say, however, that St Thomas 
More was a harbinger of modernity. Rather, within his model of social progress lies 
a diagnosis of the tendencies latent in Enlightened societies, which cause them to 
revert to barbarism. In other words, man’s instrumental reason and confidence in his 
intellectual convictions not only enables his enlightenment, but also causes 
repression and fear to a hitherto unimaginable extent.  
 The first aspect of the Dialectic of Enlightenment’s thesis is also apparent in 
Utopia. Despite being written by a Christian martyr, before the emergence of the 
vocabulary of scientific enquiry,92 it nonetheless examines the workings of the 
market using ‘schemes and models’.93 The second aspect of Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s thesis is discernible if we trace the history of the literary genre that 
More’s neologism, utopia, came to signify. Utopia, like Bacon’s New Atlantis, 
displays a remarkable faith in the capacities of technology and social organisation to 
ensure human happiness. Yet, in the latter-day dystopias of Zamyatin, Huxley and 
Orwell, it is precisely technology and social organisation—the two things that have 
enabled man to dominate nature—that thwart the possibility of his happiness. What 
had promised to liberate, now oppresses.     
 At the start of their book, Horkheimer and Adorno quote Francis Bacon’s ‘In 
Praise of Knowledge’, which contends that the chief aim of knowledge is for man to 
be able to “control [nature] by action” (DE, p. 1; DA, p. 10). This early 
philosophical formulation of enlightened man’s instrumental relationship with both 
inner and outer nature is prefigured in Utopia. Not only do the Utopians battery-
                                                                                                                                     
communism. See his ‘Introduction’ to Utopia: With Erasmus’ The Sileni of Alcibiades, ed. and trans. 
by David Wootton (Cambridge: Hackett, 1999), pp. 1–48 (p.19).    
91 The Fragile Absolute, p. 89. 
92 Wootton, ‘Introduction’, p.19.   
93 Ibid., p. 21.  
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farm their chickens, but they also ensure the maximum possible agricultural yield 
through a precise categorisation and division of land; Utopian town planning, with 
its large boulevards and identical houses, displays a striking anticipation of the 
Haussmannization of Paris and, therefore, knowledge of the attendant relationship 
between spatial design and social control. The Utopians’ notoriously pragmatic 
attitude towards war—it should be avoided at all costs and preferably won by stealth 
(see U, Book I, pp. 135–44)—chimes with the way in which Odysseus, for Adorno 
and Horkheimer the proto-bourgeois individual (DE, pp. 24–62; DA, pp. 41–88), 
eschewing the brute strength and endurance of the chivalric hero, uses stealth, 
organisation and craftiness to achieve his aims.  
 More’s new genre partly has its roots in Edenic myths like the land of 
Cockaygne (see CWM, 4, p clxvii). But his Utopia is no Big Rock Candy Mountain. 
In place of cornucopian abundance, sexual licence and freedom of movement and 
expression—apparent, for instance, in Rabelais’ Thélème with its daring injunction, 
‘Do what thou wilt’ (GP, Book 1, Chapter 57, p. 157)—there is austerity, 
surveillance and strict control of travel, expression and sexual relations. In Utopia, 
‘liberation’ from fear, the fundamental aim of ‘Enlightenment understood in the 
widest sense as advance of thought’ (DE, p. 1; DA, p. 9),94 proves to be chimerical. 
As ostensible Enlightenment ‘reverts’ to superstition, the people remain passive and 
in fear. Although the Utopians need not fear a spectacular execution like the Tudor 
thieves of the First Book, they must, as Stephen Greenblatt shows, fear shame and 
slavery. Indeed, More shames his readers by forcing them to compare the chaotic 
misery of their society with the order and formal freedom of the pagan utopians.95  
 The expectation that the Utopians ‘make good use of their free time’ (U, 
Book II, p. 98), the micro-organisation of their every waking hour and an insistence 
on sociability presage Horkheimer and Adorno’s discussion of the illusory nature of 
freedom in modern society: 
                                                
94 Lucretius writes that ‘I proceed to unloose the mind from the close knots of superstition […] because 
the subject matter is so dark and the lies I write so clear, as I touch all with the Muses grace’; the 
enlightenment urge to free man from naive ‘superstition’ or mythology is at the core of this Epicurean 
thinker’s philosophical project—as is an awareness of being able to get to the heart of things through 
imaginative rather formal discourse. (De rerum natura, trans. by W. H. D. Rouse, rev. by Martin 
Ferguson Smith, LOEB Classical Library, 181 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924; rev. 
edn. 1975), I. 931–35.  
95 See Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980; repr. 2005), pp. 57–72.  
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 Formal freedom is guaranteed for everyone. No one has to answer officially 
 for what he or she thinks. However, all find themselves enclosed from early 
 on within a system of churches, clubs, professional associations, and other 
 relationships, which amount to the most sensitive instrument of social 
 control. 
(DE, p. 120; DA, p. 158)    
 
It is not just in Book Two, More’s concrete model for social improvement, that we 
can discern anticipations of the Dialectic: in the first section, Hythloday illustrates 
how, after the Landowners’ enclosures, the persecution of those left homeless as 
vagabonds is, as he later puts it, ‘a conspiracy of the rich against the poor’ (U, Book 
II, p. 157). Morton suggests that the English could test out the practices of the 
Polyerites (‘People of Much Nonsense’ [U, Book I, p. 71]) on the ‘vagabonds’ upon 
which ‘so far none of our measures have been successful’ (U, Book I, p. 73), by 
turning them into slaves, distinguished by ‘badges’ (U, p. 72). Thus More 
thematizes the misinterpretation of Hythloday’s comments: the whole point of his 
attack on the judicial system is that such people are victims of wider social forces. 
They become vagabonds, who are, like Poor Tom, ‘whipped from tithing to tithing, 
and stock-punished, and imprisoned’ (King Lear, III. 4. 124–5) as a direct result of 
the aristocracy’s profiteering (U, Book I, 64–73). This irony throws into relief a 
pattern of thought that is comparable to the sort Horkheimer and Adorno observe at 
work in anti-Semitism, in which people are attacked on the grounds of the very 
powerlessness or weakness (political or physical) that social conditions foist upon 
them (see DE, p. 137–9; DA, 177–8).  
 ‘Like Marx’s early Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, Greenblatt 
argues, ‘More’s work propounds communism less as a coherent economic program 
than as a weapon against certain tendencies in human nature’.96 Indeed, it might not 
be altogether absurd to extend this insight and suggest that, to a certain degree, what 
Praise of Folly and Utopia are grasping for is a form of expression in which they 
can express something comparable to critical theory. What Schweppenhäuser writes 
about the Praise could equally well apply to Utopia. He contends: 
 
 [T]he Praise of Folly is an introduction to reason’s unsystematic self-
 reflection on its problematic realization. The criticism of reason, which is the 
 motive of this work, refers already to the advanced forms of self-critical 
                                                
96 Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, p. 37.  
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 reason of the present.97  
 
By using strategies of ironic disassociation, these humanists can attack the 
injustices of their world and model alternatives: in More, Utopian communism; in 
Erasmus, a life led according to the principles of holy folly. But this detachment 
means that what they offer does not have to be systematic and enclosed. Rather, 
these texts set various ideologies, beliefs and values into motion and conflict. In 
doing so, they critique the objective causes of suffering.  
 Moreover, like ‘critical theory’, Utopia and Praise of Folly are both ‘incom-
patible with the idealist belief that any theory is independent of men and even has a 
growth of its own’,98 not least because Hythloday’s ostensibly idealistic thought 
actually advocates adherence to the teaching of the Gospel, the expression of which 
is found in deeds rather than words. Both texts critique early modern society, 
debunking certain customs that shape the behaviour of individuals, who profess 
to be Christians, but act, frequently in bad faith, in a manner antithetical to that 
expounded in the Gospel.  
Playing the Fool in Utopia 
 
More’s Utopia employs narrative techniques comparable to those of Stultita’s 
oration. Despite or perhaps because of the connotations their names hold, both 
speakers furnish the reader with a critique of the world as it is and offer suggestions, 
both implicit and explicit, about what the world could one day become. Like the 
Praise and many of Erasmus’ Colloquies, Utopia is without a clear-cut conclusion. 
The final significance of this slippery, ambiguous text remains radically 
indeterminate; ‘Explaining why Utopia is the sort of text it is’, its recent editor, 
David Wootton writes, ‘is not the same as fixing its meaning, for the whole point of 
Utopia is that whenever we feel we have a grip on it, it slips from our grasp’.99 To 
fathom the significance of the ironies and distortions at work in the discourse of 
folly in Shakespeare, Montaigne and Erasmus, this study will adopt a comparable 
method. Rather than fixing their meaning, it seeks merely to understand why and 
how the texts are the way they are.  
                                                
97 ‘Narrenschelte und Pathos der Vernunft’, p. 573.  
98 Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. by M. J. O’Connell and others (New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 240. 
99 Wootton, ‘Introduction’, p. 2.  
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 This is not least because both texts appear so critical of the dominant order of 
things. Erasmus sees pretensions to certainty as mere vanity, while More’s 
Hythloday recurrently emphasizes the fact that ‘whenever you have private 
property, and money is the measure of all things, you will find society can scarcely 
ever be just or prosperous’ (U, Book I, p. 86), a comment that ‘At a stroke dismisses 
the elaborate ideology of status and custom that provided the time-honored 
justification for the uneven distributions of wealth in society’.100 To have absolute 
faith in the veracity of Hythloday’s narration, however, would be as misguided as 
implicitly trusting Utopian values. As David Wootton observes, Utopia is a Silenic 
text—an idea that is central to Renaissance folly and finds fuller exposition in the 
next chapter. The text as a whole is characterized by a sense of duplicity. Like the 
Silenus head, it ‘holds out the possibility that our ways of thinking about the world 
are fundamentally unstable; that the “right” viewpoint may be parasitic on the 
“wrong”’.101 This is most visibly evoked when the Anemolian ambassadors come to 
Utopia: 
 
 They had gold rings on their fingers, and sparkling strings of gems and pearls 
 hung from their caps. In short, they were dressed in exactly the way the 
 Utopians dress slaves to punish them, and children to amuse them. […] So 
 [the Utopians] bowed low to the lowliest servants […] as if they were great 
 lords, while they mistook the ambassadors themselves, since they were 
 wearing gold chains, for slaves, and showed them no respect at all.  
(U, Book II, p. 112) 
 
Discussing the topsy-turvy, Silenic nature of ‘all humaine thynges’ (PF, p. 37), 
Stultitia reflects that when one opens the Silenus head what was once was infamous 
becomes glorious: ‘quod infame, gloriosum’.102 The Utopians’ misapprehension 
opens up the Silenus head. The beggarly ‘slaves’ are venerated, while the 
distinguished ambassadors are thought to be mere ‘slaves’. Evidently, a 
‘transvaluation of values’ has taken place; more significantly, however, this 
transvaluation offers a satirical devaluation of the standards of this world, begging 
the question: ‘What’s aught, but as ’tis valued?’ (Troilus and Cressida, II. 2, 52). As 
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102 Opera Omnia Desiderii Erasmi, ed. by various, 9 vols (Amsterdam: E. J. Brill/London: Elsevier, 1964–
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Cusanus shows, far from being natural and intrinsic, value is relative, arbitrary, 
extrinsic and validated by custom alone.   
 This line of argument is supported by the exchange between a Friar and a 
Fool at Morton’s table. Even Hythloday, the ‘Nonsense-speaker’ himself, is unsure 
as to whether to relate this ‘ridiculous’ (U, Book I, p. 74) anecdote. The fool quips 
that Friars are the same as vagabonds and have thus been dealt with by the 
Cardinal’s idea that they should be ‘arrested and forced to work’ (U, Book 1, p. 75). 
Despite his profession, the monk fails to take the joke in good humour and becomes 
excessively angry: ‘He called his opponent a rascal, a slanderer, a tittle-tattle, and a 
“Son of perdition”. He quoted terrible threats at him out of the Bible’ (U, Book 1, p. 
75). Refusing to calm down, he evokes Papal authority: ‘we have a bull that decrees 
that anyone who mocks us is immediately excommunicated’ (U, Book 1, p. 76).  
 Wootton is quite right to point out that: 
 
 The friar and the fool are a silenus statue, offering two contrasting readings 
 of the Bible. The one claims to be a follower of Christ, but is in fact irascible, 
 ill-educated and quick to appeal to papal authority. The other presents 
 himself as a mere jester, but quoting scripture ‘was just the sort of thing he 
 was good at’.103 
 
But the ironies of this exchange, with its erudite fool and an ignorant friar,104 reach 
beyond their local context. The friar’s actions, which are tested against the wisdom 
of fool, confirm the wisdom latent in the fool’s joke. For all their faults, the 
Utopians delight in fools and hold in ‘contempt’ (U, Book II, p. 131) those, like the 
friar, who mock or attack them.105 
 This is not dissimilar to the way Utopia as a whole works. Utopia, on one 
level, is a joke, but it deals with the serious topic of secular power. By forcing 
readers to shuttle between the manifest inequalities of Tudor England, attacked in 
Book I, and the life of the Utopians unreliably narrated in Book II, and by forcing 
them to attend to the ironies and ambiguities that are generated by this process, the 
                                                
103 Wootton, ‘Introduction’, p. 30.  
104 The Friar’s ignorance and willingness to misuse scripture to justify his cause are exposed by his 
mistake when he quotes ‘The zeal of Thy house has eaten me up’ to justify his anger; as the marginal 
gloss explains: ‘Evidently the Friar, because of His Ignorance of Latin, Misuses “Zelus” (Zeal) as if It 
Were Neuter like “Hoc Scelus” (This Crime) (CWM, 4, p. 85) [eds. italics and capitalization].  
105 More uses the word ‘Moriones’ (CWM, 4, p. 192) for fools or simpletons; this unusual word would 
have recalled Erasmus’ pun on the author’s name in the title of his Praise (Moriae Encomium).   
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relative merits and failings of both models of power are diagnosed. In a discussion 
of the utopian genre, Fátima Vieira points out that ‘Utopia is, in fact, a game, and 
implies the celebration of a kind of pact between the utopist and the reader: the 
utopist addresses the reader to tell him about a society that does not exist, and the 
reader acts as if he believes the author’.106  
Playing and Mocking 
 
 Is that the king? I think you are fooling me. He seems to be a man in an 
 embroidered garment. 
—Thomas More107  
 
The enduring charisma of the fool, a creature who resides outside the domain of 
reason, lies in his ability to expose the fault lines of reason; Erasmus’ Folly shows 
how man is blinded to his better nature by philautia, while Hythloday argues 
persuasively that once money is abolished, then ‘Conflict and crimes are eliminated 
from society, just as a cancer is cut from the body’ (U, Book II, p. 158). ‘The 
mother of all mischief’, he continues, is the deadly sin of pride, ‘superbia’ (CWM, 
4, p. 242), because of which man is happy with his ‘good fortune’ only when it ‘is 
compared with the miseries of others’ (U, Book II, p. 158, p. 159). 
 But the fool is estranged from the explicit values of the society in which he 
finds himself; this perennial outsider habitually displays a lack of commitment to 
any one ideology. The court fool is politically powerless, despite the ways in which 
his mockery exposes the hypocrisy of those with political clout. And his ephemeral 
nature is further emphasized by Erasmus’ and More’s disorientating strategies of 
rhetorical disassociation. The former dons the mask of Stultitia ‘to embrace the 
whole world of things under the name of foolishness and to show that the whole 
sum of human felicity depends on Folly’ (CWE, 3, p. 126); the latter uses the 
complex play between the real More and the narrative’s Morus, who relates what a 
man called ‘nonsense-speaker’ had to say, to critique a model of reason based on 
self-preservation by comparing it to a place that does not exist.  
 Shakespeare’s mercurial fool Feste best embodies this disengagement from 
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107 The Latin Epigrams of Thomas More, ed. and trans. by Leicester Bradner and Charles Arthur Lynch 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 205.  
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the rules that govern the serious world: 
 
 Enter MARIA and [FESTE, the] clown 
 MARIA Nay, either tell me where thou hast been or I will not open my 
  lips so wide as a bristle may enter in way of thy excuse. My lady will 
  hang thee for thy absence. 
 FESTE Let her hang me. He that is well hanged in this world needs to 
  fear no colours. 
(Twelfth Night, I. 5. 1–5) 
 
Feste refuses to remain passively obedient to the whims of his mistress’ will. 
Although Maria upbraids him for his absence, Feste immediately renders her 
concerns absurd though his scurrilous punning; his quibble debases the power that 
the powers that be possess to punish disobedience.     
 Like Feste, Hythloday values his autonomy. Despite Morus’s and Peter Gilles’ 
arguments that he should put his humanist education and practical experience of the 
(new) world to good use by becoming an advisor to a prince, he stubbornly refuses 
to be committed to any particular king or country. In the Latin, this is evoked by 
wordplay; Gilles qualifies his suggestion to Hythloday that he should serve a king 
thus: ‘I meant not that you should be in servitude [seruias] but in service [inseruias] 
to kings’, but Hythloday rejoins that ‘there is only one syllable less than the other’ 
(CWM, 4, p. 54, 55). Tellingly, Ralph Robinson’s 1556 translation omits this 
potentially subversive wordplay. Hythloday’s ‘do[ing] as he please[s]’ (U, Book II, 
p. 61) recalls—perhaps deliberately—both Erasmus’ assiduous avoidance of 
commitment to one particular cause or state and his desire for intellectual autonomy, 
a desire that is encapsulated in his remarkable motto: ‘Concedo nulli, [I yield to 
none]’ (CWE, 12, p. 548), coined at around the at the time of the second edition of 
Utopia (1517–18). The most eminent humanist of his age, Erasmus, preferred not to 
join factions.  
 Hythloday follows Plato both in arguing that ‘Unless government shared the 
moral values and the rational approach of the philosopher it would not, because it 
could not, apply his advice’ and in believing that such commitment ‘would do the 
philosopher harm. It would divert him to no purpose from intellectual pursuits, and 
it would be bound to compromise his moral integrity’.108 What Morus calls 
Hythloday’s ‘eccentric wisdom’ (U, Book I, p. 83) would be out of place at court, 
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since kings—apart from those in Rabelais—are primarily interested in expanding 
their realms. However, Hythloday’s idealism comes across as egotistical, perhaps 
even a sublimated form of self-love; he uses an analogy of a philosopher who ‘sees 
people out in the streets, being soaked by a thunder storm’, but cannot ‘persuade 
them to get out of the rain and take shelter’ (U, Book I, p. 85), to express his critical 
relation to the universal unreason in which he finds himself. This one sane spectator, 
he continues, on a scene of universal madness: ‘will achieve nothing if they go out 
and join them [the madmen]’ (U, Book I, p. 85). In this, he adopts an attitude that 
corresponds to Lucretius’ and Stultitia’s Menippean perspective on ‘the 
innumerable tumults, and businesses of mortall men’ (PF, p. 70). Not without a 
degree of self-satisfaction, Lucretius reflects that  
  
 Nothing is more delightful than to possess lofty sanctuaries serene, well 
 fortified by the teachings of the wise, whence you may look down on the 
 others and behold them all astray and seeking the path of life: —the strife of 
 wits, the fight for precedence, all labouring night and day with surpassing toil 
 to mount upon the pinnacle of riches and lay hold on power. O pitiable 
 minds of men, O  blind intelligences.109   
 
The Utopians’ idea that human happiness consists mainly of avoiding pain, which 
Greenblatt argues is lifted from Lucretius,110 is evidently not the only thing that 
More borrows from De rerum natura. Taking such conspicuous pleasure in one’s 
intellectual superiority, however, sounds suspiciously like the conduct of proud 
people, who measure their success by the misery of others.  
 In contrast to Hythloday’s elitist idealism, Morus suggests that kings may in 
fact be guided by philosophy: 
 
 [B]ut not by this ivory-tower theorizing, which makes no allowances for time 
 and place. There’s another philosophy, better suited to politics, which 
 recognizes the play that’s being staged, adapts itself to playing a part in it, 
 revises what it has to say as the drama unfolds, and speaks appropriately for 
 the time and place. […] Play your part in it as best you can.  
(U, Book I, pp. 83–4) 
 
This debate is significant, because it is a dialectic that runs throughout the discourse 
of folly in Shakespeare and Erasmus. It seems one must choose between being a 
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player in the drama like Morus, or an outsider mocking the very conceits that the 
drama is based on, but whose mockery falls on deaf ears. For Stultitia, a philosopher 
in isolated superiority risks becoming one of ‘The vnkyndest kynde of men liuyng,  
[a] foolelosopher’ (PF, p. 10). She is talking about people like Jaques, who are so 
busy censuring the folly of others that they forget to recognise their own. They 
reject the common humanity they share by virtue of their corporeal nature, which is 
central to the philosophy of folly. They also deny themselves a hand in any 
achievable social change, unlike hard-nosed pragmatists like Morus, who believe 
that ‘if you cannot transform things for the better, you can at least make sure that 
they are no worse than necessary’ (U, Book 2, p. 84). The discourse of folly in 
Erasmus and Shakespeare debunks ‘ivory-tower theorizing’ as useless.  
 It would be credible to view Hythloday as akin to the philosophers satirized 
by Folly and Sidney, were it not for his response to Morus: 
  
 Christ forbade dissimulation, and he commanded those truths that he had 
 whispered into the ears of his disciples should be preached openly on street 
 corners. Most of what he taught is much more at odds with the common 
 customs of humankind than the policies I recommended in my speech. 
(U, Book 1, p. 85)  
 
There is no escaping the fact that the type of pragmatism, with its protean personae, 
that the worldly-wise Morus advocates is as much at odds with the kernel of Christ’s 
teaching as the ‘customs’ of Christian society are. Unable to change their ‘behaviour 
to conform with Christ’s commands’, preachers have ‘adapted his commands to 
their behaviour as if his standards were flexible’ (U, Book 1, p. 85). In this volte-
face, Hythloday’s desire for social reform modelled on the Utopians becomes a 
concrete set of practical measures, which, although more idealistic than Morus’ 
Machiavellian role-playing, still fail to live up to Christ’s ideal example.  
Essaying Folly 
 
 Only the fools are certain and assured. 
      —‘Of the Education of Children’111 
 
In his ‘Apologie of Raymond Sebond’, Montaigne has a revelation. He becomes 
aware that he is ‘A new figure: an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher’ (F, 
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Book 2, Chapter 7, p. 487). Anne Hartle shows that, far from being incoherent, 
‘accidental’ philosophy, ‘in contrast with deliberate philosophy’, is ‘non-
authoritative and purely human’.112 It is ‘human’ because it mocks thinkers soaring 
up to dizzying heights of abstraction—often by reminding them that they are flesh 
and blood; and it is ‘non-authoritative’ because it makes no claim to general 
validity. ‘Others fashion man’, writes Montaigne, ‘I repeat him; and represent a 
particular one’ (E, Book 3, Chapter 2, p. 451). ‘Montaigne’, writes Hartle, ‘invented 
the essay because he needed a new form to express not a “teaching” or a “system of 
thought”, but a way of being’.113 The peculiarities of an individual’s existence are, 
after all, incommensurate with the totalising impulse of systemisation.  
 Montaigne is every bit as scathing in his attacks on the serious philosophy of 
his day as More, Erasmus and St Paul are: 
 
 It is a thing worthy consideration, to see what state things are brought unto 
 in this our age; and how Philosophie, even to the wisest, and men of 
 best understanding, is but an idle, vaine and fantasticall name, of small use 
 and lesse worth, both in opinion and effect. 
       (E, Book 1, Chapter 25, p. 76) 
  
In contrast to much philosophy, the Essays do not offer a general theory, which is 
to be imposed on the contingent particulars of experience. Instead, they offer a 
response to the contingent particulars of experience, taking as their basis and 
incorporating into their method what Adorno calls the ‘non-identical’—by which he 
means that which is left by the wayside whenever one unequivocally identifies 
someone or something.   
 Perhaps for this reason, the Essays defy summarisation. Since no brief 
consideration could do them justice, I will limit myself here to illustrating the ways 
in which some of the Essays provide a conduit through which Erasmian ideas 
passed into Shakespeare’s drama. As far as Shakespeare’s favourite philosopher is 
concerned, the question is not was Erasmus an influence, but how was Erasmus an 
influence?114 Aside from their striking formal affinity with Erasmus’ Adages,115 the 
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preoccupation of the Essays with the particular features of their object adheres to 
Erasmus’ dictum, which he employs in defence of the adage as a philosophical 
form: ‘in the domain of literature, it is sometimes the smallest things which have the 
greatest intellectual value’ (CWE, 31, p. 14).  
 As Ruth Calder argues, in offering a ‘moral self-portrait’ of an individual, 
Montaigne follows Erasmus by rejecting ‘a universalizing mimesis […] in favour of 
the particular, the personal, the idiosyncratic’.116 Yet despite this—or perhaps 
because of this—Montaigne’s ‘ill-formed’ or grotesque representation of his 
thoughts and movements is strikingly philosophical, not least because it recurrently 
and playfully questions the limits of knowledge. The second half of this thesis 
speculates more specifically about the influence of the Essays on particular plays. 
For the rest of this chapter, I am concerned merely with teasing out the intellectual 
affinities between the anti-methodological methods of philosophising of Erasmus, 
Montaigne, Shakespeare and Adorno. Shakespeare’s foolosophy is non-
authoritative—and, as such, anti-authoritative too—and suspicious of any 
universalizing account of things.   
‘Tyrant custom’ 
 
Erasmus’ sustained polemic against the abuses of the clergy is premised on 
pointing out that the holy orders, especially the mendicant ones, view their dogma 
as divine, but fail to follow the explicit teachings of the Gospel. In his adage, ‘Dulce 
Bellum Inexpertis’, Erasmus suggests that ‘nothing is too villainous or too cruel to 
win approval, if custom recommends it’ (CWE, 35, p. 408). He then furnishes the 
reader with copious exempla, the most notable of which is the contention that in 
some civilisations ‘it was thought pious to feast on the flesh of one’s intimate 
friends’ (CWE, 35, p. 408). What passes for piety is not innate. It is a consequence 
of custom.  
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 ‘Of the Caniballes’ furnishes us with one of Montaigne’s most illuminating 
discussions of hypostatization, which focuses on the same taboo as Erasmus. 
Taboos are taboo, of course, precisely because they cannot be incorporated into 
existing models of knowledge, and in this respect, they are non-identical. Both 
thinkers ask how is it possible that something that seems manifestly abhorrent, such 
as cannibalism, can be perfectly acceptable in some cultures. Montaigne’s 
conclusion is justly famous: 
 
 I finde (as farre as I have beene informed) that there is nothing in that nation 
 [America] that is either barbarous or  savage, unless  men call that barbarisme 
 which is not common to them. As indeed, we have no other ayme of truth 
 and reason, than the example and Idea of the opinions and customes of 
 the countrie we live in.  
       (E, Book 1, Chapter 30, p. 101) 
  
He comes to the dispassionate conclusion that what is thought to be right and 
wrong is simply a consequence of custom—and thus of where and in what time one 
happens to be born. ‘[T]ruth’ and ‘reason’ are manufactured rather than innate. 
What is considered to be barbarous is merely what is radically different from one’s 
own opinions. For Erasmus, this is a consequence of philautia, that universal folly 
of the human race: ‘What race is so savage, or tongue so uncouth, as not to consider 
all others beneath it? What bodily form is so brutish as not to appear most beautiful 
to itself?’ (CWE, 31, p. 158). Erasmus and Montaigne expose what is taken to be 
innate moral superiority as blinkered stupidity, while More’s Hythloday goes even 
further, contending that the happiness of the Utopians can primarily be attributed to 
their ‘willingness to learn from others’ (U, Book I, p. 89). The chief resource of 
More’s brave new world is not the gold out of which the Utopians make their 
‘chamber pots’ (U, Book 2, p. 110); rather, it is the possibility of alternative ways of 
interacting with each other and understanding the world.     
 In his essay, Montaigne, like Erasmus, comes to the conclusion that it is not 
culturally sanctioned cannibalism that is irrational. Rather, it is the violent assertion 
of the innate superiority of one’s customs: ‘Whatsoever is beyond the compasse of 
custome, wee deeme likewise to bee beyond the compasse of reason, God knowes 
how, for the most part, unreasonably’ (E, Book 1, Chapter 30, p. 51). The manner in 
which ‘a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong gives it the superficial appearance 
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of being right’117 and causes humans to become enthralled by ideas of their own 
making is given explicit consideration in ‘Of Custom’. Montaigne sees custom, 
despite being mutable and relative to one’s society, as a force of gargantuan 
strength. It is ‘That monster Custom, who all sense doth eat’ (Hamlet, III. 4. 159). 
 What is important here is not so much the question of direct influence, but 
how Montaigne and Shakespeare have responded to a common intellectual heritage, 
steeped in Erasmian ideas, and come to a similar conclusion. They both see custom 
as mediating almost every aspect of social relations and experience: ‘there is 
nothing in mine opinion, that either she [custom] doth not, or cannot: and with 
reason doth Pindarus, as I have heard say, call her the Queen and Empresse of all-
the world’ (E, Book 1, Chapter 22, p. 50), writes Montaigne. A paradox apparent 
throughout his critique of cultural conventions is discernable here. While he is 
critical of treating transient cultural conventions as if they were natural, he not only 
bolsters his arguments against custom by continually invoking the authorities of the 
past, but he also recurrently inveighs against novelty and innovation in its various 
guises.  
 More’s Hythloday, however, attacks conservatives who evoke custom as if it 
were ‘an unanswerable argument’ (U, Book I, p. 62) on the grounds that: “Our 
present policies seemed good enough to our ancestors, and we can only wish we 
were as wise as they” (U, Book 1, p. 62), but who ‘don’t feel a moment’s hesitation 
in abandoning those of their policies that worked really well’ (U, Book 1, p. 62). 
This implies that custom is changeable. Indeed, what is really important about 
Montaigne’s conception of custom is that he sees it as something ubiquitous, so that 
even the so-called laws of nature are a consequence of custom: 
 
  The laws of conscience, which we say to proceed from nature, rise and 
 proceed of custome […] the chiefest effect of her power is to seize  upon us, 
 and so to entangle us, that it shall hardly lie in us to free ourselves from her 
 hold-fast, and come into our wits againe.  
       (E, Book 1, Chapter 22, p. 50) 
 
Custom is deception because it inculcates a false sense of authenticity. What are 
merely opinions ‘seeme to be the generall and naturall’ (E, Book 1, Chapter 22, p. 
51); even the ‘laws of conscience’ are a result of the ossification of mutable words 
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into immutable ‘nature’. Don Quixote is mad because of his rigid adherence to 
chivalry, to custom, albeit the custom of a bygone age:118 ‘there is’, comments the 
(less than) ingenious Hidalgo, ‘no disputing, or drawing of conclusions against the 
customes of the time’ (DQ, Book IV, Chapter XII, p. 255).  
 Shakespeare dramatizes the perils of custom with characteristic ambivalence, 
but in various ways associates it with irrationality. In King Lear, Edmund rails:  
 
 Thou, nature, art my goddess; to thy law 
 My services are bound. Wherefore should I 
 Stand in the plague of custom, and permit 
 The curiosity of nations to deprive me, 
 For that I am some twelve or fourteen moonshines 
 Lag of a brother? Why bastard? Wherefore base? 
       (I. 2. 1–6) 
 
This is a reasonable request. But it comes from a character whose unnatural, 
illegitimate birth is mirrored by his unnatural, parricidal behaviour. Unlike 
Montaigne, Edmund construes ‘nature’ in a proto-Darwinian sense as something 
diametrically opposed to, rather than formed by, social custom. Yet this construction 
of nature is undermined by the reversion to ‘nature’ that Edmund professes. 
Precisely because it is custom that prevents illegitimate or younger children from 
inheriting, he rejects the ensnaring ‘curiosity of nations’, their fastidious adherence 
to custom.  
 Othello claims that ‘The tyrant custom, most grave senators, | Hath made the 
flinty and steel couch of war | My thrice-driven bed of down’ (I. 3. 227–9). This 
metaphorical fusing of custom with tyranny may have been derived from Erasmus’ 
Colloquies, in one of which ‘Custom’ is described as ‘more powerful than any 
tyrant’ (CWE, 40, p. 835)—Shakespeare’s school almost certainly used the 
Colloquies (as well as De Copia and the Adages) to teach intermediate-level 
Latin.119 But Othello’s sinister personification of custom as a tyrant develops the 
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metaphor to suggest more strongly several things that the play as a whole shows. It 
implies that custom is a ‘tyrant’ because it is all-controlling and dangerously 
irrational, given to pursuing whims as if they were absolutes. Like a tyrant, it is 
undemocratic, since it is supported and perpetuated by the ruling elite. The 
uncustomary love between Desdemona and Othello is destroyed partly because it is 
considered unnatural. Brabantio repeatedly invokes the concept of nature to show 
that his daughter’s love is ‘Against all the rules of nature’ (I. 3. 102; see also 63, 
97). Nature is exposed as nothing other than the cultural construct it was and still is. 
The positive facts about the natures of things and people, which make up the 
knowledge of the worldly-wise, are shown to be deceptive. Thus the discourse of 
folly, which consistently interrogates custom, gains philosophical credibility, since 
its cardinal virtue lies in its capacity to penetrate the façade of custom. 
Identity Critique  
          
For Montaigne, inner and outer nature are far from static or certain; in his Essays, 
he aims to capture one particular man’s continually fluctuating experience of the 
world. In the opening pages, he dispels the idea that it is possible to determine ‘the 
rules of nature’, which Brabantio invokes for instrumental ends: ‘Surely, man is a 
wonderful, vaine, divers, and wavering subject: it is very hard to ground any 
directly-constant and uniforme judgement upon him’ (E, Book 1, Chapter 1, p. 2). 
And later, in ‘An Apologie of Raymond Sebond’, Montaigne argues along similar 
lines to Cusanus. In this essay, he uncharacteristically refers to the key ideas and 
texts of biblical folly, which were discussed earlier in this chapter; he even informs 
the reader that he writes with Ecclesiasticus’ terse rhetorical question to mankind, 
which is rendered by the Authorized Version as ‘Why is earth and ashes proud?’ 
(KJV, 10. 9), engraved in the beam above his head. He defends Sebond’s thesis that 
the natural world is a general revelation, while the Bible offers specific revelations, 
on the grounds that knowledge does not make a man good: ‘The simple and the 
ignorant (saith St. Paul) raise themselves up to heaven, and take possession of it; 
whereas we, with all the knowledge we have plunge ourselves downe to the pit of 
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hell’ (E, Book 2, Chapter 7, p. 278). 
 This corresponds to the praise of the simple-minded that Folly’s third avatar 
offers; the only clear rule is that there are no clear rules. As Cusanus also argued, 
man should attempt to fashion a negative awareness of the limits of his knowledge: 
 
 In few, there is no constant existence, neither of our being, nor of the 
 objects. And we and our judgement and all mortall things else do 
 uncessantly rowle, turn and passe away. Thus can nothing be certainely 
 established, nor of the one nor of the other; both the judgeing and the 
 judged being in continuall alteration and motion. We have no 
 communication with being; for every humane nature is ever in the middle 
 betweene being borne and dying. 
     (E, Book 2, Chapter 7, p. 340)  
 
As Cave argues, however, this idiosyncratic defence of natural theology is more 
interested in sounding the depths of Pyrrhonist thought, ‘a philosophy constantly in 
suspense, affirming no single opinion or position other than that of perpetual 
enquiry’ than defending Sebond.120 Montaigne engages with the age-old Christian 
topos of the mutability of the world. But the difference is that he views nature, both 
in the sense of the natural world and human nature, in a Heraclitian manner. The 
consequence of this is that ‘if everything is in a state of flux, so too is language; in 
which case nothing is knowable in the sense that nothing can be expressed 
immutably and clearly’.121  
 Alongside his criticism of the solidification of historically contingent actions 
into immutable customs, Montaigne presages Adorno’s three-fold critique of 
identity thinking. For Albrecht Wellmer, the central preoccupation of Adorno’s 
philosophy lies in working out how the ‘non-identical’ can be employed as a tool for 
the ‘critique of identity’,122 a critique formulated with precision in Adorno’s 
Lectures on Negative Dialectics: 
 
 The concept is always less than what is subsumed under it. When a B is 
 defined as an A, it is always different from and more than the A, the concept 
 under which it is subsumed by way of a predicative judgment. […] However, 
 in a sense every concept is at the same time more than the characteristics that 
 are subsumed under it. If […] I speak of ‘freedom’, this concept is not 
                                                
120 How to Read Montaigne (London: Granta, 2007), p. 40.  
121 Screech, Montaigne and Melancholy, p. 76.  
122 ‘Adorno and the Difficulties of a Critical Reconstruction of the Historical Present’, trans. by Frederik 
van Gelder, <www.amsterdam-adorno.net/T_wellmer_twa.pdf>, p. 2.  
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 simply the unity of the characteristics of all the individuals  who can be 
 regarded as free on the basis of a formal freedom within a given constitution 
 […] the concept of freedom contains a pointer to something that goes 
 well beyond those specific freedoms, without our necessarily realising 
 what this additional element amounts to. 
(LND, p. 7 [Adorno’s italics])  
 
Every identity, by which Adorno means positive fact or objective thing, upon 
which cognition depends, is shadowed by that which it is not, its ‘non-identity’, in a 
threefold way.  
 First, the simple fact that two things are never quite the same is overlooked 
by the identifying gesture or ‘predicative judgment’, which seeks to classify the 
particular as an example of a given category, rather than enquire into the specifics of 
the object. Second, the concept of a thing is extraneous to the thing itself—to put it 
reductively, the periodic table is not the chemical elements themselves. Third, in 
grand, abstract concepts, such as freedom, salvation, or love, the concept far 
exceeds any possible positive objective experience of it. Freedom evidently does not 
simply mean comparative legislative freedom for most people in the West, any more 
than the overall concept of love signifies a specific romantic assignation between 
two (or more) people. For these reasons, it is possible to maintain that concepts are 
always ‘less than’ and ‘more than’ what is ‘subsumed under them’. The argument 
attests to the innately paradoxical procedure of identifying something, of saying 
what something is by referring it to what it is not.   
 While Adorno’s ‘critique of identity’ may sound pretty abstract, it is 
necessary to bear in mind that he considered the horrors of the twentieth century and 
the catastrophes of history to be a direct result of ‘identity thinking’, a type of 
thought that denies difference and the provisional nature of categories. It is, 
however, necessary to think and speak using identity, although this does not mean 
that identity is ‘natural’. Simon Jarvis argues that, for Adorno, ‘the thought of 
reconciled non-identity’123––in other words, a mode of speculation that remains 
aware that the foundations of identity are built on the quicksand of non-identity––
resists the totalitarian tendencies of what Adorno calls ‘idealist-identitarian’ (ND, p. 
47) thought. Because ‘Dialectical thinking wants to say what something is, whilst 
identity thinking says what something falls under, of what it is an example or 
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representative—what it is therefore is not itself’ (ND, p. 149), the reconciliation of 
non-identity with the subject is only possible through dialectics.   
  Strikingly, in the ‘Apologie’, Montaigne likewise suggests that the very 
nature of cognition hinders itself:  
 
 [T]he privilege whereof our soule vaunts, to bring to her condition 
 whatsoever it conceiveth, and to despoile what of mortall and corporall 
 qualities belongs unto it, to marshall those things which she deemed 
 worthie her acquaintance, to disrobe and deprive their corruptible 
 conditions, and to make them leave as superfluous and base garments, 
 thicknesses, length, depth, weight, colour, smell, roughnesse, 
 smoothnesse, hardnesse, softnesse, and all sensible accidents else, to fit and 
 appropriate them to her immortall and spirituall condition […]. 
       (E, Book 2, Chapter 7, p. 268) 
 
It is in the nature of subjectivity, Montaigne suggests, to assimilate, to ‘bring to her 
condition’, whatever it apprehends. The mind renders the object an exemplum of a 
preconceived category, which belies the mutability that so perplexes Montaigne. 
The object’s specific features are displaced by presupposed attributes, which, unlike 
‘mortall and corporall qualities’, are not historically contingent. Bodies rot, while 
‘qualities’ do not. To enable objects to be conceptualized—not to mention 
exchanged with other objects, likewise ‘disrob[ed]’ of their real features—they must 
be measured in some way. Montaigne thus scorns realism, which views these 
external, quantifiable features of ‘thicknesses, length, depth, weight, colour, smell, 
roughnesse, smoothnesse, hardnesse, softnesse’ as metaphysical forms, seeing them 
instead as fictions imposed on the object that hinder an immanent understanding of 
the thing itself.  
 Montaigne elsewhere anticipates the third part of Adorno’s identity 
critique—the argument that the possibilities inherent in grand, abstract concepts 
reach beyond any possible specific experience of them: ‘We easily pronounce 
puissance, truth, and justice; they be words importing some great matter, but that 
thing we neither see nor conceive’ (E, Book 3, Chapter 8, p. 279). In order to 
suggest that the full import of humanly-fashioned concepts is inconceivable, 
Montaigne echoes the passage from Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians, which 
emphasizes the inexpressible joys of salvation thus: ‘the Eye hath not seen, nor ear 
heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath 
prepared for them that love him’ (KJV, 2. 9), the passage Shakespeare’s Bottom so 
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brilliantly bungles.  
 In the same essay, Montaigne paraphrases an argument made by the 
Grammarian Priscian:  
 
 Our contestation is verball. I demaund what Nature, voluptuousnesse, 
 circle, and substitution is? The question is of words, and with words it is 
 answered. A stone is a body: but he that should insist and urge: And what is a 
 body? – A substance. And what is a substance? and so goe-on, should at last 
 bring the respondent to his Calepine or wits end. One word is changed for 
 another word, and often more unknowne. I know better what Homo is 
 then I know what Animal is, either mortall or reasonable. 
       (E, Book 3, Chapter 8, p. 602) 
 
Juliet, when she comments ‘What’s in a name? That which we call a rose | By any 
other word would smell as sweet’ (Romeo and Juliet, II. 1. 85-6), is not the only 
early modern character to be aware of the diremption of res and verbum. Concepts 
such as ‘nature’, Montaigne suggests, are linguistic constructs.  
 In the ‘Apologie’ he extols Erasmian simplicity by suggesting that reason’s 
discourses hinder rather than help man’s understanding of the object, or own nature: 
 
 It is credible that there are natural laws, as may be seen in other creatures; but 
 in us they are lost; that fine human reason butts in everywhere, domineering 
 and commanding, muddling and confusing the face of things in accordance 
 with its vanity.  
       (F, Book 2, Chapter VII, p. 532) 
 
It is through the open-ended essay, which does not seek to appropriate the object of 
its discourse, that speculation can be unshackled from identity-thinking. The essay 
makes no claims to ‘totality’ (TEF, p. 165), or coherence; it establishes no ‘system’ 
(TEF, p. 160). ‘These universall judgements’, which characterize “deliberate 
philosophy”, reflects Montaigne, ‘say nothing at all’ (E, Book 3, Chapter VIII), 
while the essay offers the ‘provisional ordering of an encounter’, in which ‘the self 
and the object define each other, but only in a temporary way’.124  
 For this reason, in his discussion of the ‘Essay as Form’, Adorno quotes 
György Lukács’ Soul and Form; the integrity of the essay as a form of speculation 
inheres in its anti-systematic nature: 
 
 ‘The essayist dismisses his own proud hopes which sometimes lead him to 
                                                
124 Graham Good, The Observing Self: Rediscovering the Essay (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 4.  
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 believe that he has come close to the ultimate: he has, after all, no more to 
 offer than explanations of the poems of others, or at best of his own ideas. 
 But he ironically adapts himself to this smallness—the eternal smallness of
 the most profound work of the intellect in face of life’.  
         (TEF, p. 158)   
 
No universal judgement is possible in this form, for it is bound to its ever-changing 
object; it is moulded by its topic of discourse and the process of reflection. For Erich 
Auerbach, this realisation enables Montaigne to get to the heart of the human 
condition: ‘Of all his contemporaries he had the clearest conception of the problem 
of man’s self-orientation; that is, making one’s self at home in existence, without 
fixed points of support’.125 Montaigne reflects on the comparative poverty of the 
essay form with a scatological metaphor. He takes no pride in his disordered 
discourse. It is abject, shit: ‘the excrements of an ould spirit, sometimes hard, 
sometimes laxative; but ever indigested’ (E, Book 3, Chapter 9, p. 531).  
 The essay offers its readers no ‘hierarchy of concepts’ (TEF, p. 166); as 
Auerbach contends, Montaigne sees that the problem with ‘systems of moral 
philosophy’ lies in ‘the tendency of their methodology to disguise the reality of 
life’.126 Adorno openly attacks the ‘tendency’ for method to obscure the multifarious 
nature of existence and the dynamic nature of thought. Not only does he inveigh 
against philosophy’s ‘metamorphosis [Verwandlung] into method’ (MM, p. 13; 
[MM, p. 15]), but he also views the essay as the primary historical form that 
attacked dry formalism: ‘Doubt about the unconditional priority of method was 
raised, in the actual process of thought, almost exclusively by the essay’ (TEF, p. 
157). Montaigne’s fellow essayist, William Cornwallis, cuts to the chase when he 
comments that Montaigne ‘speaks nobly, honestly, and wisely, with little method, 
but much judgment’.127  
 In a paradoxical vein, Adorno reflects that ‘The law of the innermost form of 
the essay is heresy. By transgressing the orthodoxy of thought, something becomes 
visible in the object, which it is orthodoxy’s secret purpose to keep invisible’ (TEF, 
p. 171); by making no universal claims and by fashioning an anti-systematic and 
anti-philosophical philosophical system, Montaigne’s essays estrange the very 
                                                
125 Mimesis, p. 311.  
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127 The Essays by Sir William Cornwallis the Younger, ed. by D. C. Allen (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1946), p. 44.  
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building blocks of thought—in the sense of both the everyday cognition of objects 
and people and of orthodox philosophical thought. In the last analysis, it is a sense 
of negativity that Erasmus’, Montaigne’s and Shakespeare’s discussions of the 
human condition share. They imply that at the heart of being human is an inability 
to get to the essence of things. But a partial understanding of the human condition, 
lies in the realization that one is flawed—in a sense, a fool.  
 True folly, Erasmus, Montaigne and Shakespeare suggest, consists in 
attempting to establish unequivocal positive knowledge of the nature of things, 
one’s essential self, or God. To follow the famous humanist mantra, gnōthi seauton, 
and to know one’s self is to have an awareness of the limitations of concepts, 
language and cognition. What is remarkable about these thinkers’ negativity, 
however, is that it is tempered by comic self-awareness. Their ambivalent laughter 
makes a mockery of both the serious world’s philosophical systems and their own 
scepticism, which they behold from a healthily ironic position of the sort David 
Hume famously recommends in his Treatise of Human Nature: ‘A true sceptic will 
be diffident of his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical 
conviction’.128 ‘If I have a desire to laugh at a foole’, reflects Montaigne with his 
tongue in his cheek and in an inadvertent paraphrase of Seneca: ‘I neede not seeke 
one farre; I laugh at my selfe’ (E, Book 2, Chapter 25, p. 387).   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
128 A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by Ernest C. Mossner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), p. 273.   
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CHAPTER 3 
OPENING THE SILENUS:  THE FOOL’S TRUTH 
 
 All humaine thynges are lyke the Silenes or double images of Alcibiades, 
 have two faces much vnlyke and dissemble that outwardly seemed death, yet 
 looking within ye shoulde fynde it lyfe and on the other side what seemed 
 lyfe, to be death: what fayre to be foule what riche, beggarly: what cunnyng, 
 rude: what strong, feeble […] Breifly, the Silenus ones beying vndone and 
 disclosed, ye shall fynde all things [are] tourned into a new semblance.  
––PF, p. 37. 
       
In The Symposium, Alcibiades suggests that Socrates is akin to a ‘Silenus statue’.129 
This is because there is an absolute disjunction between the philosopher’s foolish 
appearance in the world—his notorious ugliness, his incessant infatuations with 
beautiful young men, and his poverty—and the ‘moderation’, ‘strength’ and 
‘beauty’130 of his innermost thoughts, which ‘despised all things for which other 
mortals run their races’ (CWE, 34, p. 263). These statues, observes Erasmus in his 
famous adage, ‘Sileni Alcibiades’ (1515), were commonly carved in the shape of 
Bacchus’s tutor, Silenus: ‘the court buffoon of the gods of poetry’ (CWE, 34, p. 
264). They were ‘small figure[s] of carved wood, so made that they could be 
divided and opened. […] When they were closed they looked like a caricature of a 
hideous flute-player, when opened they suddenly displayed a deity’ (CWE, 34, p. 
262). 
 It is easy to see how this reversible image came to encapsulate the 
paradoxical wisdom of folly and folly of wisdom, which, from Erasmus to 
Cervantes, is a striking feature of many of the most significant philosophical and 
literary texts of the Renaissance. Erasmus’s word for the reversal of values that the 
Silenus statue makes possible, writes Jonathan Bate, is ‘“praeposterum,” a 
rhetorical figure of reversal. The English translation of this adage aptly uses the 
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word “topsy turvy”.131 Walter Kaiser explains the seemingly infinite self-generative 
ironies of the Praise by evoking the idea of the Silenus,132 while Michael Screech 
examines its surprising centrality to Erasmus’ ‘theology of ecstasy’.133 As I showed 
in the previous chapter, David Wootton argues that More’s Utopia must be 
interpreted as a Silenus;134 and Terence Cave analyses the significant role this 
duplicitous little statue plays in shaping the philosophical content and literary form 
of Rabelais and Montaigne’s works.135 Claudia Corti goes so far as to describe 
Erasmus’ ‘enormous’ influence on early modern English literature with a 
deliberately Silenic image: ‘embedded within Shakespeare, Nashe, Ascham, Wilson 
and Puttenham […] lay Erasmus, with that ironic smile of his, as immortalized by 
Holbein’.136   
  Not least because Alcibiades behaves foolishly, the image of the Silenus 
head has been equivocal from its inception. Since he wanders into the Symposium 
late and drunk, we can infer that while he may find Socrates’ ‘moderation’ laudable, 
he does not feel compelled to imitate it; his encomium of Socrates’ wisdom and 
‘moderation’ is decidedly double-edged. Alcibiades is both impressed and appalled 
that, despite his multiple attempts to entrap him, the philosopher refused to be 
physically ‘gratified’ by him.137 Socrates refused to ‘strike a bargain’ with him, in 
which knowledge is traded for sex;138 as he points out, not only does Alcibiades 
misconceive the nature of love, but also this transaction does not make sense even 
by commercial standards, since Socrates would be trading the ‘gold’ of his 
knowledge ‘in exchange for [the] bronze’ of the latter’s body.139 At the end of the 
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Symposium, Socrates contends that Alcibiades’ ‘Silenus-play’ itself has a deceptive 
double nature. It furnishes the spurned lover with a way of venting his inner 
frustrations in the guise of praise.140   
 But this disjunction between inner and outer is not simply a fixture of 
Platonic thought that was rediscovered by such editors as Lorenzo Valla and 
Erasmus. It is present in the vast corpus of medieval penitential and confessional 
literature. As David Aers argues, ‘the whole medieval penitential tradition involves 
a fundamental and perfectly explicit distinction between inner and outer’, which 
harks back ‘at least as far as Augustine’s Confessions’.141 Medieval mystical writing 
is closely related to the devotional literature that flourished in Latin and the 
vernacular throughout the Middle Ages. While it is by nature idiosyncratic and thus 
generically heterogeneous, medieval mystical writing is premised on the idea that 
there is a distinction between the revelation of the divine essence, experienced 
internally, and the experience of external realities. Additionally, it is concerned with 
the epistemic problems arising from attempting to communicate and evaluate the 
idiosyncratic experience of religious ecstasy.  
 Space permits neither a consideration of the ways in which the affective piety 
of the mystical tradition fed into the devotio moderna in which Erasmus was 
brought up, nor of how this tradition continued to exert an influence on writing 
about interiority and duplicity in the early modern period. All that can be done here 
is to highlight some of the insights and techniques of negation that the anonymous 
author of The Cloud of Unknowing employs. The visionary cum narrator insists that 
would-be mystics must renounce positive human categories, images and words to 
achieve a state of ‘unknowyng’ because ‘þou maist neiþer see [H]im cleerly by liȝt 
of understonding’.142 Even in this state, free of the mediating influence of ideology 
and language, the visionary does not see God; rather, he intuits His absence—he 
must ‘bide in þis derknes […] evermore criing after [H]im’.143 The narrator 
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recurrently attacks what he calls ‘ymaginatiif witte’,144 by which he means the 
judging subject; far from making sense of the world by categorizing and 
manipulating its objective elements, this mediating ‘witte’ falsifies experience by 
indulging in the processes of categorisation and measurement. It fills man with 
human knowledge that prevents him from achieving a state of kenosis, in which 
God’s love can be experienced, albeit negatively.  
 Erasmus was the first thinker to connect the Christian via negativa, so 
powerfully evoked in The Cloud of Unknowing, with the self-revelation of 
Socrates—considered by the Oracle at Delphos to know something precisely 
because he admitted that he ‘knows nothing’.145 If we trace the key arguments of 
Erasmus’ ‘Sileni Alcibiades’, which was translated into every major European 
vernacular, including English in 1543,146 then many of his chief linguistic, social 
and theological preoccupations can be discerned. Initially, he argues that there is a 
difference between the inner core and outer appearance of true philosophers and 
apostles: ‘they wear what is most contemptible […] concealing their treasure with a 
kind of worthless outward shell and not showing it to uninitiated eyes’ (CWE, 34, p. 
264); such prophetic souls have drunk from ‘the true fountain head [of] heavenly 
wisdom, against which all human wisdom is mere folly’ (CWE, 34, p 263). Their 
revelation confounds earthly cleverness and discourse. In other words, it is not that 
we are too naïve to get to the truth, but rather that we are too sophisticated.  
 Next he contends that Scripture has a doubly Silenic nature. First, the reader 
must not ‘pause at the surface’ because all the allegories, ambiguities and textual 
instabilities make it seem ‘ridiculous’ (CWE, 34, p. 267). Instead, they must attempt 
to  ‘pierce the heart of the allegory’ and ‘open up the Silenus’, so that they can 
‘venerate the divine wisdom’ (CWE, 34, p. 267). Second, as Erasmus puts very 
clearly in the mouth of an educated layman in his Colloquies: ‘What the Old Law 
taught under a veil, the New Law placed before the eyes’ (CWE, 40, p. 167). For 
Erasmus, then, the importance of the Old Testament and pagan texts like The 
Symposium lies in what is hidden beneath the surface. When read correctly, such 
writings display a partial and imperfect prefiguration of Christ and his apostles’ 
                                                
144 Ibid., p. 12. 
145 The Symposium, p. 216c.  
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explicit teachings (see CWE, 3, p. 127 et passim).  
 Erasmus then rephrases the argument that he makes most explicitly in his 
Enchiridion Militis Christiani (1503), contending that in human nature there is 
perpetual strife between embodied existence and the being-for-the-Spirit that 
characterizes Paul’s ‘fools for Christ’s sake’ (I Corinthians, 4. 10): 
 
 In this world there are, as it were, two worlds, which fight against each other 
 in every way, one gross and corporeal, the other heavenly and already 
 practicing with all its might to become what it one day will be.   
        (CWE, 34, p. 276) 
 
The coup de théâtre of his essay, however, is when he posits a deliberately 
provocative question: ‘what of Christ? Was not he too a marvelous Silenus? His 
appearance was not only human, but also a poor, even wretched human?’ (CWE, 34, 
p. 264). In the figure of Christ there is an absolute disjunction between appearance 
and essence. God’s embodiment provides a ‘cheap’, mortal ‘setting’ for that which 
is immortal and perfect, a ‘glorious pearl’ (CWE, 34, p. 264). It is ultimately for this 
reason that the Christian ‘picks out what is least visible to the eye and pass[es] over 
all the rest or using them with a measure of contempt […] he draws his principles of 
judgment entirely from what is within’ (CWE, 34, p. 268).  
 Erasmus plays on the idea that if the mean is splendid, the foolish is wise and 
the insubstantial substantial, then the inverse must also be true; he regrets that 
earthly experience, reality, is akin to a reversed Silenus head. The essence is absurd 
and ugly, but the external appearance is grand. The holy essence of things has been 
etiolated: the ceremonies and sacraments of the Church Militant are akin to ‘seeing 
the Silenus from the outside’ (CWE, 34, p. 167). This incredulity at visual signifiers 
of faith and his critique of the hypostatization of ceremonies in the Church 
corresponds with Reformist arguments, such as Luther’s and Von Hutten’s, against 
ostentatious displays of faith, which they saw as idolatrous attempts to represent the 
divine,147 and with the deep unease that the medieval mystics felt about the 
iconography of their world.   
 At the conclusion, Erasmus’ gloss itself opens up, betraying its double nature 
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and suggesting that exegesis is always an indeterminate procedure: that which 
promises to get to the essence of things may just have been captivated by 
appearances all along. What Erasmus has been writing is seriocomic, since the 
adage has grown from a drunken praise of a man’s wisdom for knowing nothing to a 
discussion of the way that the mankind is universally taken in by appearances. ‘Of 
course’, writes Erasmus, ‘it was Alcibiades in his cups, and his Sileni, that drew me 
to this very sober disputation’ (CWE, 34, p. 281). Erasmus even paints himself as a 
Silenic grotesque: with a characteristic act of self-effacement, he casts himself as a 
rash man, almost a fool, asking: ‘whither has the flood of my language carried me 
away, so that I, who profess myself a mere compiler of proverbs, begin to be a 
preacher?’ (CWE, 34, p. 281).  
  Michel Foucault argues that in Sebastain Franck’s and Erasmus’ works the 
Silenus epitomizes the fact that:  
 
 The abyss of folly into which men are plunged is such that the appearance 
 that men find there is in fact its complete opposite. But there was more: the 
 contradiction between truth and appearances was present in appearance itself, 
 for if the appearance was coherent with itself, at least it would be an 
 allusion to the truth, or some form of hollow echo. 
         (HM, p. 30) 
          
To put it another way, appearances are not wholly convincing in themselves, which 
is why we have a niggling sense that they are appearances rather than reality proper. 
For this reason, they cannot recall the essence of things. If they did, then their 
suggestion of their own incoherence would be part of this essence. For the historian 
of madness and deviancy, reality is abysmal and man is immured in a 
phantasmagoria, from which he cannot quite awake. Something not dissimilar to 
this is implicit in August Wilhelm Schlegel’s comment that the Shakespearean fool 
offers an ‘antidote to the emptiness and boredom of everyday life, a welcome 
interruption to traditional formalities’.148 If the quotidian world really were wholly 
fulfilling, there would be no call for the paradoxical wisdom of folly.    
 That appearances are not even ‘coherent’ with themselves proves essential to 
understanding Erasmus’ use of the Silenus for explicit critique of civil authority, the 
trappings of which, Erasmus suggests, are nothing other than an artful piece of 
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dissimulation, a costume (not quite) concealing man’s bestial inner nature:  
  
 Those of whom you would say, were you to inspect their outward bodily 
 form, that they are human beings and distinguished beings too; open the 
 Silenus, and inside you will find maybe a pig or a lion, a bear or a donkey.   
        (CWE, 34, p. 268) 
 
Such men are the opposite of the Silenic Christian Erasmus described: what was 
once ‘riche’ is shown to be ‘beggarly’. Erasmus’ capacity for critical thought is an 
attribute that the real-life Dutchman shares with his fictional doppelganger. In Sir 
Thomas More, More plays a practical joke on Erasmus, getting his manservant to 
pretend to be him to ascertain ‘if great Erasmus can distinguish | Merit and outward 
ceremony’ (III. 2. 39–40).149 As it transpires, he can. 
 This topos of the inverted Silenus, with its disjunction between inner poverty 
and external grandeur, recurs throughout Erasmus’ ‘Sileni Alcibiades’ and The 
Praise of Folly and can be discerned in Lear’s ‘reason in madness’ (IV. 6. 171): 
  
 LEAR  Thou hast seen a farmer’s dog bark at a beggar? 
 GLOUCESTER Aye, sir. 
 LEAR  And the creature run from the cur? There thou mightst 
  behold the great image of authority: a dog’s obeyed in office. 
  Thou rascal beadle, hold thy bloody hand! 
  Why doest thou last that whore? Strip thine own back; 
  Thou hotly lusts to use her in that kind 
  For which thou whipp’st her. The usurer hangs the cozener. 
  Through tattered clothes small vices do appear; 
  Robes and furred gowns hide all. Plate sin with gold, 
  And the strong arm of justice hurtles breaks; 
  Arm it in rags, a pigmy’s straw does pierce it. 
(IV. 6. 150–161) 
 
In this breathtaking indictment of society’s hypocrisies, Lear draws similar 
conclusions about the bestial essence that the signifiers of civil authority commonly 
hide. Perhaps the influence of the Praise, the Colloquies and the Adages goes a little 
deeper than the tantalising echoes I discussed in the previous chapter. The powers 
that be can hide their moral poverty with costumes (‘Robes and furred gowns hide 
all’), but even the minor misdemeanours of the poor can be discerned through their 
rags. As Shakespeare emphasises with his demotic analogy, however, those in 
                                                
149 Sir Thomas More in Shakespeare and Others: Collaborative Plays, ed. by Jonathan Bate and others 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), pp. 349–421 (pp. 381–385). 
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authority are placed there by mere chance—in a certain context even ‘a dog’s 
obeyed in office’. It is there that the demented king formulates explicitly what the 
action of the play implies; kings are but men and ‘man, proud man’, as Isabella 
reminds Angelo in Measure for Measure, is ‘Dressed in a little brief authority’ (II. 
2. 118).  
Silenic Style 
 
In ‘Of Physiognomy’, Montaigne explicitly mentions Socrates’ Silenic nature, 
suggesting that people these days would not appreciate him, since ‘they perceive no 
charms that are not sharpened, puffed out and inflated by artifice’ (F, Book III, 
Chapter 12, p. 965). His primary interest in Alcibiades’ image, however, is in how it 
relates to the register in which the philosopher chose to speak: 
 
 Socrates makes his soul move with a natural and common motion. […] His 
 mouth is full of nothing but carters, joiners, cobblers and masons. His are 
 inductions and similes drawn from the commonest and best-known actions 
 of man. Under so mean a form we should never have picked out the 
 nobility and splendor of his ideas.  
              (F, Book III, Chapter 12, p. 965) 
        
Beneath the surface of Socrates’ homely metaphors and the commonplaces, there is 
profound philosophical wisdom. Erich Auerbach argues that by the Renaissance the 
Silenus head had become a metonym for the humanist ideal of absolute clarity of 
expression. Montaigne and Rabelais saw it as representing ‘Socratic style [which] 
meant […] something free and untrammeled, something close to ordinary life, 
indeed, for Rabelais, something close to buffoonery’.150   
 This ideal is derived from Erasmus. He writes admiringly of Socrates that 
‘his language was simple and homely and smacking of common folk; for his talk 
was all of carters and cobblers’ (CWE, 34, p. 263), which Montaigne echoes. As 
Ruth Calder argues, because his language mixed rough and ready expression with 
philosophical content, ‘Socrates was seen as the archetype of the Spondaioloios’151 
or mixed mode, characteristic of Erasmus, Montaigne and Shakespeare. This 
                                                
150 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. by Willard R. 
Task (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953; repr. 2003), p. 279.  
151 From Grotesque to Silenus, p. 256.  
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register enables the ‘common characteristic of dissimulatio’,152 found in 
Montaigne’s twin rhetorical personae of Socrates and Horace, which consists of ‘an 
understated, self-deprecating form of self-expression, and a profound, smiling irony 
in their judgments’.153 Irony penetrates appearances. It brings ‘human wisdom back 
down to earth’ (F, Book III, Chapter 12, p. 966). Such a style furnishes Montaigne 
with the perfect form with which to posit what is perhaps the central tenet of his 
philosophy: namely that the ‘essence’ of human beings is ‘radically imperfect’.154  
 Montaigne pits the demotic speech of his Socratic persona against windy 
self-aggrandizement and vanity. His copious discourse is not wholly senseless, 
because it is through it he expresses his wry sense of irony, which enables him to 
become ‘a living Silenus’;155 like Socrates, Montaigne is ‘always one and the same’ 
(F, Book III, Chapter 12, p. 966), content with man’s absurdity and the radical 
contingency of things. For this reason, in ‘Of Experience’, ‘he contemplates his old, 
troublesome body with its disgusting excretions, and gazes upon it with the 
detachment of a wise and serene mind’. This is not to say, however, that he is some 
kind of ascetic mystic, who renounces the outer world and his body. Rather, this 
process enables Montaigne to re-experience a sense of philosophical wonder, 
especially at the most inconsequential and material things. Existence, he realizes, is 
not a riddle to be solved by reason: ‘the more I frequent myself and know myself, 
the more my deformity astonishes me, and the less I understand myself’ (F, Book 
III, Chapter 11, p. 958).  
 As I argued in the previous chapter, Montaigne makes the inadequacy of 
reason an object of philosophical inquiry. Thus the idea of the Silenus affects both 
the style of his self-deprecating self-presentation and his conception of philosophy 
as something that is intrinsically playful. But this playful character has been 
obscured and made ‘inaccessible for children’ (E, Book 1, Chapter, 25, p. 76) by 
modern ‘Sophists’ who, through their ‘quibbling’ and abstruse formalism, have 
given philosophy a grotesque outer appearance; they have set ‘Lady Philosophy […] 
foorth with a wrimpled, gastlie, and frowning visage’ (E, Book 1, Chapter, 25, p. 
                                                
152 Ibid., p. 256.  
153 Ibid., p. 256.  
154 Anne Hartle, Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), p. 160.  
155 Calder, p. 3.  
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76). However, the shining deity beneath this formidable—yet risible—exterior need 
be neither fastidiously sincere, nor something that has been transformed into an 
intangible method. Philosophy actually has a decidedly bacchanalian aspect: 
 
 There is nothing more beauteous, nothing more delightfull, nothing more 
 gainesome; and as I may say, nothing more fondly wanton: for she 
 [Philosophy] presenteth nothing to our eyes, and preacheth nothing to our 
 eares, but sport and pastime. 
(E, Book 1, Chapter, 25, pp. 76–77) 
           
Montaigne amplifies the playful nature of philosophy; his conception of philosophy 
corresponds to what Adorno—acknowledging Socrates, Montaigne and Nietzsche 
as his forerunners—was later to formulate so clearly as to warrant quotation at 
length: 
 
 We can perhaps express this scepticism, this element of fallibility that 
 philosophy must remain conscious of, and also of this spiritual element, by 
 saying that, in contrast to all the methods that have been taught in the 
 philosophical tradition, there is an essential element of play in philosophy. 
 This is the element that the growing trend to make philosophy scientific 
 would  like to expel, whether in accordance with the laws of the natural 
 sciences, or […] those of the philological disciplines. From this angle, I 
 think one of Nietzsche’s greatest achievements was the emphasis he placed 
 on the  element of play in his philosophy. In this respect, if we set aside the 
 Greeks, and especially Socrates, he really does stand out from the entire 
 philosophical  tradition, with the exception of the so-called moralists and 
 their predecessor Montaigne […] I would ask you not to think of this playful 
 element of philosophy as something merely psychological, but, as I just said, 
 as something essential to the discipline itself. This is because philosophy 
 goes beyond whatever secure knowledge that it possesses, and because it 
 knows  this, and because it is fallible, it also possesses this playful element 
 without which it could not be philosophy in the first place. It does not 
 just flirt with  playfulness in its motives or its methods; rather playfulness is 
 deeply embedded within it and candidly so. I would go so far to say that 
 without playfulness there is no truth. And I would say further that the 
 element of chance inherent in play makes an essential contribution to the 
 truth— as the  thing that under the general spell of identity thinking reminds 
 us of the unthinkable. In this connection, let me remind you of a saying that I 
 have myself applied to art in a spirit of playfulness, when I said that art is the 
 most serious thing in the world, but then again, not that serious.  
(LND, p. 90) 
 
There is a palpable connection between playfulness and a dissatisfaction with the 
given nature of things, which arises from a realization that things could be other 
than how they appear. Playfulness animates philosophical speculation by virtue of 
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the fact that it ‘goes beyond whatever secure knowledge it possesses’, but it retains 
an awareness of its own fallibility and provisonality.    
 The Casket Test 
 
Erasmus suggests that one of the original functions of Sileni was to provide a 
‘humorous surprise [that] made the carver’s skill all the more admirable’ (CWE, 34, 
p. 262): the ‘ugly outer folded back to reveal a golden statue of a god’ (CWE, 34, p. 
262). Shakespeare delights in exploiting his audience’s wider capacity for 
delusion—they are consistently taken in by appearances—by drawing attention to 
his own virtuoso skill at generating artifice. In the opening scene of The Merchant 
of Venice, Antonio displays a melancholic awareness that the world of appearances 
is not even, as Foucault, in his discussion of the Silenus, puts it, ‘coherent in itself’: 
‘I hold the world but as the world, Graziano—| A stage where every man must play 
a part, | And mine a sad one’ (I. 1. 77–79). Like Erasmus’ duplicitous Folly, who, 
moments after her discussion of the Silenic nature of things, reflects that ‘All this 
life of mortall men, what is it els, but a certaine kynde of stage plaie? wheras men 
come forthe one in one araie, an other in another, eche playing his parte’ (PF, p. 
38), Antonio invokes the theatrum mundi topos. 
 This theatrical self-awareness is not the only way in which The Merchant of 
Venice is strangely duplicitous. The play has two generic aspects: it is tragicomic. 
The play’s dual loci are like Erasmus’ Silenus turned inside out: underneath the 
peaceful appearance of Belmont lies the rancour and ruthless exploitation of the 
Venetian marketplace, while embedded in the demotic discourse of the clown’s 
speech lies a grasp of the play’s central concerns. When, for instance, Gobbo voices 
regrets about Jessica’s conversion to Christianity—‘This making of Christians will 
raise the price of hogs. If we grow all to be pork-eaters we shall not shortly have 
rasher on the coals for money’ (III. 5. 19–21)—he furnishes the audience with a 
reductio ad absurdum of the logic of the marketplace. His doctrinal ignorance 
implicitly illustrates how commodity, competition and exchangeability blind people 
to their better selves. The conversion of Jews had an even more important 
significance than an increase in the price of bacon: it presaged the Second Coming 
of Christ. 
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 The most obvious way in which the deceptiveness of Erasmus’ Silenus is 
evoked, however, is through a game within the play: the seriocomic casket test. 
Portia’s suitors must choose one of three caskets in order to marry her and acquire 
her fortune. Inside the winning casket lies a ‘picture’ of Portia (II. 7. 11). Each 
casket is inscribed with a riddle, which Morocco, the first to play the game, reads: 
 
  This first of gold, who this inscription bears: 
  ‘Who chooseth me shall gain what many men desire’. 
  The second silver, which this promise carries: 
  ‘Who chooseth me shall get as much as he deserves’ 
  This third dull lead, with warning all as blunt: 
  ‘Who chooseth me must give and hazard all he hath’. 
         (II. 7. 4–9) 
  
The correct interpretation of appearances, it seems, can enable us to fathom the 
essence of things. The audience is not informed which casket contains the image of 
Portia. They too are set an interpretative puzzle, which is only solved by a process 
of elimination, once two incorrect choices have been dramatized. Shakespeare 
assumes that his audience tends, in Paul’s words, to ‘look on things after the 
outward appearance’ (II Corinthians 10. 7). Morocco, who asks Portia not to be 
deceived by appearance or ‘complexion, | The shadowed livery of the burnished 
sun’ (II. 1. 1–2), is a naive realist, since he thinks essence corresponds to 
appearance. No one, he comments, could bear to encase the beautiful picture in 
‘gross’ (50) lead. Besides, he loves himself well enough to know that ‘A golden 
mind stoops not to shows of dross’ (20). But when he opens the golden casket, he is 
disabused of his illusions. He is greeted with a skull—in the age of vanitas 
iconography, shorthand for the poverty of all human wealth and ambition, a 
reminder that ‘all is vanity’ (KJV, Ecclesiastes, 1. 1). In its riddling couplets, the 
scroll, placed in the ‘empty eye’ of the skull, extols the wisdom of correctly 
interpreted commonplaces (or adages of the ancients): “All that glistens is not gold; | 
Often have you heard that told” (65–66).  
 When it is Aragon’s turn to play the casket game, he discloses its rules to the 
audience. He must not tell anyone which casket he chooses and he must leave if he 
chooses incorrectly. Most seriously, ‘if [he] fail[s] | Of the right casket’, he may 
never ‘woo a maid in way of marriage’ (II. 9. 11–14). The significance this final and 
binding vow would have in a society based on rigid structures of primogeniture 
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need hardly be pointed out. He is a little more successful in his interpretation. He 
will not choose gold, ‘what many men desire’: 
 
 ARAGON […] the fool multitude, that choose by show, 
   Not learning more than the fond eye doth teach, 
   Which pries not to th’interior, but, like the martlet, 
   Builds in the weather on the outward wall 
   Even in the force and road of casualty. 
(25–39) 
 
Like Montaigne in ‘Of Physiognomy’, Aragon does not assume that there is a 
correspondence between appearance and essence; later in the speech he employs the 
example of people who ‘cozen fortune’ and corruptly acquire ‘dignity’ (35–45) to 
prove this point. He chooses the silver casket. As its inscription predicts, he ‘get[s] 
as much as he deserves’ (48). He is presented with ‘a portrait of a blinking idiot’ 
(53). Here the Silenus has been reversed. Its appearance is precious silver, while its 
essence is a grotesque portrait of a fool. There is another verse with this portrait, 
which suggests that those who think themselves wise—that is, not ‘fool[s] of the 
multitude’—are actually foolish. Such is the self-satisfied knowledge of what Portia 
calls ‘deliberate fools’ (79); the riddle informs Aragon that such false knowledge 
characterizes old men—those who have grown grey, ‘Silvered o’er’ (68). Despite 
being among Folly’s greatest devotees, they consider themselves wise (PF, p. 17). 
The riddle allows him to marry (‘Take what wife you will to bed’), but informs him 
that ‘I [i.e. the blinking idiot] will ever be your head’ (69–70).  
 Bassanio is a good Machiavellian. This prodigal son of Venice advises 
Graziano that one must manipulate appearances to give the right impression: 
sometimes one must ‘Use all the observance of civility’; at other times, ‘put on | 
Your boldest suit of mirth’ (II. 2. 172–95). Perhaps because of this, when he comes 
to play the game, he is not taken in by appearances: 
 
 BASSANIO [aside] So may the outward shows be least themselves. 
   The world is still deceived with ornament. 
   In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt 
   But, being seasoned with a gracious voice, 
   Obscures the show of evil? In religion, 
   What damnèd error but some sober brow 
   Will bless it and approve it with a text, 
   Hiding the grossness with fair ornament? 
       (III. 2. 73–80) 
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Aragon’s arguments against duplicity in public life are reiterated. The legal system 
is corrupt and so are the clergy, who, as Erasmus’ Folly also intuits, justify their 
vices with deceptive readings and self-serving interpretations of scripture (see PF, 
p. 88–91). But Bassanio’s critique of these duplicities is itself expressed through a 
piece of linguistic ingenuity. The word ‘ornament’, signifying deceptive rhetorical 
embellishment, is itself expressed though the rhetorical ornament of epiphora.   
 Bassanio then rejects the ‘gaudy’ gold casket as ‘hard food for Midas’ (101) 
and the silver because it is a ‘pale and common drudge’ (106). He foolishly chooses 
the outwardly unpromising lead and is appropriately rewarded. Inside he finds the 
picture, and with it the right to marry Portia: 
 
      What find I here? 
  Fair Portia’s counterfeit. What demi-god 
  Hath come so near creation? Move these eyes? 
  Or whether, riding on the balls of mine, 
  Seem they in motion? Here the severed lips 
  Parted with sugar breath. So sweet a bar 
  Should sunder such sweet friends. Here in her hairs  
  The painter plays the spider, and hath woven 
  A golden mesh t’untrap the hearts of men 
  Faster than gnats in cobwebs. But her eyes— 
  How could he see to do them? Having made one, 
  Methinks it should have power to steal both his  
  And leave itself unfurnished. Yet look how far 
  The substance of my praise doth wrong this shadow 
  In underprizing it, so far this shadow 
  Doth limp behind the substance.   
(III. 2. 114–129)  
 
 On the surface, it seems as though Erasmus’ comment that ‘All humaine thynges 
are lyke the Silenes or double images of Alcibiades’ holds true in a straightforward 
way. The casket text has shown us that what ‘outwardly seemed death […] looking 
within ye shoulde fynde it lyfe and on the other side what seemed lyfe to be death: 
what fayre to be foule’. Beneath ‘what men most desire’, the gold casket, lies a 
skull; inside the leaden casket—compared by Morocco to a shroud—lies the lifelike 
picture of Portia. 
 However, when we look deeper this is not the case. When Bassanio opens his 
Silenus he gets a painting, a ‘counterfeit’ (115). This is not altogether surprising, so 
long as we recall that ‘Breifly, the Silenus ones beying vndone and disclosed, ye 
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shall fynde all things [are] tourned into a new semblance [breviter, omnia repente 
versa reperies, si Silenum aperueris]’.156 In fact, Bassanio’s eloquent praise of 
Portia’s beauty furnishes the audience with an ekphrasis—a vivid description of the 
beauties of a painting, an image of a person. Portia’s radiant natural beauty, which 
finds its realisation in art alone, is expressed primarily through two negations. First, 
the life-like quality of her eyes cannot be positively described in the way her 
hair⎯‘A golden mesh t’untrap the hearts of men’⎯can. Second, Bassanio’s 
description of this painting is as unequal—‘The substance of my praise doth wrong 
this shadow | In underprizing it’—as this inexpressibly beautiful painting is to 
capture Portia’s radiance: ‘so far this shadow | Doth limp behind the substance’. But 
this ‘substance’, which this painting—or rather this lover’s ekphrasis of this 
painting by a ‘demi-god’—cannot fully represent, is no ‘substance’ at all, for she is 
an actor in a play.  
Self-Serving Mercy 
 
 For the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: But we preach 
 Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks
 foolishness. 
(I Corinthians, 1. 22–24) 
 
Because it underlies what Paul calls the ‘great love wherewith He loved us’ 
(Ephesians, 2. 4), the peculiar ‘quality of mercy’ (IV. 1. 179) is of paramount 
importance for understanding the concept of holy folly. Owing to His excessive 
mercies—most significantly, the incarnation and the general resurrection—God 
appears foolish by the standards of the world. For Erasmus, as for St. Paul, God’s 
mercy is a truth that confounds earthly knowledge and logic, while in The Merchant 
of Venice, Shakespeare examines how seeming knowledge, infected with the 
pernicious logic of measurement and of quid pro quo, can blind people to their 
better intentions.  
 The most obvious evocation of mercy in Shakespeare is furnished by Portia’s 
frequently anthologized courtroom speech. ‘Mercy’, she argues 
 
      […] becomes 
                                                
156 Opera Omnia Desiderii Erasmi, ed. by various, 9 vols (Amsterdam: E. J. Brill/London: Elsevier, 1964–
2005), IV, p. 428 a–b.  
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  The thronèd monarch better than his crown. 
  His sceptre shows the force of temporal power, 
  The attribute to awe and majesty, 
  Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings; 
  But mercy is above this sceptred sway. 
  It is enthronèd in the hearts of kings; 
  It is an attribute of God himself, 
  And earthly power doth then show likest God’s 
  When mercy seasons justice.  
        (IV. 1. 184–193) 
 
The disguised Portia’s duplicitous testimony demonstrates how the relative truths 
of the marketplace can corrode even the suprarational truth of God’s foolish mercy. 
Her speech is an inside-out Silenus: its passionate, erudite appearance hides the fact 
that the Christians of the play are as bereft of mercy as the individual this speech 
effectively condemns.  
 Mercy, Portia argues, is a key quality of the earthly Christian weakness that 
is actually transcendent strength: ‘earthly power doth then show likest God’s | When 
mercy seasons justice’. She suggests that the real power of kings lies in the mercy 
‘enthroned in [their] hearts’. This inner disposition is greater than their ‘force of 
temporal power’ and its outward signifiers, a sentiment that recalls a similar claim 
made in Erasmus’ late sermon, De Immensa Dei Misericordia (1524): ‘A king’s 
power and majesty are often admired even by those who hate or envy him […] 
clemency and generosity are loved even by those who have no need of them’ (CWE, 
70, p. 231). Unlike ‘majesty’, mercy is a universally admirable quality. Portia 
recalls four other Erasmian ideas. First, Erasmus holds that visual signifiers of faith 
or power—such as ‘sceptres’—are at best a necessary evil and at worst a mere 
deceptive stage property, which conceals a depleted or deformed essence. Her 
appeal to Shylock’s conscience, in addition to her suggestion that regal power lies in 
the heart, displays a typically Erasmian emphasis on an internalized form of faith—
an idea de-sublimated by Gobbo’s mock catechism, in which the clown’s seemingly 
intense self-scrutiny actually enables him to follow the urges of his stomach (see II. 
2. 1–25).  
 Second, Portia suggests that the ethical way to live is through the imitation of 
Christ. Man should be merciful because it is an ‘attribute of God himself’. The 
Gospel should be lived, not merely paid lip-service to. Third, she suggests that man 
should actively seek his ‘salvation’ (195) through his deeds of mercy, which 
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‘mitigate[s] the justice’ of Shylock’s ‘plea’ (198). Shylock will not be saved unless 
he seeks out his salvation through deeds. Erasmus contends that divine mercy is 
what enables us to exist and that ‘good’ and ‘justice’ spring from an understanding 
of mercy (CWE, 70, pp. 132–5). Fourth, Portia echoes Erasmus’ emphasis on the 
reciprocity of mercy: ‘any gift to another human being for the love of Jesus is made 
in a worthy cause’ (CWE, 66, p. 137). She describes mercy as something that 
‘blesseth him that gives, and him that takes’ (182). The use of anadiplosis reiterates 
the reciprocity it denotes. And in a covertly self-interested, but nonetheless 
effective, argument she reflects that mercy should temper justice, because men are 
judged by their deeds of mercy in life. She asks Shylock: ‘how canst thou expect 
mercy giving none?’ Shylock, however, remains steadfast in his insistence on the 
immutability of letter of the law: ‘an oath, an oath! I have an oath in heaven | Shall I 
lay perjury on my soul? | No, not for Venice’ (222–25). His conscience drives him 
in the opposite direction from Portia’s.  
 Similarly, when Portia implores him for the sake of ‘charity’ (256), which 
Erasmus considers to be an offshoot of mercy (CWE, 70, p. 136), to use ‘some 
surgeon […] | To stop his wounds, lest he do bleed to death’ (252–3). Shylock 
answers prosaically: ‘I cannot find it. ‘Tis not in the bond’ (257). This legalistic 
logic is responsible for his downfall and, ethically speaking, for Portia’s too. The 
paradox of this scene is that the action of the play hinges on an absolute Judaic 
adherence to the letter of the law, which is confounded by Christian folly. But it 
characterizes Portia’s dexterous quibbling just as much as it does Shylock’s insistent 
demands that he is allowed to demand that his ‘bond’ is paid in full. Not ‘a jot of 
blood’ is to be spilt, if his ‘bond’ is to be kept to the letter; ‘just a pound of flesh’ 
(321) no ‘less nor more’ (320) is stipulated in the bond; and he is not to receive the 
compensation that Portia promised earlier because ‘He hath refused it in open court. 
| He shall have merely justice and his bond’ (333–34). 
 This paradox speaks volumes about the play as a whole. Kiernan Ryan and 
Zdravko Planinc both argue that the reason why these Venetians hate Shylock is not 
because of their difference from him, but because of their similarity to him.157 In 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno suggest that this hatred of 
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one’s reflection, so cogently examined in The Merchant of Venice, is the key to 
understanding Nazi hatred of the Jews: ‘in the image of the Jew, which the racial 
nationalists hold up before the world, they express their own being. Their craving is 
for ownership, appropriation, unlimited power […] at any price’ (DA, p. 177; [DE, 
p. 137]). In his famous threat, Shylock acknowledges that the rage of the Christians 
is that of Caliban’s in the mirror: ‘The villainy you teach me I will execute, and it 
shall go hard but I will better the instruction’ (III. 1. 60–61). 
 Planinc is correct to point out the hypocrisy of the Christian traders: ‘Neither 
Antonio nor Bassanio produce wealth; they merely redistribute it [...]. And yet that 
is the ostensible basis of their hatred of money-lending Jews’.158 Indeed, the state of 
Venice itself does not produce anything. It, too, merely redistributes wealth. This is 
hinted at when the Duke hesitates to release Antonio from his bond: ‘the trade and 
profit of the city | Consisteth of all nations’ (III. 3. 30–31). Erasmus’ adage, ‘To 
extract tribute from the dead’, in which he laments how ‘money breeding money’ 
(CWE, 32, p. 184) has become ubiquitous, voices comparable views to those tacit in 
The Merchant of Venice. Erasmus writes: ‘I would accept a usurer sooner than this 
sordid class of merchants, who use tricks and falsehoods, fraud and 
misrepresentation, in pursuit of profit from any source’ (CWE, 32, p. 185). 
 Antonio’s business must be seen for what it is: reckless venture capitalism. 
And Portia’s testimony must also be seen for what it is: perjury—the ‘plea’ is both 
‘tainted and corrupt’. As Planinc shows, she engages in entrapment; she appears in 
court in a disguise, ‘gives a false name and legal credentials’;159 is ignorant of the 
difference between ‘contract law and civil law’;160 and is the wife of one of the 
interested parties.161 It is safe to assume that her instrumental evocations of ‘mercy’ 
and ‘charity’ fall on deaf ears. Despite the fact that his losses have been common 
knowledge for some time, the Venetian Christians have conspicuously failed to give 
or lend Antonio ‘the money he needed in time, though he had often done so for 
them in similar circumstances’.162  
 This play shows the audience how even the radically egalitarian concept of 
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God’s mercy, which applies to all people of all times and of all creeds, can be used 
in earthly testimony as a means to an end. In Shakespeare’s Venice, even the 
concepts that ostensibly transcend the ruthless exploitation of the marketplace are 
not safe from it. The ironies of this play suggest that mercy cannot be realized in a 
world in which even the minds of the ostensibly faithful are ensnared by a ‘mad 
passion for property [that] has gone so far that there is nothing in the wide world, 
sacred or profane, from which something like usury cannot be extracted’ (CWE, 32, 
p. 185).   
Epilogue 
 
What Erasmus, Rabelais, Montaigne and Shakespeare all find so fascinating about 
the Silenus is its self-generative, self-reflexive possibilities. In Montaigne, Silenic 
style enables self-reflection, through which he becomes aware of his own 
limitations. Through Socratic ‘ignorance’ he reaches a negative truth: ‘Ignorance 
that knows itself, that judges itself and condemns itself, is not complete ignorance’ 
(F, Book 2, Chapter 12, p. 451). Truth is not a consequence of human knowledge. 
Rather, a truth of sorts is found negatively, through the unlearning of received 
wisdom. The Silenic texts of Erasmus, Montaigne and Shakespeare all delight in 
lifting the veil of appearances to point out the untruth of the way things are, of what 
passes for reality.  
 Of course, the paradox at the core of the Greek Sileni is that they did not 
contain a holy essence, but rather a gold statuette, a representation of a deity; 
similarly, the lead casket in The Merchant of Venice contains a semblance of an 
actor. It should not be forgotten that it is Erasmus’ Folly in her encomium to folly 
who invokes the idea of the Silenus as a metaphor for the truth of ‘[a]ll humaine 
thynges’ and that she points out that when you open the Silenus ‘ye shall fynde all 
things [are] tourned into a new semblance’. ‘[S]emblance’ carries multiple 
connotations of dissimulation, especially in early modern English:163 this duplicitous 
icon undermines its revelation that the reality is mere shadow play. But by doing so, 
it also embodies the need to have a sceptical attitude towards determinate values, 
even of the determinate value of universal indeterminacy.  
                                                
163 ‘Semblance’ primarily signifies the outward appearance of a thing or a person, but holds multiple 
connotations of dissimulation, especially in early modern English (compare OED, definitions nos. 1a, 
2a and b, 3a and b, 4a and c, 5, 6, 7, 8).  
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 Isabella suggests something comparable in Measure for Measure. She 
informs Angelo that man is ‘Most ignorant of what he’s most assured | His glassy 
essence’ (II. 2. 22–3). Shakespeare shies away from positing negative truths about 
man’s essential ‘ignorance’. The ambiguity in ‘glassy’ allows for an essence that is 
at once brittle yet solid, translucent yet reflective.164 If the human essence is 
translucent, then there is a nihilistic inference to be drawn: appearances are an 
envelope around a void and, as such, all we have. Thus man becomes a perpetual 
actor—an appropriate enough creed for a dramatist. If the essence is reflective, the 
distinction between appearance and essence is collapsed. We are faced with the 
proposition that the essence of things actually reflects back the monstrous, quotidian 
world of appearances. This also suggests that it is through speculative reflection on 
semblance that it is possible to get to the essence of things. The fragile truth of the 
Silenus head may lie less in the uncovering of an essence, which is an image, and 
more in the process by which this uncovering of a false idol is reached. However 
quixotic this process may be, its profound strength—its peculiar truth—lies in its 
obdurate refusal to resign itself to the given, to certain knowledge and to explicit 
values. In this connection, Adorno writes that ‘Art is magic delivered from the lie of 
being truth. Its semblance disenchants the disenchanted world’ (AT, p. 75). As I will 
endeavour to establish in the following chapter, the philosophical potential of 
Shakespeare’s drama inheres in its capacity to expose the expedient fictions by 
which the serious world functions, while refusing to forget that it is itself a form of 
semblance.  
                                                
164 Compare OED, definitions no. 1a, b, e.   
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CHAPTER 4: 
HONEST DEFORMITIES AND MENDACIOUS HISTORIES 
 
           If one at a solemne stage plaie, would take vpon hym to plucke of the 
 plaiers garments whiles theyr were saying theyr partes, and so disciphre vnto 
 lokers on, the true and natiue faces of eche of the plaiers, shoulde he not 
 (trow ye) marre all the mattier? And well deserue for a madman to be pelted 
 out of place with stones? Ye shoulde see yet straightwaies a new 
 transmutacion in thynges: that who before plaied the woman, should than 
 appeare to be a man: who seemed youth, should shew his hore heares: who 
 counrefaited the kynge, should tourne to a rascall, and who plaied god 
 almightie became a cobbler as he was before.  Yet take awaie this errour, 
 and as soone take awaie all togethers, in as muche as the feigning and 
 counterfaitying is it that so delighteth the beholders. So likewise, all this life 
 of mortall men, what is it els, but a certaine  kynde of stage plaie? Whereas 
 men come foor the disguised one in one arraie, an other in another. 
––PF, pp. 37–8. 
  
At the heart of Shakespeare’s Second Tetralogy lies a productive tension between 
the aesthetic critique of material conditions and the materialist critique of aesthetic 
semblance. Any account of these plays, however, should not establish a crude 
dichotomy between representation and reality, which are always implicated in one 
another. Rather, following Adorno, I contend that mimesis can lay bare the untruths 
that constitute reality, while the brute facts of reality, especially those of digestion, 
excretion and decomposition, subvert the idealizing tendencies inherent in aesthetic 
semblance.  
 On the one hand, these plays expose the provisional and retroactively formed 
nature of history. The most striking example of this is the way in which kingship is 
exposed as something manufactured, instrumentally acquired, maintained by the 
fictions of ceremony and legitimated by custom alone. Hugh Grady’s claim that 2 
Henry IV ‘displays the scandalous truth that political power grows, not from any 
deputation of authority from God to king and his subjects, but from the social 
acceptance of artfully produced illusions of legitimacy’,165 holds true, I suggest, for 
these plays in general.  
                                                
165 Shakespeare, Machiavelli and Montaigne: Power and Subjectivity from Richard III to Hamlet (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 175. 
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 In Shakespeare, history happens. As the insistent use of the theatrum mundi 
trope suggests, what passes for reality is constituted by the successful performance 
of certain roles: ‘all this life of mortall men, what is it els, but a certaine kynde of 
stage plaie?’ In this way, Shakespeare uses aesthetic semblance to point to the 
aesthetic dimension of empirical reality; kingship appears as legitimate and laudable 
only as a result of a combination of performance and the ‘forgetting’ intrinsic to ‘all 
reification’ (DE, p. 191; DA, p. 244). As Jonathan Baldo shows, forgetting, which is 
often an ideological act in itself, plays almost as large a role in these histories as 
remembering: ‘nearly any play based on chronicle histories, necessarily highly 
selective and truncated in its treatment, may easily assume the qualities of a cover-
up as much as a rescue of memorable, heroic acts’.166   
 On the other hand, these plays admit their complicity in maintaining a reality 
that is characterized by appalling suffering. Any representation makes certain claims 
to authority; in doing so, it reproduces, to a certain extent, the values and ideals of 
the world in which it is historically situated. As Michael D. Bristol argues: 
‘Authority is […] the state or quality of being an author; that is, an originator, 
creator, one who conceives and brings to completion even the humblest social 
initiative or artistic project’.167 Artworks, then, are not privileged objects free from 
the sway of the prevailing ideology. They are shaped by it and have a hand in 
shaping it. Through their awareness of their complicity in real suffering, however, 
these plays expose both the monstrous distortions that ideology produces and the 
self-destructive consequences of a power politics premised on self-preservation.  
 In an illuminating analysis of selected comedies, tragedies and problem 
plays, Grady describes Shakespeare’s techniques of authorial self-effacement, which 
work to subvert the aesthetic ideals of formal purity and perfect proportion. 
Shakespeare, Grady argues, fashions an ‘impure aesthetics’:168 In other words, an 
aesthetics that remains acutely aware that, in Walter Benjamin’s terse formulation, 
‘There is no document of civilization that is not at the same time a document of 
                                                
166 Memory in Shakespeare’s Histories: Stages of Forgetting in Early Modern England (London: 
Routledge, 2012), p. 16.  
167 Carnival and Theater: Plebeian Culture and the Structure of Authority in Renaissance England (New 
York: Methuen, 1985), p. 22. 
168 Shakespeare and Impure Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 5 ff.  
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barbarism’.169 Since these histories do not claim to be expressing a determinate 
truth, they are not hoodwinked by the idea that it is possible to get to the essence of 
things. They do not try to recount history as it actually happened. Rather, they 
‘brush history against the grain’170 in order to reach a negative truth, giving the lie to 
what passes for history.  
 Philip Sidney writes eloquently about the means by which poetry sidesteps 
positive truth-claims: 
 
          What child is there that, coming to a play, and seeing Thebes written in 
 great letters upon an old door, doth believe that it is Thebes? If a man can 
 arrive, at that child’s age, to know that the poet’s persons and doings are but 
 pictures of what should be, and not stories of what has been, they will 
 never give the lie to things not affirmatively but allegorically and 
 figuratively written. And therefore, as in History looking for truth, they 
 shall go away full fraught with falsehood, so in Poesy looking but for 
 fiction, they shall use the narration but as an imaginative ground-plot of a 
 profitable invention.171   
  
Even a child is aware that drama does not promise positive facts. The representation 
of reality in fiction is ideal and ‘allegorical’—far from simply replicating the way 
things are, representation organises reality and offers ‘pictures of what should be’. 
Indeed, as the following chapters establish, Shakespeare’s drama is deeply 
suspicious of the idealising tendencies inherent in mimesis. Sidney’s spirited 
defence of aesthetic veracity is nonetheless germane to the aims of this thesis, since 
it critiques affirmative knowledge: whereas ‘poetry never lieth for it never 
affirmeth’,172 those who go to the facts, dates and grand personages of ‘History 
looking for truth’ will inevitably ‘go away full fraught with falsehood’.  
 After all, Shakespeare’s telling of history focuses on how the received 
accounts of history diverge from the truth. For this reason, I pay careful attention to 
the various levels of mendacity throughout the plays. For Kiernan Ryan, 
understanding Shakespeare’s historical practice is of crucial importance to those 
who wish to write politically engaged criticism today: 
                                                
169 ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, in Illuminations, ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zohn 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1969), pp. 255–67 (p. 258). 
170 Ibid., p. 258. 
171 An Apology for Poetry: or the Defense of Poetry, ed. by R. W. Maslen (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2002), p. 103. 
172 Ibid., p. 103.  
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 As dramatizations of the fate of the Crown and nation two centuries before 
 the time of Shakespeare and his audience, the Henry IV plays pose explicitly 
 the key questions facing radical criticism today. What is the relationship 
 between the reality of history and its creative representation, between the 
 world of the past and the work’s account of it?173   
 
In fact, in his history plays, Shakespeare comes close to creating the type of history 
that implicitly prefigures Foucault’s description of his own practice as a kind of  
‘historicizing negativism’ (GSO, p. 5 f.n), which 
 
 [I]nvolves replacing a theory of knowledge, power, or the subject with the 
 analysis of historically determinate practices. A nominalist negativism, since 
 it involves replacing universals like madness, crime, and sexuality with the 
 analysis of experiences, which constitute singular historical forms. A 
 negativism with a nihilistic tendency, if by this we understand a form of 
 reflection which, instead of indexing practices to systems of values which 
 allow them to be assessed, inserts these systems of values in the interplay of 
 arbitrary but intelligible practices.   
  (GSO, p. 5 f.n.)   
  
Shakespeare’s histories in particular provide the perfect means by which to show 
the effect of universal forms on individual experience. These plays repeatedly show 
how a particular character’s actions are governed, even generated, by the universal 
concept or category of which they are supposed to be an instance. By staging a 
segment of history, a sample group of ‘arbitrary but intelligible’ practices, these 
plays submit universal concepts—most notably, that of history itself—to intense 
critical scrutiny. Shakespeare leaves his audience to draw general conclusions from 
particular instances, rather than imposing a general theory—such as the providential 
theory of history—on particular events. 
 Through the discourse of folly, I argue, these plays criticise history even as 
they dramatise it; after establishing folly’s structural significance to the workings of 
these plays, this chapter examines how this discourse infiltrates the serious action of 
Richard II. It then shows how the gardeners’ candid speech is not only interwoven 
with images and ideas from the main plot, but also tacitly concerned with the ethical 
ramifications of giving aesthetic form to contingent historical reality. In the analysis 
of 1&2 Henry IV that follows this, I argue that the concern of mendacity in these 
plays furnishes Shakespeare with a way of reflecting on the process of writing 
                                                
173 Shakespeare, 3rd edn. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 38.  
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history. This argument is developed in the reading of Henry V with which this 
chapter concludes. By contrasting two antithetical accounts of history—the official 
account of history that attempts to fashion myths and the fool’s truth that debunks 
such myths—this play dramatises the dangers that a fictionalised past can hold for 
the future of a nation.  
 While this tension can be detected in the First Tetralogy, which is concerned 
with the chaos that followed Henry V’s reign, I suggest that it is most apparent in 
the Second Tetralogy—Shakespeare’s mature engagement with the dubious truths 
of history. Moreover, it is through the tension between truth and lies in these plays 
that Shakespeare implicitly engages with the dialectic of reality and representation, 
with which this chapter opened. Fredric Jameson formulates this dialectic with 
admirable clarity: 
 
Genuine art, which cannot abolish Schein altogether without destroying itself 
and turning to silence, must nonetheless live its illusory appearance and its 
unreal luxury status as play in a vivid guilt that permeates its very forms, and 
is sometimes oddly called reflexivity or self-consciousness.174 
  
Shakespeare’s histories are genuine art in Jameson’s sense. Paradoxically, however, 
they are obsessed with lying; not only is Shakespeare seriously playful, but he is 
also honestly dishonest. In these histories, Shakespeare lies like the Cretan who 
declares: “All Cretans are liars”. 
Stultitia loquitur 
  
Criticism of the Henriad has long been divided into two broad camps. One 
presupposes that the plays offer an essentially conservative philosophy of history; 
the other argues that these plays debunk such a philosophy. The latter camp at least 
emphasizes the text’s transmission of festive traditions or, following Mikhail  
Bakhtin, examines the radical potential of plebeian characters and 
fools.175 Unsurprisingly, studies of folly in the Second Tetralogy have been attracted 
to its most magnetic and enigmatic character, Falstaff. They have tended to examine 
                                                
174 Late Marxism: Adorno, or, the Persistence of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 1990), p. 166.  
175 For critical examinations of these two ways of viewing Falstaff in particular and 1&2Henry IV in 
general, see Ryan, pp. 61–64; and Grady, Shakespeare, Machiavelli and Montaigne, pp. 139–218.  
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him in comparison to Shakespeare’s other wise fools,176 place him in a genealogy of 
European trickster figures, such as Rabelais’ mercurial Panurge,177 or analyze him 
in the light of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival.178 But the significance of folly in the 
Henriad is by no means circumscribed by Falstaff’s ample girth.  
 These approaches fail to perceive that the paradoxical wisdom of folly and 
folly in the sense of misapprehension are integral components of the plays. In these 
histories, wise folly lays bare credulous folly, or misapprehension. Wise folly, in 
these plays, shows up the folly of those who swallow the fictions that constitute 
reality hook, line and sinker. Folly is central to the philosophy of history that these 
plays promulgate and it infiltrates their language, form and structure; it is not, 
therefore, confined to individual avatars, such as Falstaff. Aside from 
unintentionally replicating the ideology of individualism that these plays subject to 
criticism,179 to treat this character in isolation is to neglect both his role within the 
                                                
176 Robert Bell, Shakespeare’s Great Stage of Fools (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), pp. 20–35; Andrew 
McCulloch, “Events Borrowed from History’: the Real Life Drama of Henry IV’, The English Review, 
16 (2006), 2–5. David Wiles contends that ‘Falstaff is the clown of Henry IV’ and that his part was 
written for Kemp in Shakespeare’s Clown: Actor and Text in the Elizabethan Playhouse (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 116–35 [p. 116].   
177 See Walter Kaiser, Praisers of Folly: Erasmus, Rabelais, Shakespeare (London: Victor Gollancz, 
1964), pp. 195–267. Enid Welsford distances Falstaff from tricksters like Eulenspiegel, because he is a 
‘typical buffoon, understood and interpreted by Shakespeare’: he is not like opportunist tricksters, 
since ‘ Like Quixote […], Falstaff tilts against reality and loses’; see The Fool: His Social and 
Literary History (London: Faber and Faber, 1935; rept. 1968), p. 52. Cathleen T. McLaughlin argues 
for strong similarities between Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel and 1&2 Henry IV and the 
possible influence of the former on the latter. She argues that the Silenic Socrates (as transmitted 
through Lucian) accounts for Erasmus’, Rabelais’ and Shakespeare’s shared fascination with folly 
(Shakespeare, Rabelais, and the Comical Historical, Currents in Comparative Romance Languages 
and Literatures, 80 (New York: Peter Lang, 2000), esp. pp. 137–48). Examining the various ways in 
which Shakespeare combines traditions and types of fool in his construction of Falstaff is another 
popular critical move, which goes back as far as Karl Friedrich Flögel at the close of the eighteenth 
century, who dubs Falstaff ‘the king of clowns’ and provides a detailed taxonomy of Falstaff’s lineage 
(Geschichte des Grotesk-Komischen: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Menschheit, ed. by Max Bauer, 2 
vols (Munich: Georg Müller, 1913 [1788]), I, pp. 154–60 [p. 155]).  
178 See Grady, ‘Falstaff: Subjectivity Between the Carnival and the Aesthetic’, MLR, 96 (2001), 609–623; 
this was reprinted in a revised form in Shakespeare, Machiavelli and Montaigne, pp. 143–162). David 
Rutter argues that ‘festivity is, both structurally and politically, the tie that binds the four plays of 
Shakespeare’s Second Henriad together’ in Shakespeare’s Festive History: Feasting, Festivity, 
Fasting and Lent in the Second Henriad (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 169; Focusing on the idea of 
carnival, Tim Prenki examines Falstaff’s relationship with the ‘dominant ideology in the world of the 
play’ (The Fool in European Theatre: Stages of Folly (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), pp. 50–68). 
Applying Bakhtin, Graham Holderness considers Falstaff a ‘collective rather than individual being’ 
(Shakespeare Recycled: The Making of Historical Drama (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1992), p. 
139). Joachim Frenk views him as essentially a carnival figure, but points out the important ‘dialectic’ 
between the way in which Falstaff is shown and how he is narrated; see ‘Falstaff erzählen und zeigen’, 
Wissenschaftliches Seminar 3 (2005), 16–23 (p. 16 ff). 
179 David Ellis provides a cogent attack on this tendency, which is apparent from Johnson to L. C. 
Knights; indeed, even Grady adopts a character-centred approach in ‘Between the Carnival and the 
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text and the other, less immediately apparent, but much more important, 
manifestations of folly in the plays. Through the protean mode of folly, these texts 
display the dialectic that lies at the heart of Shakespeare’s seriocomic philosophy of 
history: the dialectic between art’s freedom from social coercion and its complicity 
in it.   
 In the Second Tetralogy, Shakespeare uses the grotesque register—the 
primary register through which the paradoxical wisdom of folly is expressed—to 
expose the grotesque nature of authority in the serious world. In ‘Of Friendship’ 
Montaigne views his Essays as parenthetical, ‘fantasticall pictures’, arranged around 
the centrepiece of La Boétie’s revolutionary Discourse on Voluntary Servitude, or 
the Anti-Dictator. They are similar to the grotesques with which his painter fills 
‘void places’ in his works, but, Montaigne suggests, in a typical act of Socratic self-
effacement, his compositions lack the technical ability apparent in the painter’s 
grotesquerie:  
 
 And what are these my compositions in truth, other than antike works and 
 monstrous bodies, patched and hudled up together of divers members 
 without any certaine or well ordered figure, having neither order, 
 dependencie, or proportion, but casual and framed by chance? 
(E, Book 1, Chapter 27, p. 90)  
 
Although it does not go so far as to interrogate the idealizing tendencies of aesthetic 
proportion, Montaigne’s characterization of his Essays as grotesque implies that a 
static, complete and ideally proportioned being is radically at odds with life’s 
irregularity and multiplicity. In this respect, the Essays testify to the truth of 
Bakhtin’s belief that the grotesque ‘seeks to grasp in its imagery the very act of 
becoming and growth, the eternal incomplete unfinished nature of being’.180 The 
grotesque register points out the lies and idealisations behind the neat, finished 
products of an Apollonian aesthetic. In short, Shakespeare’s use of the grotesque 
opens up the Silenus: he implies that the concept of the beautiful has a grotesque, 
even monstrous, aspect.  
 Through the discourse of folly and the grotesque register representation can 
gain a certain proximity to the ugliness with which it is complicit because of its 
                                                                                                                                     
Aesthetic’. However, despite his protestations to the contrary, Ellis also considers Falstaff in isolation; 
see ‘Falstaff and the Problems of Comedy’, Cambridge Quarterly, 34 (2005), 95–108.  
180 Bakhtin, p. 52.  
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association with all that is complete and proportioned. The grotesque register and 
the discourse of folly, however, do not simply serve as modes for straightforward 
desublimation or inversion in the plays. To suggest that they merely provide comic 
relief, in which grand narratives are brought down to earth, is to misunderstand 
them, not least because ‘The elements [of an artwork] are not arranged in 
juxtaposition, but rather grind away at each other or draw each other in; the one 
seeks or repulses the other. That alone constitutes the nexus [Zusammenhang] of the 
most demanding works’ (AT, p. 242).  Folly is an essential facet of these texts’ 
incohesive ‘cohesion’, which is an alternative way of translating the German word 
Zusammenhang. Far from offering comic relief, folly enables these histories to 
question the values of the concepts, ideologies and institutions they purport to 
represent; folly ‘grinds away’ at privileged concepts at the same time as authority 
‘grinds away’ at it by attempting to silence, renounce or occlude it.  
 For Adorno, the work that epitomises this tension between reality—what is—
and representation—what could be—is the last great text of Renaissance folly, Don 
Quixote:   
 
The object of bourgeois art is the relation of itself as artefact to 
empirical society; Don Quixote stands at the beginning of this development. 
Art, however, is social not only because of its mode of production, in which 
the dialectic of the forces and relations of production is concentrated, nor 
simplybecause of the social derivation of its thematic material. Much more 
importantly, art becomes social by its opposition to society, and it 
occupie this position only as autonomous art. By crystallizing itself as 
something unique to itself, rather than complying with existing social norms 
and qualifying as ‘socially useful’, it criticizes society by merely existing, 
for which puritans of all stripes condemn it. 
(AT, p. 296) 
 
Quixote’s folly, his purposive purposelessness, is comparable to that of bourgeois 
art in general. It is through his socially useless quest that the values both of his 
society and of the romances with which he is infatuated are tested. The novel’s 
representation of art’s relation to the reality in which it was conceived is also made 
apparent by the text’s insistence on its materiality, its existence as a thing, an object 
in circulation, a motif equally apparent in Rabelais, Montaigne and Shakespeare.  
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Degeneracy 
 
 So too should the historian write, consorting with Truth and not   
 with flattery, looking to the future hope, not to the gratification   
 of the flattered. 
—Lucian181 
 
In Shakespeare’s histories, the concept of degeneracy is frequently employed as a 
byword for a disregard for the values of the established order. In this respect, it has 
an affinity with the word folly, signifying a dangerous, even sinful, 
misapprehension, as in the Richard’s ‘follies’ (IV. 1. 275).182 According to 
Bolingbroke, Richard was ‘unhappied and disfigured clean’ by Bushy and Green. 
They ‘Made a divorce betwixt his queen and him’ and ‘Broke the possession of the 
royal bed’ (III. 1. 10, 12–13 [my emphasis]). Making the platonic association 
between physical beauty and virtue, the usurper suggests that Richard is physically 
marked by his immoral behaviour; ironically, however, it is Bolingbroke himself 
who is responsible for Richard being ‘Doubly divorced’, breaking ‘A twofold 
marriage: ’twixt my crown and me, | And then betwixt me and my married wife’ (V. 
1. 71, 72–3). As the word’s etymological root implies—it stems from the Latin 
genus, which signifies ‘birth, decent, origin; offspring; kind; race; family; nation; 
gender’—to be degenerate is to be183 ‘One who has lost, or has become deficient in, 
the qualities considered proper to the race or kind; a degenerate specimen; a person 
of debased physical or mental constitution’.184 In Richard’s case, his degeneracy is 
bound up with property in general and primogeniture in particular. He is a ‘Most 
degenerate king’ (II. 1. 263), for over taxing the commons and robbing his cousin 
Hereford of his ‘patrimony’ (238).185  
 Because it threatens the legitimacy of the royal genus and because the king’s 
behaviour is supposed to be exemplary, the aberrant sexual behaviour of 
Holinshed’s Richard attracts the chronicler’s scorn. He comments, in an observation 
                                                
181 ‘How to Write History’, in The Works of Lucian of Samosata, trans. by H. W. and F. G. Fowler, 4 vols 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905), II, pp. 110–137 (p. 136).   
182 See OED, definitions nos. 1a, c, 2a, b.  
183 OED., definition no. 1. 
184 OED., definition, no. 1.  
185 In the play’s main dramatic source, the anonymous Thomas of Woodstock, Lancaster (John of Gaunt) 
employs this word to describe Richard: ‘A heavy charge good Woodstoke hast thou had | To be 
protector to soe wyld a prince, | Soe far degenerate from his noble father’ (NDSS, 3, p. 461 [I.1.34–7]).  
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not found in his main source,186 that Richard committed the ‘filthie sinne of 
leacherie and fornication, with abhominable adulterie, speciallie in the king’ (NDSS, 
3, p. 408). To be degenerate is to violate the past by failing to fulfil the deep-rooted 
expectations of how you should behave in the present or how you will behave in the 
future. It is to shatter the petrified historical constructs of form and precedence, as 
Hal does in his mockery of chivalric conceits, which Hotspur reports to the King: 
  
    he would unto the stews,  
  And from the common’st creature pluck a glove,  
  And wear it as a favour, and with that  
  He would unhorse the lustiest challenger. 
 (V. 3. 20–3) 
 
Paving the way for Henry IV Parts 1 and 2, in which it is of central thematic 
importance, the concept of degeneracy is subjected to close critical scrutiny at the 
close of Richard II. Moments after Hotspur and Henry IV have discussed Hal’s 
delinquent behaviour, the theme is replayed in Aumerle’s thwarted attempt to 
depose Henry (his uncle)—a degenerate king according to the rules of 
primogeniture. Aumerle’s father, York, in what his wife regards a degenerate action, 
betrays his son to the king and is praised as a paradigm of constancy:  
 
 O loyal father of a treacherous son!  
 Thou sheer, immaculate, and silver fountain,  
 From whence this stream through muddy passages  
 Hath held his current and defiled himself.  
(V.3.57–61)  
  
What is really significant about the idea of degeneracy in Richard II, however, is 
the way in which ideas of legitimacy become a disguise for wholly instrumental 
relations. It is hard to say who is more degenerate: Hal or Henry, York or Aumerle. 
The play dramatizes the fall of a degenerate king’s realm into the hands of one 
whose claim is degenerate because it breaks with primogeniture. In terms of 
legitimacy, the play’s action lies somewhere between Scylla and Charybdis. 
                                                
186 Roy Rosenstein, ‘Richard the Redless: Representations of Richard II from Boccaccio and Polydore to 
Holinshed and Shakespeare’, in Michael Pincombe ed. International Conference on Travels and 
Translations in the Sixteenth Century: Selected Papers from the Second International Conference of 
the Tudor Symposium (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 137–148 (p. 143). As Phyllis Rackin shows at 
length, the 1587 version of Holinshed’s chronicles, which Shakespeare used, is a text characterised by 
its plurality both in terms of the multitude of sources it drew on and in the number of augmentations 
and glosses that other writers added to it; see Stages of History: Shakespeare’s English Chronicles 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 22–26. 
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Moreover, despite Richard’s hysterical protestations to the contrary, ‘the breath of 
worldly men’ can ‘depose | The deputy elected by the Lord’ (III. 2. 52–3). As 
Katharine Eisaman Maus puts it: ‘If being a king and having a kingdom were 
completely inseparable—if the realm, were, so to speak, permanently soldered to the 
monarch—usurpation would be an impossibility’.187   
        The discord with which the play opens, in which the ‘ceremonious form of the 
appeal of treason’188 is used to cloak Hereford’s knowledge of Richard’s complicity 
in Woodstock’s murder, is followed by the scene in which John of Gaunt is 
upbraided by his brother’s widow. She accuses him of being degenerate because he, 
one of ‘Edward’s seven sons’, one of ‘seven vials of his sacred blood’ (I. 2. 11–12), 
fails to take revenge upon his brother’s murderer: 
 
                                                Thou dost consent 
            In some large measure to thy father’s death 
            In that thou seest thy wretched brother die, 
            Who was the model of thy father’s life. 
            Call it not patience, Gaunt, it is despair. 
            In suff’ring thus thy brother to be slaughtered 
            Thou show’st the naked pathway to thy life, 
            Teaching stern murder how to butcher thee. 
            That which in mean men we entitle patience 
            Is pale cold cowardice in noble breasts. 
 (25–34) 
 
She attempts to motivate Gaunt’s action in the present by recalling memories of an 
idealised past. The ironies of this marginal character’s speech expose the self-
serving core of the concept of legitimacy. She appeals to Gaunt’s sense of pride and 
then his desire for self-preservation, rather than his desire to defend his genus. ‘Old 
John of Gaunt’, may indeed be ‘time-honoured’ (I. 1. 1)—as in Richard’s formal 
epithet with which this play opens—but the common critical assumption that he 
embodies the values of the good old days of chivalry is undermined by the 
Duchess’s speech.   
             In Thomas of Woodstock, the tyrant Richard is impressed that Trissillian—a 
‘Janus lyke’ fawning lawyer and parasite—has thought up the idea of ‘Blanke 
charters, to fill up our treasury, | Opening the cheasts of hoording cormorants | That 
                                                
187 Being and Having in Shakespeare: Oxford Wells Shakespeare Lectures (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), p. 26. 
188 Ibid., p. 2. 
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laugh to see ther kingly soveraigne lacke’ (NDSS, 3, p. 470 [III.1.1135–8]). 
Shakespeare reverses the significance of the bestial image of the gluttonous 
cormorant to describe the voracious greed of Richard’s inner circle.189 In a desperate 
plea for the king to, in Northumberland’s words, ‘make high majesty look like 
itself’ (II. 1. 297), Gaunt piles one commonplace about the perils of prodigality onto 
another, suggesting that the ruthless pursuit of self-interest is self-destructive: 
            He tires betimes that spurs too fast betimes. 
            With eager feeding food doth choke the feeder. 
            Light vanity, insatiate cormorant,            
            Consuming means, soon preys upon itself. 
(II. 1. 36–39) 
 
Invoking the licence granted to fools and dying men, Gaunt inveighs against the 
madness into which society has degenerated. He concludes his famous praise of 
England, ‘This royal throne of kings, this sceptxred isle’ (II. 1. 40), thus: 
 
            Is now leased out—I die pronouncing it— 
            Like a tenement or pelting farm 
            England, bound in with the triumphant sea, 
            Whose rocky shore beats back the envious siege  
   Of wat’ry Neptune, is now bound in with shame, 
            With inky blots and rotten parchment bonds. 
            That England that was wont to conquer others 
            Hath made a shameful conquest of itself. 
(59–66) 
 
Although Richard’s ‘blank charters’ turn out to be not so much writing that 
conquers as writing that deposes, his legal discourse, which seeks to order reality, 
illustrates the darker side of reason’s desire to categorise the world. The ‘shame’ of 
which Gaunt speaks is connected to the king’s degeneracy in two interrelated ways.  
                                                
189 Grady writes: ‘The references here and elsewhere in the play to farming, weeds, and caterpillars, 
however, suggest a connection to another form of reification investigated by Shakespeare in other 
plays: the social context for this language, as a number of recent works have understood, is the 
enclosure movement which was proceeding apace as Shakespeare wrote in the 1590s, a slow economic 
process in which once customarily half lands which had existed largely outside the money economy 
were alienated by their legal possessors and turned over from farming to sheep-raising for the woolen 
trade—all in the interest of the money to be made from such transactions’ (Shakespeare, Machiavelli 
and Montaigne, p. 74). Ralph Robinson’s 1551 English translation of More’s Utopia renders the Latin 
‘helluo’, which signifies ‘glutton’ (CWM, 4, p. 64–8), as ‘cormorant’ (Three Early Modern 
Utopias: Utopia, The New Atlantis and The Isle of Pines, ed. by Susan Bruce (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999; repr. 2008), p. 22). This word is used in Hythloday’s attack on the Tudor 
enclosures to describe the voracious sheep eating away the livelihoods of the poor, all in the name of 
the production of a profitable luxury good, wool.  
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 First, because he exults in the works of man, Richard is idolatrous. As David 
Hawkes explains: 
 
 The pursuit of fleshly pleasures or worldly goods indicates a misconstrual of 
 the telos of the human being. To be carnal is to forget that the body is a 
 means to a spiritual end. Such a fleshy consciousness will systematically 
 reduce the spiritual to the material, the subjective to the objective. It is, in 
 other words, a fetishistic consciousness.190 
 
As Gaunt makes clear, the ‘bonds’ that enact this quantification are material. 
Written script is ultimately perishable, liable to become ‘rotten’. To put one’s faith 
in such bonds, in humanly produced contracts, rather than divine revelation, is a 
misapprehension or folly that endangers the soul. Such a fetishistic consciousness is 
dangerously foolish, since it misapprehends the world, seeing it as possessing 
cornucopian plenitude, whereas, in and of itself, without the hope of salvation and 
resurrection, the world is barren, and human activity bereft of significance.   
 Second, Richard’s conduct is at odds with how a Christian prince should 
behave. As Erasmus argues at length in his Institutio Principis Christiani (1518), the 
earthly pomp and decadence in which tyrants revel can be measured only by the 
privations of their subjects (see CWE, 27, p. 225). In the terms of Shakespeare’s 
Alexander Iden, ruminating in his country garden, Richard ‘wax[es] great’ as a 
result of  ‘others’ waning’  (2 Henry VI, IV. 9. 18–19). By being captivated by the 
signifiers of kingship, he actually negates its mysterious, spiritual power. Erasmus 
explains this in theatrical terms: ‘If all that makes a king is a chain, a sceptre, robes 
of royal purple, and a train of attendants, what after all is to prevent actors in a 
drama who come on stage decked with all the pomp of state from being regarded as 
real kings?’ (CWE, 27, p. 215). This praeposterum reverses the Silenic 
transformation of a king into an actor that has been examined in the previous 
chapter, suggesting that temporal authority is fashioned through performance, rather 
than derived from innate authority.      
            Gaunt jokes about the similarities between his cadaverous appearance and 
his name, itself an Anglicization of Ghent, in such a way as to negate its metonymic 
significance in favour of its literal one. His humour subtly enacts the systematic 
reduction of the ‘spiritual to the material, the subjective to the objective’ that 
                                                
190 Idols of the Marketplace: Idolatry and Commodity Fetishism in English Literature, 1580–1680 (New 
York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 58.  
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Hawkes sees as characteristic of idolaters. The object of Gaunt’s former pride 
becomes the object of his scorn. The very names of the nobility attest to the way 
their identity—or property in the early modern sense of a distinguishing feature—is 
determined by what they own.191 This piece of moribund humour is absent from 
Shakespeare’s sources: 
 
            KING RICHARD Can sick men play so nicely with their names? 
            JOHN OF GAUNT      No, misery makes sport to mock itself. 
                        Since thou doest seek to kill my name in me, 
                        I mock my name, great King, to flatter thee. 
            KING RICHARD  Should dying men flatter with those that live? 
             JOHN OF GAUNT    No, no, men living flatter those that die. 
            KING RICHARD       Thou now a-dying sayst thou flatter’st me? 
            JOHN OF GAUNT     O no: thou diest, though I the sicker be. 
            KING RICHARD        I am in health; I breathe, and see thee ill. 
            JOHN OF GAUNT      Now He that made me knows I see thee ill: 
                        Ill in myself to see, and in thee seeing ill. 
                        Thy deathbed is no lesser than thy land, 
                        Wherein thou liest in reputation sick. 
  (II. 1. 84–96) 
               
Gaunt’s name has become as polysemous as a word in the mouth of a fool. 
Although Richard dismisses this critique as the words of a “lunatic lean-witted fool” 
(113), Gaunt turns reality on its head by playing on the dual significance of the word 
“ill”: the ill man is morally healthy, the healthy man is terminally ill in moral terms. 
Gaunt ironically adopts the position of one of Richard’s flatterers so as to warn him 
about the deceptive nature of their eloquent counsel, as opposed to his riddling 
wordplay, which is as erudite as Lear’s fool’s castigations of his master and is 
removed from the inarticulate language of lunacy. Because his son returns to 
England specifically to make good his name, Gaunt’s self-deflation has a residual 
significance: it creates a structural irony, which tacitly makes a mockery of Henry’s 
project to reclaim his birthright.  
 To destroy the documentation of someone’s existence, however, is to write 
them out of history. This is precisely what Richard’s flatterers attempt to do to 
Bolingbroke; his sense of vulnerability to historical erasure is palpable when, in a 
kangaroo court, he indicts them for logocide. They have 
 
 From my own windows torn my household coat,  
                                                
191 Maus, p. 17 ff.  
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  Razed out my imprese, leaving me no sign,  
 Save men’s opinions and my living blood,  
 To show the world I am a gentlemen.  
(III. 2. 24–27)  
 
The proliferation of first-person pronouns in connection with his property certainly 
supports Maus’ point about the interrelation of personal identity and ownership. 
Moreover, Bolingbroke’s return makes it clear that concerns about the duplicity and 
mutability of words in the face of the reality they purport to signify are not simply a 
problem of representation: it shapes history. 
Deformities  
 
To examine the theme of deformity, it is necessary to consider the exchange 
between the gardeners, absent from the sources, which puts the historical narrative 
of the nobles and gentry on hold. Far from providing comic relief, their exchange is 
rife with tensions that are also apparent in the serious action. As with the Clowns in 
Hamlet, the Porter in Macbeth and Falstaff’s language of exuberant corporeality in 
1&2 Henry IV, these plebeian characters not only reflect upon the main action, but 
also betray an uncanny grasp of significant patterns of imagery that runs through the 
serious action of the play. They ‘brush history against the grain’,192 deforming the 
received account of history by their very presence. These men, who work up to their 
elbows in mud but speak in elegant blank verse, display an intuitive grasp of a 
conflict at the heart of Shakespeare’s representation of history: the contradictory 
nature of historical narration.  
 The central problem that faces the positivist conception of history is that its 
own form belies it. As Lucian’s ‘How to Write History’—one of the very first 
theorizations of historical practice—suggests, the object of history is, in a certain 
sense, an aesthetic one, since it is to ‘superinduce upon events the charm of 
order’.193 To write history is to give the formal organisation intrinsic in 
representation—something, which in an objective sense, is not—to the formless 
multiplicity of what has been. Perhaps this tension accounts for the striking contrast 
between form and chaos in the exchange between the Gardener and his mate and, 
indeed, in the play as a whole:   
                                                
192 Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, p. 258.  
193 ‘How to Write History’, p. 132.  
113 
 
 
 GARDENER [To First Man]  Go, bind thou up yon dangling apricots 
  Which, like unruly children, make their sire 
  Stoop with oppression of their prodigal weight. 
  Give some substance to the bending twigs. 
  [To Second Man] Go thou, and, like an executioner, 
  Cut off the heads of too fast-growing sprays 
  That look too lofty in our commonwealth. 
  All must be even in our government. 
  You thus employed, I will go root away 
  The noisome weeds which without profit suck 
  The soil’s fertility from wholesome flowers. 
 FIRST MAN  Why should we, in the compass of a pale, 
  Keep law and form and due proportion, 
  Showing as in a model our firm estate, 
  When our sea-wallèd garden, the whole land, 
  Is full of weeds, her fairest flowers choked up, 
  Her fruit trees all unpruned, her hedges ruined, 
  Her knots disordered, and her wholesome herbs 
  Swarming with caterpillars? 
           GARDENER    Hold thy peace.  
  He that hath suffered this disordered spring 
  Hath now himself met with the fall of leaf. 
  The weeds, which his broad spreading leaves did shelter, 
  That seemed in eating him to hold him up, 
  Are plucked up, root and all, by Bolingbroke.  
(III. 4. 30–53) 
 
This exchange offers a précis of the play’s themes and imagery. Prodigal offspring 
that threaten to destroy the achievements of their fathers must be ‘Cut off’ to 
prevent lasting damage to the abundance of England, a ‘sea-wallèd garden’, which 
is infested with parasitical creatures and ‘weeds’. In addition to echoing 
Bolingbroke’s description of himself as a gardener and the king’s flatterers as 
‘caterpillars of the commonwealth | Which I have sworn to weed and pluck away’ 
(II. 3. 165–66), as with the image of the ‘cormorants’, Shakespeare inverts the 
significance of the ‘caterpillars’ in the second half of the source.194 In the latter part 
of Woodstock, Trissillian’s trickster-servant, Nimble, insults a group of common 
people, from whom he is extorting money, by calling them ‘caterpillars’ (NDSS, 3, 
                                                
194 As Richard Hillman shows, this word is initially employed in Woodstock to describe Richard’s 
flatterers; see Shakespeare, Marlowe and the Politics of France (Basingstoke: Ashgate, 2002), p. 178). 
‘According to OED, the word ‘caterpillar’ had been applied for roughly a century to social parasites; 
playwrights may have especially relished the term, given Stephen Gosson’s 1579 polemic, The 
Schoole of Abuse, Conteining a plesent inuectiue against Poets, Pipers, Plaiers, Iesters, and such like 
Caterpillers of a Commonwealth’ (Ibid., p. 223, n.7); my thanks to Prof. Hillman for drawing my 
attention to this fact.  
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p. 477 [III. ii. 1636]), while here the word is used by a worker to describe the 
venality of ‘the Earl of Wiltshire, Bushy, Green’ (54).  
 Not only because it reveals how the grotesque register lies at the heart of the 
play, but also because it is associated with the nature of dramatic representation in 
the period, this imagery of parasites is significant. The Second and Third Blast to 
the Players (1580), like many of the contemporary anti-theatrical polemics, views 
theatre as a degenerate activity, which tempts its audiences, who ‘prodigalie 
consume’195 this commodity, to replicate the atrocities they see on stage. Real-life 
desires and emotions are all too easily infiltrated by represented ones. The 
audience’s ‘insatiable desire [for the] filthie plesure’ of the theatre not only allures 
‘schollers […] from their studies’, but, far worse, is intrinsically idolatrous: ‘we 
despise the Lordes table, and honor Theaters; at a worde, we loue al things, 
reuerence al things, [that] God alone seemeth vile to vs’.196 One need only think of 
the modern notion of the matinee idol to observe the continuing association between 
actors and idols, theatre and idolatry.  
 The polemicist continues, observing that itinerant players debase their 
patrons: 
 
 Since the reteining of these Catetpillers, the credite of Noble men hath 
 decaied, & they are thought to be couetous by permitting their seruants, 
 which cannot liue of theselues, and whome for neerenes they wil not 
 maintaine, to liue at the deuotion or almes of other men, passing from 
 countrie to countrie, from one Gentlemans house to another, offering their 
 seruice, which is a kind of beggerie [my emphasis].197  
 
Obviously, the actor’s art and the plays themselves are commodities. Thus they are 
objects of the implacable desire that characterizes a fetishistic consciousness, which, 
never satisfied, restlessly and relentlessly shifts from desiring one thing to desiring 
another. Shakespeare’s telling of history, however, makes it apparent through 
theatre, a commodity, that the dangers of an objectifying or fetishistic 
                                                
195 Anthony Munday [?], A second and third blast of retrait from plaies and theaters the one whereof was 
sounded by a reuerend byshop dead long since; the other by a worshipful and zealous gentleman now 
aliue: one showing the filthines of plaies in times past; the other the abhomination of theaters in the 
time present: both expresly prouing that that common-weale is nigh vnto the cursse of God, wherein 
either plaiers be made of, or theaters maintained. Set forth by Anglo-phile Eutheo (London: Henrie 
Denham, 1580), p. 25.  
196 Ibid., p. 14.  
197 Ibid., p. 74.  
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consciousness, which, as we have seen, reduces kingship to stage playing, can be 
diagnosed. Richard is captivated by the signifiers of authority; and in this respect, he 
is like the idolatrous tyrant of the Trauerspiel, of whom Benjamin writes: ‘His 
unfaithfulness to man is matched by his loyalty to those things [the symbols of 
kingship] to the point of being absorbed into contemplative devotion to them’.198  
 In striking contrast to the other plebeian characters in the rest of the Second 
Tetralogy, the Gardeners speak with ‘law and form and due proportion’—for the 
most part in elegant iambic pentameter. This registers the play’s obsession with 
form and formality in the face of material disorder, the inexorable growth of weeds 
even in the most carefully maintained of gardens. Analogies between the state of the 
nation and the state of a garden, ill-maintained or otherwise, abound in both of the 
play’s two main sources. In Woodstock, Lancaster reflects on the duties and 
achievements of himself and his brothers, making the comparison between statecraft 
and gardening: 
 
  Princly Edwards sonnes In tender care  
 Of wanton Richard & ther Fathers realme,  
 Have toyld to purge faire Englands plessant field  
 Of all those ranckorous weeds that choakt the grounds  
 & left hir plessent meads like barron hills 
(NDSS, 3, p. 491) 
  
Meanwhile, in Holinshed, horticultural degeneration acquires a providential 
significance. In the year of Richard’s deposition, ‘old baie trees withered, and 
afterwards, contrarie to all mens thinking, grew greene againe, a strange sight, and 
supposed to import some unknowne event’ (NDSS, 3, p. 396).               
 Shakespeare, however, puts this providential rendering of history into the 
mouth of the Welsh captain, so as to gesture towards the abuse of history, the way in 
which giving form to multiplicity, a process intrinsic to representation, can lead to 
manifestly erroneous conclusions: 
  
 ’Tis thought the king is dead. We will not stay. 
 The bay trees in our country are all withered, 
 And meteors fright the fixèd stars of heaven. 
  […]  
 And lean-looked prophets whisper fearful change, 
                                                
198 The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. by John Osborne (London: Verso, 1998; repr. 2009), p. 
156.  
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 Rich men look sad, and ruffians dance and leap; 
 The one in fear to lose what they enjoy, 
 The other to enjoy by rage and war.  
 These signs forerun the death or fall of kings.  
(II. 4. 7–9, 11–15) 
 
Of course, the irony is that, for all his dire imagery of the mundus inversus, it is the 
Welshman’s decision to leave that is in no small part responsible for the earth-
shattering event he foresees in the stars. When the Gardener, silencing the protests 
of the First Man, suggests that Richard’s fall is a result of his tolerance of a 
‘disordered spring’, the tension between historical allegorisation, in which Richard 
indulges, and personal agency, which Bolingbroke exploits to the full, comes to the 
fore. When he uses the ‘fall of the leaf’ as a metaphor for Richard’s fall, the 
Gardener evokes images of autumnal, natural decomposition. But he also makes it 
clear that this fall is not part of an organic cycle: it is the consequence of an 
intervention. Bolingbroke has ‘plucked up’ these ‘weeds’, Richard’s parasitical 
flatterers, ‘root and all’. Shakespeare uses the Gardeners to reflect upon the history 
in which the other characters are embroiled. England, the Gardeners make clear, is 
‘full of weeds’ not because the land or some higher power somehow foresees 
Richard’s fall, but because the lethal combination of Richard’s prodigal kingship 
and Bolingbrook’s ‘boist’rous’ (I. 3. 127) ambition has created chaos.   
 The Gardener’s reflection, ‘All must be even in our government’, makes 
clear the link between statecraft and representation. The former must be even-
handed and calm, while the latter lends an ‘even’ form to multiplicity. But it also 
echoes the under-garrisoned York’s abrupt reflection shortly before, after a series of 
self-interruptions, that ‘All is uneven’ (II. 2. 121). His discontinuous utterance 
lapses from mainly iambic pentameters into a fragmented line consisting of a dactyl 
followed by a trochee,199 reflecting metrically what his panicked observation 
denotes. On the one hand, if one reads the Second Man’s comment more literally, it 
poses a potentially incendiary question, which exemplifies how ‘Clowning […] 
creates openings both in the literary text and in the social structure that it purports to 
reflect’:200 why should the working man obey and be productive, when those 
assumed to be his moral superiors consume all he produces and fail to adhere to the 
                                                
199 This line is presented as a fragment in the Oxford/Norton edition.  
200 Bristol, p. 150. 
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laws of primogeniture? On the other hand, the Second Man’s rhetorical question—
‘Why should we, in the compass of a pale, | Keep law and form and due 
proportion?’—emphasises the fact that ‘due proportion’ is conceivable only in a 
harmonious aesthetic form. Richard later reflects that life is at odds with ‘law and 
form’: 
 
              How sour sweet music is 
            When time is broke and no proportion kept. 
   So is it in the music of men’s lives. 
            And here have I the daintiness of ear 
            To check time broke in a disordered string; 
            But for the concord of my state and time 
            Had not the ear to hear my true time broke. 
   I wasted time and now doth time waste me, 
  For now hath time made me his numb’ring clock. 
(V. 5.42–50) 
 
He can sense aesthetic discord, but can neither govern his state harmoniously, nor 
admit his culpability in its degeneration into civil war. He is an ‘allegory 
monger’,201 preferring to make himself a hapless victim of ‘time’ in the de casibus 
vein,202 rather than admitting that he has been ‘deposed’ (III. 2. 153) because of 
human action.  
            Through voices associated with unreason, Richard II critiques its diverse 
and, indeed, contradictory historical sources, rather than simply replicating their 
assumptions. It comes as no surprise in a text so vitally attuned to its own method 
that Shakespeare provides a cue for its interpretation, a cue that employs the 
pervasive imagery of visual and cerebral reflection in the play. Attempting to cheer 
up the Queen, who is suffering from a portentous ‘unborn sorrow’, the favourite 
Bushy comments: 
 
 For Sorrow’s eye, glazèd with blinding tears, 
 Divides one thing entire to many objects— 
 Like perspectives, which, rightly gazed upon,  
 Show nothing but confusion; eyed awry,  
 Distinguish form.  
(II. 2. 19–21) 
                                                
201 Zenón Luis-Martínez, ‘Shakespeare’s Historical Drama as Trauerspiel: Richard II—and After’, ELH, 
75 (2008), 673–704 (p. 690). 
202 See Paul Budra, A Mirror for Magistrates and the de Casibus Tradition (Toronto and Buffalo: 
University of Toronto Press, 2000), pp. 85–95. 
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Moments later, when Green announces the rebellion, Bushy’s elaborate suggestion 
that the Queen is worrying about nothing is disproven. Although he suggests that 
her premonitions are the consequence of a skewed perspective on reality, it is clear 
that, in Richard II, Shakespeare himself views history ‘awry’.   
 Through these five marginal voices, which remain silent in his sources, 
Shakespeare incorporates into his history irrational and alternative voices, which 
give the lie to the received account of history—not least because, as Lukas Lammers 
astutely observes: ‘When Richard asks the Queen to tell his “lamentable tale” he 
explicitly asks for a particular version of his suffering to be passed on. Significantly, 
however, this tale does not simply coincide with what the play has shown’.203 The 
deformity of an anamorphic painting skews the viewer’s perspective, forcing them 
to adjust the position from which they view it and, commonly, suggesting that the 
serious world is mere vanity. In the same way, the themes of degeneracy and 
deformity in this play ultimately evoke ‘This problem of the infamy of sovereignty, 
of the discredited sovereign’, which: 
 
 [I]s precisely the problem posed by [Shakespeare’s] royal tragedies, 
 without it seems the sovereign’s infamy ever being theorised. […] from Nero 
 […] down to the little man with trembling hands crowned with forty million 
 deaths, who, from deep in his bunker, asks for two things, that everything 
 above him be destroyed and that he be given chocolate cakes until he bursts, 
 you have the outrageous functioning of the despicable sovereign.  
(A, p. 13) 
 
Richard II is a play manifestly concerned with ‘ridiculous authority’ (A, p. 13), an 
authority that is degenerate. Richard is a pathetic man, usurped by a violent 
hypocrite, with a son who acts the fool. Still more striking, however, is how the 
gardeners, who deform the received account of history, gesture towards the 
grotesque nature of the reasonable world. The tyrant is ‘Grotesque’ because ‘by 
virtue of their status a discourse or individual can have effects of power that their 
intrinsic qualities should disqualify them from having’ (A, p. 11). It is the play’s 
marginal voices, the voices that are associated with unreason—the grieving widow, 
the dying man and the two plebeian characters—that tell the truth about the state of 
affairs.  
                                                
203 “Eyed awry’—Richard II and the Shapes of History’, Shakespeare Jahrbuch, 147 (2011), 145–154 (p. 
153).  
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 Of course, it is not in Richard II alone that Shakespeare uses the grotesque 
register to point out the tyrannical nature of those in power. Explicitly referring to 
festive custom of the Lord of Misrule, Angus suggests that Macbeth feels ‘his title | 
Hang loose about him, like a giant’s robe | Upon a dwarfish thief’ (V. 2. 20–22). 
Likewise, Hamlet characterises Claudius as ‘a king of shreds and patches’ (III. 4. 
99). This comment turns the real King of Denmark into a travesty and political 
reality into a pageant. It is in 1&2 Henry IV and Henry V, however, that 
Shakespeare views the grotesque from an alternative angle: far from being a 
perversion of the natural well-proportioned form, the grotesque foregrounds the 
ugliness of the serious world.  
Telling the Truth through Lies  
 
 The notablest lier is become the best Poet; he that can make the most 
 notorious lie, and disguise falshood in such sort, that he maie passe 
 vnperceaued, is held the best writer.204 
     —Anthony Munday [?]  
 
‘These lies are like the father that begets them—gross as a mountain, open, 
palpable’ (I Henry IV, 2. 5. 208–9): so says Prince Hal of Falstaff’s Rabelaisian 
amplification of his assailants at the robbery in 1 Henry IV. Like everything else 
about him, Falstaff’s lies are excessive, ‘open’ and ‘palpable’. Poins has staged the 
robbery with the express intention of making Falstaff lie: ‘The virtue of this jest will 
be the incomprehensible lies that this same fat rogue will tell us when we meet at 
supper’ (I. 2. 164–166). Although the ‘fat rogue’ in question clearly fails to pull the 
wool over anyone’s eyes, his grandiloquent circumlocutions captivate rather than 
appal his on-stage audience. His deception ends, of course, with a festive 
production, ‘a play extempore’ (II. 5. 257), which lays bare the ‘outrageous 
functioning of the despicable sovereign’. Whereas A second and third blast 
condemns ‘common plaies, vsual iesting, and riming extempore’ as ‘publike enimies 
to virtue & religion’,205 Shakespeare uses this piece of spontaneous theatricality 
within 1 Henry IV to ‘let the world slide’ (The Taming of the Shrew, ‘Induction’, 5). 
It exposes the provisionality of the serious world: in this scene, the audience is 
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furnished with a prince, disguised by beggarly behaviour, playing a king and then 
re-playing himself.  
 Hal’s response to Falstaff’s barefaced lying resonates with the twofold 
concerns of this section. First, I identify possible echoes of specific comments from 
the 1580 anti-theatrical polemic, A second and third blast of retrait from plaies and 
theatres the one whereof was sounded by a reuerend byshop dead long since; the 
other by a worshipful and zealous gentleman now aliue: one showing the filthines of 
plaies in times past; the other the abhomination of theaters in the time present […] 
in 1&2 Henry IV. As its title implies, the former text, sometimes attributed to 
Anthony Munday, is concerned with the lessons that history can offer. The ‘first 
blast’ has been furnished by Stephen Gosson’s Schoole of Abuse, which was 
published the year before this polemic in 1579;206 and the ‘second blast’ is a 
translation of Book 6 of the fifth-century Christian moralist Salvian of Marseille’s 
De gubernatione Dei, for whom the theatre was partly responsible for the moral 
degeneracy and widespread corruption that ultimately led to the fall of Rome. 
Finally, the ‘third blast’ brings Salvian’s observations to bear on early modern 
London with considerable rhetorical flair. If Shakespeare’s collaborator Munday, 
who worked with practically every significant playwright of the Elizabethan and 
Jacobean era and was an actor and a prolific writer of pageants, plays and histories, 
did translate this passionate invective against the theatre and pen its third section, he 
must have done so with his tongue in his cheek. An actor and playwright, who 
denounces his profession as perverse, dishonest and politically subversive would be 
something of a Cretan liar.   
 What follows is not concerned with whether Shakespeare’s plays contain an 
immediate response to this polemic, or if they simply make a mockery of the 
assumptions that underpin it; this, in any case, remains impossible to fully 
determine. Rather, my second contention is that putting 1&2 Henry IV and Henry V 
into dialogue with A second and third blast sheds new light on how these plays 
thematise the writing of history and how they engage with their sources. Through the 
‘comic refunctioning of preformed linguistic or artistic material’207 in the ‘palpable’ 
deception of a theatrical performance, it becomes clear that Shakespeare offers a 
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counterblast or defence of the capacity of aesthetic semblance to re-envisage the 
past.208 He implies that it is through the brazen lies of a manifestly fictional account 
of history that the received account of history’s untruths can be shown. It is hardly a 
Falstaffian exaggeration to claim, therefore, that mendacity is every bit as important 
to the structure and content of these plays as it is to the later history play, Henry VIII 
or All is True, which bills its preoccupation with truth-telling in its title.  
 Munday’s complaint that contemporary history plays give facts ‘a newe face, 
and turn them out like counterfeites to showe themselves on the stage’209 is true in a 
way that he could not possibly have imagined. Because 1&2 Henry IV and Henry V 
recurrently insist on their counterfeit status, questioning the ability of this ‘cockpit 
[to] hold | The vasty fields of France’ (Henry V, Prologue, 11), they lie openly: by 
which I mean that they acknowledge their fictional status. Shakespeare, it seems, has 
little interest in disguising ‘falshood in such sort, that he maie passe vnperceaued’: 
‘the truest poetry’, reflects his wise fool Touchstone, ‘is the most feigning’ (As You 
Like It, 3. 3. 15–16). By playing off different accounts of history against one another 
in the drama, these plays create a critical space that reflects upon the ‘erasure, 
rewriting and forgetting’210 that is, paradoxically, intrinsic to historical writing.  
 On the one hand, this conflict gives voice to those who have been silenced or 
skated over by the grand sweep of history. For example, Michael Williams, a 
common solider absent from the sources, questions Henry V’s reason for going to 
war, imagining a macabre, hydra-headed, multi-limbed, monstrosity calling the King 
to ‘reckoning’: ‘if the cause be not good, the King himself hath a heavy reckoning to 
make, when all those legs and arms and heads chopped off in a battle shall join 
together at the latter day’ (IV. 1. 130–132). On the other hand, such a critique of the 
success of the received account of history sees through both the untruths that 
constitute the past and the fictions that continue to govern the appalling facts of 
                                                
208 Arguing for parodic intertextuality between anti-theatrical polemics and plays, François Laroque 
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Vergessen’, Deutsche Shakespeare-Gesellschaft Jahrbuch, 145 (2009), 124–140; and Umberto Eco 
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reality. It thereby offers a trace of a kind of thought that is not ‘captivated by the 
truth of a foolish world’,211 in the manner that Sidney considered historians to be.  
‘Greedie of wickednes’ 
 
Scrutiny of the ostensible act of truth-telling, which frames the action of 1 Henry IV, 
supports the argument that these plays are preoccupied with mendacity. In his 
famous soliloquy, the Prince admits that he is playing along with Poins’ duping of 
Falstaff as part of a wider deception: 
 
 I know you all, and will awhile uphold 
 The unyoked humour of your idleness. 
 Yet herein will I imitate the sun, 
 Who doth permit the base contagious clouds 
 To smother up his beauty from the world, 
 That when he please again to be himself, 
 Being wanted he may be more wondered at, 
 By breaking through the foul and ugly mists 
 Of vapours that did seem to strangle him. 
 If all the year were playing holidays,  
 To sport would be as tedious as to work; 
 But when they seldom come, they wished-for come, 
 And nothing pleaseth but rare accidents. 
 So, when this loose behavior I throw off 
 And pay the debt I never promisèd, 
 By how much better than my word I am, 
 By so much shall I falsify men’s hopes; 
 And like bright metal on a sullen ground, 
 My reformation, glitt’ring o’er my fault, 
 Shall show more goodly and attract more eyes 
 Than that which hath no foil to set it off. 
 I’ll so offend to make offence a skill, 
 Redeeming time when men think least I will. 
(I. 2. 173–195) 
 
In contrast to his sources, Shakespeare gives a reason for Hal’s degenerate 
behaviour. It is a piece of politic mendacity. This point is made recurrently 
throughout the three plays—for instance, when the English Constable informs the 
French court that when he consorted with Falstaff and the denizens of Eastcheap, 
Hal was merely ‘Covering discretion with a coat of folly’ (Henry V, II. 4. 38). Owing 
to this instrumental use of folly, the subsequent tavern scenes take on the quality of a 
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dissimulation within the action of the play, itself an intrinsically dishonest form that 
shapes the dubious truths of the play’s sources.  
 Moreover, this trickery illustrates how the objective conditions of one’s given 
historical situation infiltrate the recesses of one’s subjectivity. In Hal’s speech, 
Shakespeare implies that the idea of a mental space unshaped by the prevailing 
ideology, a space of the sort that Montaigne describes as his ‘principal place of 
retreat and solitude […] [an] arriereboutique, a room, just for ourselves, at the back 
of the shop’,212 is, unfortunately, an illusion. When Hal levels with the audience, 
confessing his secret motives in soliloquy, these motives merely reflect what his 
historical-social situation expects of him. In this respect, he possesses what Isabella 
in Measure for Measure calls a ‘glassy essence’ (Measure for Measure, II. 2. 23), an 
essence that reflects back the historical coercion he has undergone. He too is duped. 
This act of truth telling implicitly presages what Adorno formulates when he reflects 
that ‘we are preformed by that being-for-others to the very core of our being’ (HF, p. 
71). Although ‘Prince Hal […] thinks he can operate outside of history’ and attempts 
‘to write history to accommodate his personal wishes’,213 these very wishes and 
hopes are a series of pragmatic choices that have been scripted for him.   
 Indeed, when Hal tells the truth in his soliloquy, the only truth he tells is a 
negative one: he is deceiving the other characters both at court and in the tavern. He 
alludes to Ephesians: ‘Take heed therefore that ye walk circumspectly, not as fools, 
but as wise, Redeeming the season: for the days are evil’ (Geneva, 5. 15–16). 
Although Munday uses the same scriptural passage as the epigraph for his book, the 
contrast between the two invocations of it could scarcely be more striking. Hal uses 
it to justify his use of theatre for the earthly end of falsifying ‘men’s hopes’, while 
Munday uses it to support his central contention that theatregoing is a sinful waste of 
time, which results in self-dissipation. Theatre audiences are liable to lose both 
‘themselues and the time’.214  
 Seemingly unwilling to accept the critical capacity of theatre, the polemicist 
employs sustained metaphors of consumption to describe the London populace’s 
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enthralment by the theatre as gluttony: 
 
 Those vnsauerie morsels of vnseemelie sentences passing out of the mouth of 
 a ruffenlie plaier doth more content the hungrie humors of the rude multitude, 
 and carieth better rellish in their mouthes, than the bread of the worde, which 
 is the foode of the soule. They are alwaies eating, & neuer satisfied; euer 
 seeing, and neuer contented; continualie hearing, & neuer wearied; they are 
 greedie of wickednes, and wil let no time, nor spare for anie weather (so 
 great is their deuotion to make their pilgrimage) to offer their penie to the 
 Diuel.215   
   
Drawing a similar comparison, Falstaff ironically assumes a position of moral 
superiority in order to castigate Hal for his ‘most unsavoury similes’ (1 Henry IV. I. 
2. 70). He also suggests that the implicit meaning of Hal’s descriptions of him 
infects his listeners with immorality. And he continues:  
 
 FALSTAFF An old lord of the council rated me the other day in the  
  street about you […], but I regarded him not; and yet he talked  
  very wisely, and in the street too. 
 PRINCE HARRY Thou didst well, for wisdom cries out in the streets  
  and no man regards it.  
 FALSTAFF O, thou hast damnable iteration, and art indeed able to  
  corrupt a saint. Thou hast done much harm upon me, Hal, God  
  forgive thee for it. Before I knew thee, Hal, I knew nothing; and  
  now I am, if a man should speak truly, little better than one of the  
  wicked.  
(74–84) 
The comic incongruities of this exchange warrant clarification in the context of truth 
telling. Not without some wisdom, Falstaff confesses to being blind to the moral 
sense of the Lord Chief Justice’s castigations. Hal travesties a misunderstanding—or 
a temporary forgetting—of the significance of Proverbs 1. 20. 20–22, which is that 
people remain obstinately in ‘love’ with ‘foolishness’, when they should in fact heed 
what ‘Wisdom cries without’. Subsequently, Falstaff plays the penitent sinner, 
hypocritically reprimanding the Prince for his parody of holy writ, before making the 
outrageous suggestion that Hal has corrupted him. Falstaff’s detachment from 
explicit values undermines even negative, Socratic wisdom—‘Before I knew thee, 
Hal, I knew nothing’—by travestying it. 
 Falstaff’s mock lament that ‘company, villainous company, hath been the 
spoil of me’ (1 Henry IV, 3. 3. 8–9), ridicules the notion apparent in anti-theatrical 
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polemics that proximity with actors not only made the audience imitate what they 
saw on stage, but also caused a radical alteration in their God-given identity.216 For 
Salvian, moreover, authorities are tarnished by their tolerance of and complicity with 
the theatres:  
 
 An euil cause maintained is nearetheles euil; &, as pitch defiles the toucher 
 thereof, be he neuer so cleane: so the virtuous bring their life into question 
 either by sufferace, or maintenance of euil.217  
 
Shakespeare memorably redeploys the Erasmian adage that is invoked to justify his 
ideas about sin by association (see CWE, 33, p. 172); in donning the persona of 
Henry IV, Falstaff rehearses the castigation the Prince will receive from his father in 
the following scene: ‘There is a thing, Harry, which thou hast oft heard of, and it is 
known by many in our land by the name of pitch. This pitch, as ancient writers do 
report, doth defile. So doth the company thou keepest’ (2. 5. 375–378). Falstaff’s 
citation of the wisdom of the ancients humorously subverts the authority of ‘ancient 
writers’. When, in the guise of the King, he comments that ‘there is virtue in that 
Falstaff. Him keep with; the rest banish’ (391), he both rescripts the past, suggesting 
(as he frequently does) that he has not led an errant life, and envisages an alternative 
future, in which Hal neither ‘throw[s] off’ his ‘loose behaviour’, nor gets castigated 
by his father for his association with everyone in the tavern.  
 Hal’s description of Falstaff’s mendacious utterances—‘These lies are like 
the father that begets them—gross as a mountain, open, palpable’—aptly associates 
him with a gigantic geological formation. Falstaff is ‘open’ both in the sense that his 
lies are brazen and in the Bakhtinian sense that his body is ‘blended with the 
world’;218 he amply embodies the subversive potential of corporeal openness, about 
which Bakhtin writes at length, and is described as ‘lard[ing] the lean earth as he 
walks along’ (II. 3. 17) when he runs away from the robbery. ‘A dissolute man’ 
writes Adorno is ‘one who dissolves in all directions, who is not subject to a 
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sustained, harmonious rational principle’ (HF, p. 255). This grossness is made 
manifest in The Merry Wives of Windsor, in which Falstaff admits that he is ‘as 
subject to heat as butter, a man of continual dissolution and thaw’ (III. 5. 98–100).  
 However insincere, Hal’s dispraise of Falstaff in their ‘play extempore’ is 
rooted in aesthetic objections to Falstaff, who is disgusting and morally 
reprehensible because he is disproportioned. He is ‘out of all reasonable compass’ (1 
Henry IV, III. 3. 19),219 not unified—spectacularly failing to conform to the socially 
expedient aesthetic/moral ideals of being ‘neat and cleanly’ (II. 5. 415). But when he 
comments about Bardolf’s complexion, Falstaff assumes the standpoint of someone 
who associates virtue with neat proportion, parodying the idealising aesthetic that he 
himself confounds: ‘I make as good use of it as many a man doth of a death’s head, 
or a memento mori. I never see thy face but I think upon hell-fire and Dives that 
lived in purple—for there he is in his robes burning, burning’ (1 Henry IV, II. 3. 25–
28). This comment perhaps recalls Salvian’s reflection that theatre encourages a 
hedonistic intoxication, which ultimately causes an utter disregard for the spiritual 
telos of human being: ‘we burne, we burne, yet dread we not the fire wherwith we 
burne’.220 Needless to say, Falstaff embodies this state of spiritual blindness. Not 
only does he forget part of the parable—Dives was rich, while Bardolf is not—but 
also, despite his duplicitous protestations to the contrary, he fails to heed the moral 
message of his paradoxically incarnate death’s head. In fact, in 2 Henry IV, he 
attempts to wilfully forget about his mortality, imploring Doll, to whom his physical 
limitations are manifest, to ‘not speak like a death’s head; do not bid me remember 
mine end’ (II. 4. 232–233).  
 In the conclusion of the ‘third blast’, the Elizabethan polemicist, perhaps 
propelled by his own hyperbole, describes actors as ‘Cretan liers’.221 This is glanced 
at by Shakespeare’s introduction of Rumour in 2 Henry IV and when Falstaff 
exclaims, after his first meeting with Shallow: ‘Lord, lord, how subject are we old 
men to this vice of lying!’ (2 Henry IV, 3. 2. 275–6). The hapless Justice of the 
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Peace’s reminiscences throws into relief the combination of nostalgia and 
forgetfulness that acts of remembrance are prone to exhibit. Falstaff’s comment 
recalls the Cretan liar paradox: do we trust a self-confessed liar’s confession of his 
own (and others’) mendacity? This question is all the more pressing since Falstaff’s 
paradoxical candour about his habitual dishonesty echoes Rumour’s comparable 
disclosure. 
 While confessing her untruthfulness, Rumour actually tells the truth. 
Realising that she is being uncharacteristically candid, she then corrects herself: 
‘But what mean I | To speak so true at first? My office is | To noise abroad that 
Harry Monmouth fell’ (2 Henry IV, ‘Induction’, 27–30). This flagrantly fictional 
supplement replays alternative histories within 2 Henry IV. Rosalie Colie’s 
observation that the ‘essence of paradox is its doubleness, with its concomitant 
detachment and postponement of commitment’,222 is borne out by the way in which 
any claim to historical veracity in this play is framed by Rumour’s remarkable 
admission of her mendacity. Additionally, there is a related paradox at work: 
namely, that it is Rumour’s Cretan lie that takes the audience para-doxa. It takes 
them outside of the very opinions, doxa—the ‘slanders’, ‘false reports’, ‘surmises’ 
and ‘conjectures’ (6, 8, 16, 16) that baffle humankind—that this personification of 
dishonesty honestly admits to spreading ‘from the orient to the drooping west’ (3). 
But this means that the audience must take her avowedly unreliable word as gospel. 
They are thereby left stranded in a state of insoluble contradiction or aporia.  
 When it comes to writing history, Lucian’s desire for it to consist of the 
‘establishment of truth’223 is exposed as either naive or over-ambitious.  Those who 
go to ‘History looking for truth’, blind to the fact that like poetry it is ‘allegorically 
and figuratively written’, writes Sidney, ‘shall go away full fraught with 
falsehood’.224 Shakespeare’s account of history lies in the manner of the Cretan liar. 
By pointing out its manifestly false nature—not least by using Rumour and the 
Chorus in Henry V—he exploits the negative potential of mimesis to give the lie to 
reality. These plays use this paradox to expose the dishonesties of the orthodox 
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account of history—the account of history that standardises and orders (as the 
prefix, ortho implies) opinions, doxa, and passes them off as facts.  
 The Use and Abuse of History 
 
Shakespeare’s histories expose the way that a fictionalised past is used to justify 
what is instrumentally expedient in the present. Falstaff has already made a mockery 
of this tendency when he plays on Shallow’s false memories for his personal gain, 
confessing to the audience: ‘If the young dace be a bait for the old pike, I see no 
reason in the law of nature but I may snap at him’ (2 Henry IV, 3. 2. 295–6). But the 
abuse of history is most apparent in the main action of Henry V. Out of pure self-
interest the Archbishop of Canterbury wilfully misreads Numbers 2. 28, providing 
an obscure genealogy to create Henry’s right to France.225  
 The retroactive construction of the past was a key factor in Tudor nation 
building: ‘Genealogies were constructed to derive the Tudor dynasty directly out of 
the line of Brutus, come to reunite for ever the divided kingdoms of England, Wales 
and Ireland’.226 Not only does Shakespeare question the legitimacy of hereditary 
privilege in Richard II, but, early in his career, he also travesties this sort of 
fashioning of the past. In 2 Henry VI, the manifestly illegitimate Jack Cade 
constructs a thoroughly mendacious genealogy (see IV. 2. 33–51). Through a piece 
of egregious mendacity, Cade declares his legitimacy: ‘My father was a Mortimer’, 
a comment deflated by the Butcher’s aside: ‘He was an honest man and a good 
bricklayer’ (33–35). Although it could be overlooked as merely a comment 
calculated to rile the Globe’s audience, the Dauphin’s petulant description of the 
British as ‘Normans, but bastard Normans, Norman bastards’ (Henry V, III. 5. 10) 
debunks the fictions of legitimacy upon which the British nobility and royalty 
depend—by the French account, Henry is sans droict.    
 In Henry V, the Fluellen’s providential and self-aggrandizing historiographic 
analogies are comically vague. They imply that the historical analogues of the de 
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casibus tradition, from which the popular Mirror for Magistrates developed, reflect 
the self-interest of victors as much as the fall of great men: 
 
          I tell you, captain, if you look in the maps of the world I warrant you 
shall            find, in the comparisons between Macedon and Monmouth, that the 
 situations, look you, is both alike. There is a river in Macedon, and there is 
 also moreover a river at Monmouth […]. If you mark Alexander’s life well, 
 Harry of Monmouth’s life is come after it indifferent well. For there is 
 figures in all things. 
(IV. 7. 19–24) 
 
The Welshman is absurd because of his dogmatic adherence to formal frameworks, 
regardless of how they are contradicted by empirical reality. Fluellen is duped by a 
providential tradition of historical writing, which suppresses the physical privations 
and material consequences of war.  
 No doubt the ‘pristine wars of the Romans’ (III. 3. 25–6), to which he 
compares present actions, actually caused as much physical suffering, with ‘shrill-
shrieking’ daughters raped and ‘naked infants spitted on pikes’ (112, 115), as 
Henry’s invasion of France could potentially. Indeed, after Agincourt, Shakespeare 
briefly stages the selective amnesia that characterises the writing of history in his 
list of the casualties: ‘Edward duke of York, the Earl of Suffolk, | Sir Richard 
Keighley, Davy Gam Esquire; | None else of name, and of all other men not five and 
twenty’ (IV. 8. 96–100). The names of some of Henry’s erstwhile ‘band of brothers’ 
(IV. 3. 60) do not warrant being recorded in history. Moreover, by foregrounding 
Henry V’s insecurities and the war’s spurious justification, Shakespeare certainly 
undermines Holinshed’s explanation of this miraculous triumph as a particular 
instance of the universal principle that ‘victories for the most part followeth where 
right leadeth, being advanced forward by justice, and set foorth by equitie’ (NDSS, 
3, p. 382).  
 The question of the truth of history is the central tension in these plays and 
Henry V in particular. As we have seen, negative truths about the untruth of the 
received account can be voiced through aesthetic semblance. But writing history 
necessarily lends aesthetic form to material facts and events. Shakespeare employs 
the Chorus to peddle the authorised account of history, which conveniently forgets 
inconvenient facts; only present in the Folio edition of the play, it frames the action 
as a whole and each act with a jingoistic and providential account of the history that 
the play’s action dramatizes. It offers, amongst other things, the ‘point of 
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crystallization for the complexity of this history’ in this play.227 The Chorus 
recurrently evokes art’s triumph over, and inevitable separation from, empirical 
reality; it does so by using Henry’s favoured rhetorical tactic, occupatio, which he 
employs at Harfleur and in his wooing of Katherine. By saying that it is incapable of 
describing the action, the Chorus describes it:  
 
 I humbly pray them to admit th’excuse  
 Of time, of numbers and due course of things,  
 Which cannot in their huge and proper life  
 Be here presented.  
 (5. 0. 2–5) 
  
As Rackin put it, ‘Grounded in the contemporary material reality of the playhouse’ 
Shakespeare’s histories ‘undermined the authority of the imagined historical action, 
and with it the authority of history’.228 But the disparity between the history that the 
Chorus imposes on events and what the play’s action dramatises is no less great than 
that between Falstaff’s tale of the robbery and what is presented: 
    
 Now all the youth of England are on fire, 
 And silken dalliance in the wardrobe lies; 
 Now thrive the armourers, and honour’s thought 
 Reigns solely in the breast of every man. 
 They sell the pasture now to buy the horse, 
 Following the mirror of all Christian kings, 
 With winged heels, as English Mercuries. 
(2. 0. 1–7) 
 
The following scene, in which the inept, reluctant and old soldiers illustrate the 
grotesque reality of ‘silken dalliance’, incorporates an alternative to the triumphal 
account of events that the Chorus is attempting to give. And so does the Chorus’s 
language.  
 The image of the mirror, which recalls the providential historiography of the 
Mirror for Magistrates and the function of mimesis to ‘hold as ’twere the mirror up 
to nature’ (Hamlet, 3. 2. 20), reworks Holinshed’s opinion that Henry was one ‘that 
bothe lived & died a pattene in princehood, a lode-starre in honour, and mirror of 
magnificince’ (NDSS, 3, 408). Citing historical precedence, the Chorus implies that 
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Henry’s ‘Following the mirror of all Christian kings’ is self-destructive. His self-
evidently unchristian warmongering is damaging to the commonwealth. It betrays 
the fact that he is interested only in the ephemeral pleasure of worldly glory; 
prodigally, this ‘starre’ sells ‘the pasture now to buy the horse’.  
 At the start of the fourth act, the Chorus praises how ‘a little touch of Harry 
in the night’ inspires the ‘ruined band’ (IV. 0. 28) with his ‘cheerful semblance and 
sweet majesty’ (40). However, this ‘little touch’ conspicuously fails to make a ‘deep 
impression’.229 What is noticeable about the scene in which Henry visits the soldiers 
is that here the imagery of monstrosity—prevalent in all of these plays—reaches its 
zenith; the monstrous is that which violates the categories of normal experience and 
here it is used to question the validity of these categories, to question the authority 
of the king.   
 Given the impending physical annihilation that the ‘poor, condemméd 
English’ (IV. 0. 22) fear, the formal niceties of Henry’s debate with Bates about 
personal responsibility and the demands the state places on the individual seem 
incongruous. Williams makes this abundantly apparent:       
 
 BATES   If his cause be wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the  
  crime of it out of us. 
 WILLIAMS But if the cause be not good, the King himself hath a heavy  
  reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads chopped 
  off in a battle shall join together at the latter day, and cry all, ‘We  
  died at such a place’—some swearing, some crying for a surgeon,  
  some upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the debts  
  they owe, some upon their children rawly left. I am afeard there are 
  few die well that die in a battle, for how can they charitably dispose 
  of anything when blood is their argument? Now, if these men do not 
  die well, it will be a black matter for the King that led them to it— 
  who to disobey were against all proportion of subjection.   
 (IV.1. 127–38) 
 
Absent from the sources, this plebeian voice is an avatar of what Grady calls 
‘impure aesthetics’. Breaking through the legal discussion between the king and 
Bates, he posits a view of history as something eminently physical; it is something 
that maims, deforms and obliterates living bodies, a view commonly obscured by 
the factual, providential and legal discourses recorded by historians.  
                                                
229 Andrew Gurr, ‘Henry V and the Bees’ Commonwealth’, SS, 30 (1977), 61–72 (p. 66). 
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 In fact, in this scene, two distinct models of history are counterpoised. On the 
one hand, there is Williams’ embodied history. Williams makes it clear that obeying 
earthly powers can have serious consequences for the soul, since the syntactical 
proximity of ‘proportion’ and ‘subjection’ implies that ideas of aesthetic proportion, 
which the grotesque imagery of his prose violates, are closely related to his 
historical ‘subjection’.  On the other hand, Henry would like to tell a providential 
version of history: national destiny predictably reflects the desires of the aristocracy 
for more wealth and political power.  It is characterised by techniques of abstraction 
and disassociation; its values are relative. Henry manages to cancel out the 
potentially egalitarian idea of man’s shared physical vulnerability—the 
philosophical and social significance of which was considered in Chapter 2—by 
using it instrumentally in his politic humbling.  
 Henry enables and justifies his destruction of the nameless victims of 
progress by appearing to be ‘but a man’ (IV. 1. 99):  
 
 I think the King is but a man, as I am. The violet smells to him as it doth to 
 me. All his senses have but human conditions. His ceremonies laid by, in his 
 nakedness he appears but a man.  
(99–102) 
 
Falstaff, his mentor in excess, has already warned him of the consequences of his 
politic dissimulations. Towards the end of the ‘play extempore’ in which his 
banishment is foreshadowed, Falstaff anticipates a crisis of meaning: ‘Dost thou 
hear, Hal? Never call a true piece of gold a counterfeit—thou art essentially made 
without seeming so’ (1 Henry IV, II. 5. 449–450). What he means is that because of 
all his acting, Hal’s true essence, which is in any case merely a product of the 
dominant ideology, takes on the quality of a performance; even as he declares that 
‘the King is but a man’, Henry testifies to the fact that the King is a perpetual 
performer, a ‘counterfeit’.    
  Nonetheless, Henry’s encounter with Williams gives him cause for 
reflection: 
 
 ‘Let us our lives, our souls, our debts, our care-full wives, 
 Our children, and our sins, lay on the King.’ 
 We must bear all. O hard condition, 
 Twin-born with greatness: subject to the breath 
 Of every fool, whose sense no more can feel 
 But his own wringing. What infinite heartease 
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 Must kings neglect that private men enjoy? 
 And what have kings that privates have not too, 
 Save ceremony, save general ceremony? 
 And what art thou, thou idol ceremony? 
 What kind of god art thou? That suffer’st more  
 Of mortal griefs than do thy worshippers? 
 What are thy rents? What are thy comings in? 
 O ceremony, show me but thy worth. 
 What is thy soul of adoration? 
 Art thou aught else but place, degree and form, 
 Creating awe and fear in other men? 
 Wherein thou art less happy being feared, 
 Than they in fearing. 
 (IV.1.214–251) 
 
This soliloquy betrays an understanding of what I considered earlier in connection 
with Henry’s ‘I know you all’ soliloquy. As Adorno writes:  
 
 At the very moment when people believe they are most themselves and 
 belong to themselves, they are not only the prey of ideology. We might even 
 go so far as to say that they themselves have turned into ideology. 
 (HF, p. 78)  
  
There is, it appears, a tacit realisation that there is possibly no remainder, no recess, 
no ‘room, just for ourselves, at the back of the shop’ in Henry’s subjectivity: ‘men | 
Are as the time is’ (King Lear, V. 3 31–32). Kingship is an aesthetic product, 
dependent upon ‘place, degree and form’; it is built on the uncertain footings of 
‘opinion’, which Henry IV confesses ‘did help’ him ‘to the throne’ (1 Henry IV, III. 
2. 41). It is legitimated by manufacturing history.  
 In contrast to the soliloquy in the tavern, however, Hal realises the extent to 
which ideology mediates every moment of his existence. When Henry delivers this 
speech there is a turn in the drama. Beneath ‘ceremony’ the king is not a mere 
‘man’, but one whose repose is continually interrupted by the Sisyphean burden of 
kingship. Although Erasmus denounces the ‘idol ceremony’ associated with 
kingship as meaningless—‘nobility, statues, wax masks, family trees, and all 
heraldic pomp which makes the common people swell with girlish pride, are only 
empty gestures’ (CWE, 27, p. 213)—Henry, in contrast, implies that that is all there 
is to it. When he appears to break through his social role, he shows that he has been 
conditioned by the burgeoning mercantile ideology premised on ‘reckoning’.230 This 
                                                
230 OED, definitions, nos. 3a, b, c and d.  
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sort of rationality cannot conceive of the excessive, valueless, and even idolatrous 
nature of regal ‘ceremony’.  
 Just as in the ‘I know you all’ soliloquy, Henry here uses the platea to 
estrange the fictions that constitute kingship; indeed, all the characters who use this 
liminal space are, in one way or another, either lying or reflecting on mendacity: 
Falstaff recurrently lies outright and outrageously and also formulates his liar 
paradox from the platea; the Chorus in Henry V peddles a dubious account of events 
from here; while Rumour comments on the prevalence of doxa from this position. 
Hal uses this location near the audience to give speeches, which consider the extent 
to which objective historical conditions shape the Silenic core of human beings. 
Paradoxically, Falstaff uses this position of proximity to evoke the distance he and 
his audience are at from authentic interiority. In this respect, the invention of the 
human, it seems, is just that, an invention or fiction; as Heinrich Böll’s clown, Hans 
Schnier, puts it in Ansichten eines Clowns: ‘That which other people call nonfiction 
appears to me to be very fictive’.231 In these plays, it takes the manifestly fictional 
discourse of folly to expose the fictional nature of history.   
 At the close of the play, Shakespeare also inverts the significance of 
Holinshed’s image of Henry as ‘a lode-starre’ in the Epilogue, which is spoken by 
the Chorus:  
 
 Small time, but in that small most greatly lived  
 This star of England  
    […]  
 Henry the Sixth, in infant bands crowned king  
 Of France and England, did this king succeed,  
 Whose state so many had the managing  
 That they lost France and made his England bleed. 
(‘Epilogue’, 5–6, 9–11) 
  
At a stroke, the closing lines of the play write off Henry’s achievements. The 
tension between the official account of history and an alternative one premised on 
the critique of such accounts is even apparent in the Chorus’s metaphor of Henry’s 
soldiers as ‘English Mercuries’. On the one hand, it suggests that Henry’s mission is 
divinely sanctioned. Like Mercury, the English solders are messengers from the 
gods, and thus agents of their wills, although this allusion is certainly strained by the 
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foregrounding of the trumped up grounds for going to war. On the other hand, they 
are thieves; not only are they invading another country with no real justification, but 
also certain members of the army are ‘sworn brothers in filching’ (III. 2. 41–3).   
 Such ambiguities stand in stark contrast to Samuel Daniel’s First Four 
Bookes of the Civil War, which seeks to create a national identity based on a 
shared—and therefore unequivocal—memory of this victory. Daniel castigates 
present ‘times’: ‘Ungrateful times that impiously neglect | That worth that never 
again times shall show’, before invoking the nationalistic potential of poetry: ‘O 
what eternall matter here is found! | Whence new immortal Illiads might proceed’ 
(NDSS, 3, p. 421 [Book IV, Stanzas, 4–5]). It is easy to see Shakespeare’s 
antagonistic historical practice at work in Troilus and Cressida, his disenchanted 
reworking of one of the founding stories of western civilisation, the myth to which 
Daniel refers. Throughout, Shakespeare questions the significance of the fall of 
Troy and the malcontent Thersites even debases poetry that seeks to unequivocally 
honour the war caused by Paris’s abduction of Helen with his reductive assertion: 
‘Here is such patchery, such juggling and such knavery! All the argument is a whore 
and cuckold’ (II. 3. 64–65). While the next chapter of this thesis is devoted to the 
follies of love in As You Like It, Twelfth Night and The Winter’s Tale, it is clear that 
this Heldensage also hinges on Paris’s lust.  
 Shakespeare’s histories frustrate the construction of a shared national 
memory by refusing to forget the self-interested motives and selective amnesia that 
constitutes such an account of the past. As Rackin astutely argues, in Shakespeare’s 
histories, the age of honour is a vanishing point:  
 
 Just as the first tetralogy looks back to Henry V as an emblem of lost glory 
 that shows up the inadequacy of his son’s troubled reign, the second looks 
 forward to his glorious accession [….] But […] when he finally appears as 
 king, all that longingly remembered and eagerly anticipated glory evaporates 
 in ambiguity.232   
 
Moreover, 1&2 Henry IV and Henry V make it clear that the world in which they 
were composed is moulded by the very history whose veracity they expose. 
Munday’s complaint that early modern historians are like dishonest tailors, who use 
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‘shreds’ from ‘old coate[s]’233 to create new ones, encapsulates not only the 
plurality of Holinshed’s Chronicles, but also Shakespeare’s parodic refashioning of 
his source materials. From the fragments of what has been, these plays work to 
elucidate the inadequacies of the world in which they were written. In doing so, they 
offer thought that is not bound into its objective circumstances, but goes beyond 
them through critical reflection. ‘A good wit’, reflects Falstaff, ‘will make use of 
anything. I will turn diseases to commodity’ (2 Henry IV, I. 2. 227). What vitiates 
such critical reflection, however, is the principal paradox with which I have been 
concerned: the fact that to guard against mendacity one must employ the openly 
dishonest form of theatrical representation. 
 
                                                
233 A second and third blast of retrait from plaies and theatres, p. 105.  
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CHAPTER 5 
LOVE’S FOOLS 
 
 Hope refresheth, as much as misery depresseth; hard beginnings have many 
 times prosperous events, and that may happen at last, which never was yet. 
      —Robert Burton234 
  
That love makes a fool of everyone is something of a commonplace. In The 
hospitall of incurable fooles, Thomaso Garzoni argues that this particular branch of 
folly underwrites all human activity: 
 
 Now woulde it be requisite that we had the knowledge and practise togither 
 of as many amorous accidents, as haue fallen out both in the old, and this our 
 present age, that we might describe with conuenient solemnitie, all the 
 fopperies of louers, they being manifest causes of a thousand other follies, 
 which from this stock as from their beginning, drawing their originall and 
 essence, cause their life not onely to appeere, but really and in effect to be the 
 strangest and maddest race, that may be imagined.235  
This view is certainly shared by Shakespeare, who reflects upon this fact primarily 
through the discourse of folly. As the wise fool Touchstone observes, ‘We that are 
true lovers run into strange capers. But as all is mortal in nature, so is all nature in 
love mortal in folly’ (As You Like It, II. 4. 48–49).  
 The connection between love and folly has not escaped critical attention. Tim 
Prentki devotes a chapter to the comedies entitled ‘Fooling with Love’, contending 
that Shakespeare’s comedies ‘take as their theme the discrepancies between the 
ideal view of love and the reality of the workings of desire within the human 
animal’.236 Likewise, Robert Bell shows how love is persistently characterised as a 
necessary folly throughout Shakespeare’s comedies and romances.237 For Andy 
                                                
234 The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. by Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicholas K. Kiessling and Rhonda L. Blair, 3 
vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989–1994), II, p. 167. Subsequent references are to this 
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the vnskilfull hand of an ignorant architect could deuise […], trans. by anon (London: Edm[und] 
Bollifant, 1600 [1586]), p. 81.  
236 The Fool in European Theatre: Stages of Folly (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), pp. 69–96 (p. 69).  
237 Shakespeare’s Great Stage of Fools (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), esp. pp. 49–77.  
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Mousley, ‘in Shakespeare’s comedies […] love is foolish and proves the “only 
human” ridiculousness of human beings’.238 Examining the ‘influence of liturgical, 
Pauline and Erasmian paradoxes concerning faith and folly’, Chris Hassel argues for 
the centrality of holy folly, ‘the great love where with He loved us’ (KJV, Ephesians 
2. 5), to Shakespeare’s ‘comic vision and comic form’;239 developing Hassel’s 
arguments, Donald Whers provides a theoretically nuanced reading of 
Shakespearean comedy through the prism of Erasmus’ theories of grace and 
Levinasian ethics.240  
 This chapter, however, contends that love and folly are connected in As You 
Like It, Twelfth Night and The Winter’s Tale in a twofold way that has not hitherto 
been considered. On the one hand, these plays expose how love, which is ostensibly 
perhaps the most intensely personal of emotions, is ideologically mediated. The 
characters are duped by love: even those who acknowledge the severe limitations 
inherent in the prevailing—monogamous and heterosexual—conception of love find 
themselves conforming to it. In Much Ado About Nothing, for instance, the two 
lovers, who are ‘too wise to woo peacefully’ (V. 2. 61), ultimately find themselves 
performing the roles that, as the eavesdropping scenes make clear, have been 
scripted for them all along. Benedict’s very declaration of love is equivocal: ‘I do 
love nothing in the world so well as you’ (IV. 1. 266). Beatrice aptly responds by 
amplifying the unease lurking in his comment: ‘It were as possible for me to say I 
loved nothing so well as you, but believe me not, and yet I lie not. I confess nothing, 
nor I deny nothing’ (268–70). For all the ironic distance from the explicit values of 
the serious world implicit in her riddle, at the end of the comedy she nonetheless 
marries.  
 On the other hand, to be wholly outside of love’s sway, the plays suggest, is 
to take a conceited satisfaction in one’s own wisdom. This, paradoxically, is a form 
of self-love, a perverse form of love considered at length in this chapter. Because it 
                                                
238 Re-Humanising Shakespeare: Literary Humanism, Wisdom and Modernity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007), p. 135.  
239 Faith and Folly in Shakespeare’s Romantic Comedies (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1980; 
repr. 2000), p. i.  
240 See ‘Touching Words: Embodying Ethics in Erasmus, Shakespearean Comedy, and Contemporary 
Theory’, MP, 104 (2006), 1–33.  
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negates the libidinal drives that make everybody tick, for Erasmus’ Stultitia such 
scoffing is disingenuous: 
 Consider now (I praie you) how muche more Affection, than Reason, Iupiter 
 hath put in man, to the end theyr lyfe should not althogethers be heauy, and 
 vnpleasant. […] he shutte vp Reason within the narowe compasse of mans 
 head, leauyng all the rest of the bodie to affections.  
(PF, p. 23) 
  
Fortunately, cold reason has little sway over humankind. It is the affection we feel 
for others that makes life bearable. 
 Shakespeare suggests that the promesse de bonheur lies in love. ‘Love’, it 
transpires, ‘is wise in folly, foolish witty’ (Venus and Adonis, 838). These plays 
imply, however, that to be open to what love could one day be, one must accept love 
in the distorted form in which it manifests itself in the everyday world, but retain a 
critical awareness of this distortion—as Petruccio does when he makes his own 
wedding into a pantomime in The Taming of the Shrew. Not only do the resolutions 
of the comedies expose the coercion that forces people into conforming to the way 
things are, but also, by staging the way in which these characters are forced into 
doing the same thing as everyone else, these weddings estrange the everyday 
institutions, discourses and rituals that people unthinkingly accept.  
 While it may be true that ‘Wishers were ever fools’ (Anthony and Cleopatra, 
IV. 16. 38), it is in the nature of thought, Shakespeare implies, to be discontented 
with what is and to foolishly wish for what is not—as an infatuated lover does. As 
the great philosopher of hopes and dreams, Ernst Bloch, was later to formulate it: 
‘Thinking means going beyond [Überschreiten]’.241 Commenting along similar lines 
to Shakespeare’s archetypal lover, Cleopatra, Montaigne associates certainty with 
intellectual complacency. For him, yearning for that which is not is characteristic of 
genuinely insightful thinking: ‘if you grant follie what it desireth, it will no-whit be 
satisfied’, whereas seeming ‘wisdome [is] content with that which is present, and 
never displeased with it selfe’ (E, Book 1, Chapter 3, p. 5). Owing, however, to his 
Erasmian techniques of ironic framing, Shakespeare goes one step further than 
Montaigne. As You Like It, Twelfth Night and The Winter’s Tale disavow their own 
capacity to create the absolute convictions upon which conceited wisdom is based. 
                                                
241 Das Prinzip Hoffnung, 3 vols (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1959; repr, 1985), I, p. 3.  
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They suggest, ultimately, that even the negative knowledge that love, in one form or 
another, dupes everyone might also be mere nonsense.  
 As You Like It and Twelfth Night contain two of Shakespeare’s most 
esteemed wise fools, Touchstone and Feste. While my readings of these plays 
emphasise the thematic integrity of these jesters, showing that they should not be 
treated in isolation from the plays’ philosophical standpoints, folly in these 
comedies is by no means limited to specific avatars, to clowns and jesters. Rather, it 
possesses as vital a thematic, structural and conceptual significance as it does in the 
histories. My analysis of The Winter’s Tale, with which this chapter concludes, 
argues for the thematic integrity of two conceptions of folly to this play: namely, 
folly in the sense of misapprehension and folly in the sense of the utopian desire for 
things to be other than how they are. The analysis of Shakespeare’s dramatisation of 
aesthetic judgements in this play also anticipates my readings of Hamlet and King 
Lear, which build on my arguments about the role of the grotesque in the Second 
Tetralogy. In these tragedies, I argue, Shakespeare fashions an anti-aesthetics with 
which he exposes the inhumanity of art that is finished, clean and correctly 
proportioned.  
Making a Mockery of Allegory  
 
 The more pity that fools may not speak wisely what wise men do foolishly. 
 —I. 2. 72–73 
 
For G. K. Chesterton, the title As You Like It is ‘an expression of utter carelessness, 
but it is not the bitter carelessness which Mr. Bernard Shaw reads into it; it is the 
god-like and inexhaustible carelessness of a happy man’.242 Of course, Chesterton 
does not mean that the comedy is careless in the sense that it is badly constructed, or 
slapdash in the way that Folly’s citations sometimes are.243 The ‘inexhaustible 
carelessness’ Chesterton perceives designates a playful attitude, of the sort apparent 
in Montaigne’s comment: ‘Our life consisteth partly in folly and partly in 
wisedome. Hee that writes of it but reverently and regularly, omits the better moitie 
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of it’ (E, Book 3, Chapter 5, p. 498).  
 This type of wisdom can be discerned in Rosalind’s opening dialogue with 
Celia, who enjoins her disenfranchised cousin to ‘be merry’ (I. 2. 15): 
 
 ROSALIND  From henceforth I will, coz, and devise sports. Let 
  me see, what think you of falling in love? 
 CELIA Marry, I prithee do, to make sport withal; but 
  love no man in good earnest, nor no further in sport 
  neither than with safety of a pure blush thou mayst 
  in honour come off again. 
 ROSALIND  What shall be our sport, then? 
 CELIA Let us sit and mock the good housewife Fortune from 
  her wheel, that her gifts may henceforth be bestowed equally. 
 ROSALIND I would we could do so, for her benefits are 
  mightily misplaced; and the bountiful blind woman 
  doth most mistake in her gifts to women. 
 CELIA ’Tis true; for those that she makes fair she scarce 
  makes honest, and those that she makes honest she 
  makes very ill-favouredly. 
 ROSALIND  Nay, now thou goest from Fortune’s office to 
  Nature’s. Fortune reigns in gifts of the world, not in the  
  lineaments of Nature.  
(20–36) 
 
At this moment, love, the emotion around which the events of the comedy revolve, 
is not taken at all sincerely—not least because, as Rosalind later comments, ‘Men 
have died from time to time and worms have eaten them, but not for love’ (IV. 1. 
91–92). Love becomes a provisional proposition, a ‘sport’, which seems to reflect 
her counterpart’s attitude towards love in the play’s chief source, in which she 
considers it ‘a toye, and fancie a momentary passion, that as it was taken with a 
gaze, might be shaken off with a winck’ (NDSS, 2, p. 172). This badinage reduces 
the grand concepts of ‘love’, ‘Fortune’ and ‘Nature’ to mere playthings; it suspends 
the values of the serious world in order to hold them at arm’s length and critique 
them. Not only does this mockery of the ‘good housewife Fortune’ voice a longing 
for the ‘benefits of fortune’ to be ‘bestowed equally’, but it also demands a detached 
perspective, a perspective, in other words, that entails a refusal to resign oneself to 
the idea that one ‘must be circumstanced’ (Othello, III. 4. 196), or hopelessly 
immured in the world as it is, as the prostitute Bianca considers herself to be.   
 Rosalind and Celia’s pseudo-scholastic quibbling about the auspices of 
‘Nature’ and ‘Fortune’ gestures towards the key tension in As You Like It; this 
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tension is between sincerity and insincerity or, to put it in more literary terms, 
between perceiving the world in prefabricated allegorical categories, and the parody 
of such wisdom, which, the play as a whole is at pains to point out, writes of life all 
too ‘reverently and regularly’. The main problem with an allegorical understanding 
of the world, as John Donne suggests, is that it generalises, forcing the diversity of 
human behaviour, emotions and relationships into predetermined categories, 
regardless of whether they fit or not: 
 
 When thou knowest a wife, a sonne, a servant, a friend no better, but that that 
 wife betrayes thy bed, and that sonne thy estate, and that servant your credit, 
 and that friend thy secret, what canst thou say thou knowest?244  
 
Such an understanding of the world forecloses any possibility of experiencing a 
new and unexpected relationship with a person or the world. As Shakespeare’s 
sceptical treatment of providential history’s allegories attests, not only is allegory 
frequently used to support the status quo—why wives and servants are treated the 
way they are—but an allegorical (or, for that matter, analogical) understanding of 
the world also interprets new events and ideas in the terms of the past. It remains, 
like Lot’s wife, paralyzed by the past.  
 The dangers of perceiving the world in terms of the past are apparent from 
the first scene of the play. When Oliver uses the stock example of folly, the parable 
of the prodigal son, to justify his denial of Orlando’s inheritance, his younger 
brother rightly questions the analogy, echoing Luke 15. 16: ‘Shall I keep your hogs 
and eat husks with them? What prodigal portion have I spent, that I should come to 
such penury?’ (I. 1. 29–32); Oliver evidently misses the point of the parable, which 
is used to explain God’s foolish, gratuitous love for every member of creation. But 
when Orlando rescues Oliver from the lion, it is just this sort of unwarranted, 
irrational love that he extends to his brother. In the parable, the elder son is angered 
by his father’s joyous welcoming of his erring son with ‘melody, and dancing’ 
(Geneva, Luke 15. 25), for he has ‘done thee service, neither brake I at anytime thy 
commandment’ (Geneva, Luke 15. 29). Oliver, however, has done his father a 
disservice by ignoring his behest to bequeath Orlando ‘a thousand crowns’ (I. 1. 2). 
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 143 
In contrast to the prodigal son, Orlando is innately good: ‘he’s gentle; never 
schooled, and yet learned; full of noble device; of all sorts enchantingly beloved’ 
(141–2). And it is partly for this reason that his Canaanite brother despises him.  
 The audience’s first encounter with the lachrymose Jaques—the report of his 
passionate reaction to the injured animal—critiques allegory even as it describes 
one:  
  
 FIRST LORD   […] The wretched animal heaved forth such groans 
  That their discharge did stretch his leathern coat 
  Almost to bursting, and the big round tears 
  Coursed one another down his innocent nose 
  In piteous chase. And thus the hairy fool, 
  Much markèd of the melancholy Jaques, 
  Stood on th’extremest verge of the swift brook, 
    Augmenting it with tears. 
 DUKE SENIOR But what said Jaques? 
  Did he not moralize this spectacle? 
 FIRST LORD  O yes, into a thousand similes. 
  First, for his weeping into the needless stream; 
  ‘Poor deer,’ quoth he, ‘thou makst a testament 
  As worldlings do, giving thy sum of more 
  To that which had too much.’ Then being there alone, 
  Left and abandoned of his velvet friend, 
  ’Tis right,’ quoth he, ‘thus misery doth part 
  The flux of company.’ Anon a careless herd, 
  Full of the pasture jumps along by him 
  And never stays to greet him. ‘Ay,’ quoth Jaques, 
  ‘Sweep on, you fat and greasy citizens, 
  ’Tis just the fashion. Wherefore do you look 
  Upon that poor and broken bankrupt there?’ 
  Thus most invectively he pierceth through 
  The body of the country, city, court, 
  Yea, and of this our life, swearing that we 
  Are mere usurpers, tyrants, and what’s worse, 
  To fright the animals and to kill them up 
  In their assigned and native dwelling place. 
 (II. 1. 36–63) 
 
Jaques’ sustained prosopopoeia turns the Duke’s earlier assumption that nature is 
insensible on its head. For Jaques it is civilized men—especially the enfranchised 
‘citizens’ of cities—who are insensible: they are content to turn a cold shoulder to 
the suffering around them, in which they are complicit, so long as they can cram 
themselves with ‘greasy’ commodities.  
 Shakespeare does not endow Jaques with the powers of divination associated 
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with melancholia by Ficino and Agrippa; Jaques is the opposite of ‘a common type 
of Renaissance utopianist or Arcadian, who out of his own medically aberrant 
consciousness spins a tale of a better world’.245 Not least because he shares the 
Duke’s tendency to allegorise, his wisdom is decidedly shortsighted. Even in the 
radically new or unusual, he can only ever see more of the same—his thought fails 
to go ‘beyond’. He does not so much ‘moralize’ as allegorise the spectacle of the 
deer, reducing it to yet another example of man’s innate cruelty. He even 
characterizes the stag as a fellow melancholic, shunned by the world. The actual 
suffering of this ‘poor dappled fool’ (II. 1. 22) is muted.  
 This is not surprising, since this image ‘is the closest approximation we have 
in Shakespeare of an actual emblem’.246 It hails from the Metamorphoses and recalls 
the moment when Actaeon glimpses his reflection after he has been transformed 
into a stag: 
  
     But when he saw his face   
 And hornèd temples in the brook, he would have cried, ‘Alas!’ 
 But as for then no kind of speech out of his lips could pass, 
 He sighed and brayed; for that was then the speech that did 
  remain.  
 And down the eyes that were not his, his bitter tears did rain.  
 No part remained (save his mind) of what he erst had been’.247  
 
Shakespeare employs this image to evoke Jaques’ alienation from society rather 
than the alienation from personal identity apparent in Ovid. Moving from 
sympathy—weeping with and for the beast—to an aggressive attack on society 
(‘invectively he pierceth through | The body of the country, city, court’), Jaques is 
not passive in the way Actaeon is. This extended metaphor links the scoffing 
satirist’s actions unequivocally to those of the hunters; like the hunters, he turns the 
‘native burghers of this desert city’ (II. 1. 24) to his own uses. Since the play is 
vitally concerned with tyranny and usurpation—as well as with the figurative 
tyranny of an allegorical mindset—it is not insignificant that this ‘allegorical 
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description’ is wholly ‘static and distanced from the action of the play’.248  
 In his first encounter with Jaques, Touchstone, who is absent from the source, 
makes a mockery of the seriousness associated with an allegorical habit of mind. 
But Jaques is delighted to find another outsider, a recently homeless wanderer, in 
the forest: 
 
 JAQUES A fool, a fool, I met a fool i’th’ forest, 
  A motley fool—a miserable world!— 
  As I do live by food, I met a fool, 
  Who laid him down and basked him in the sun, 
  And railed on Lady Fortune in good terms, 
  In good set terms, and yet a motley fool. 
  ‘Good morrow, fool,’ quoth I. ‘No, sir,’ quoth he, 
  ‘Call me not fool till heaven hath sent me fortune.’ 
  And then he drew a dial from his poke, 
  And looking on it with lack-lustre eye 
  Says very wisely, ‘It is ten o’clock.’ 
  Thus we may see,’ quoth he, ‘how the world wags. 
  ’Tis but an hour ago since it was nine, 
  And after one hour more ’twill be eleven; 
  And so from hour to hour we ripe and ripe, 
  And then from hour to hour we rot and rot; 
  And thereby hangs a tale.’ When I did hear 
  The motley fool thus moral on the time 
  My lungs began to crow like chanticleer, 
  That fools should be so deep-contemplative, 
  And I did laugh sans intermission 
  An hour by his dial. O noble fool, 
  A worthy fool—motley’s the only wear. 
(II. 7. 12–34) 
 
In a play otherwise characterized by role-playing, parody and disguise, Jaques is 
not changed by the course of events, remaining to the last a melancholic. Even when 
he laughs, crowing ‘like chanticleer’, his laughter does not distance him from the 
rigid identities of the sublunary world, since it recalls the case of the melancholic in 
Galen,249 who, in Garzoni’s words, ‘imitate[s] the crowing and noise the cocke 
made with his winges’.250 Because he takes the fool’s Janus-faced discourse at face 
value, the paradoxical wisdom or ‘moral’ implicit in Touchstone’s meditation on 
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time and decay is lost on Jaques. Through his mock-serious attitude, Touchstone 
travesties the calibration of time into easily measurable segments; his ‘lack-lustre 
eye’ is dissimulated and the fact that he spends his time basking in the sun implies 
that he is unconcerned by the ‘moral’ of his ‘tale’.  
 Such an attitude towards the time of the ‘working-day-world’ is apparent 
elsewhere in the play. In her mock catechism of Orlando’s tardiness, Rosalind 
contends that such an account of time is an abstraction, wholly at odds with lived 
experience, in which ‘Time travels in divers paces with divers persons’ (III. 2. 282–
3): 
  
 Break an hour’s promise in love! He that will divide a minute into a thousand 
 parts and break but a part of the thousand part of a minute in the affairs of 
 love, it may be said of him that Cupid hath clapped him o’th’shoulder, but 
 I’ll warrant him heartwhole.  
(IV. 1. 39–44)  
 
Because ‘There’s no clock in the forest’ (III. 2. 275), a temporality not based on 
sequential progression is possible; Celia likes Arden and ‘willingly could waste 
[her] time in it’ (II. 4. 90).  
 Allegory is a fragile thing, not least because, as Walter Benjamin contends, 
‘the parody of a form proclaims its end’.251 This is apparent in the complex parody 
at work in Jaques’ on-stage report to the Duke and his followers of Touchstone’s 
allegory: 
 
     All the world’s a stage, 
  And all the men and women merely players.     
  They have their exits and their entrances, 
  And one man in his time plays many parts, 
  His acts being seven ages. At first the infant, 
  Mewling and puking in the nurse’s arms. 
  And then the whining schoolboy with his satchel 
  And shining morning face, creeping like snail 
  Unwillingly to school. And then the lover, 
  Sighing like furnace, with a woeful ballad 
  Made to his mistress’ eyebrow. Then, a soldier, 
  Full of strange oaths, and bearded like the pard, 
  Jealous in honour, sudden, and quick in quarrel, 
  Seeking the bubble reputation 
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  Even in the cannon’s mouth. And then the justice, 
  In fair round belly with good capon lined, 
  With eyes severe and beard of formal cut, 
  Full of wise saws and modern instances; 
  And so he plays his part. The sixth age shifts 
  Into the lean and slippered pantaloon, 
  With spectacles on nose and pouch on side, 
  His youthful hose, well saved, a world too wide 
  For his shrunk shank, and his big manly voice, 
  Turning again toward childish treble, pipes 
  And whistles in his sound. Last scene of all, 
  That ends this strange, eventful history, 
  Is second childishness and mere oblivion, 
  Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything.  
(II. 7. 135–165) 
 
On the face of it, this account of man’s inexorable decline into senility seems to 
echo Folly’s famous description of the innate foolishness of each age of Man. 
Jaques’s melancholy, however, skews her descriptions. For Folly, ‘the first age of 
man’ is ‘most gracious and acceptable vnto all folks’ (PF, p. 16). People delight in 
babies because of the ‘allurement of Folie; ‘all men put to theyr helpyng handes’ to 
assist youths (PF, p. 16); in the serious part of his life, ‘Manhode’, ‘the floure of his 
beautie decaieth, his myrth fadethe, his grace waketh colde’; and in Eld man 
becomes ‘not only vrksome to others, but hatefull also to him selfe’, but, at ‘deaths 
dore’, he reverts ‘back againe vnto childhode’ (PF, p. 17). For Folly, as a 
‘wasshying awaie [of] all the troubles and carefullnesses of the mynde’, this sort of 
‘Obliuion’ (PF, p. 17) is not the self-annihilation to which Jaques alludes. Rather, it 
is a gift that helps man to die well, maintaining his hope in the face of the brute facts 
of physical finitude. The essential difference between Folly’s understanding of the 
seven ages of man and Jaques’ is that the former conceives it in essentially comic 
terms, while the latter regards it with a sense of tragic inevitability.   
 But such a generalization is at risk of ignoring the multiple layers of parody 
operating in this speech, through which Shakespeare makes a mockery of objective 
standpoints. Indeed, Erasmus puts his speech into the mouth of an unreliable 
narrator, the high priestess of folly, Stultitia. Her invocation of this allegorical 
conception of human development, which is itself based on the notion of linear 
progression of time As You Like It is so suspicious of, is very far from serious. 
Sincerely peddling the wisdom of Touchstone and Stultitia, Jaques not only 
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foolishly takes their word for gospel, but he also misunderstands it. His conception 
of the universality of folly is more akin to Sebastian Brandt’s remorseless didactic 
satire than the vertiginous ironies of the Praise. As with the death of the stag, he 
understands the theatrum mundi topos, which is insistently invoked by Stultitia 
throughout the Praise, in his own melancholic terms, in which it epitomizes a world 
drained of meaning. Ironically, the world appears in this way to him precisely 
because he is so certain about his own caustic wisdom, which for the most part is 
sententious drivel. Orlando points out that this melancholic has ‘studied’ his 
‘questions’ from ‘a painted cloth’ (III. 2. 251–252).  
 Jaques not only attempts to reduce every person’s existence to an allegory of 
progressive disintegration, but also indulges in narcissistic reflection about his 
melancholy, which the rapier wit of Rosalind cuts immediately down to size: 
 
 JAQUES Why ’tis good to be sad and say nothing. 
 ROSALIND Why then, ’tis good to be a post. 
 JAQUES I have neither the scholar’s melancholy, which is emulation,  
  nor the musician’s, which is fantastical, nor the courtier’s, which is 
  proud, nor the soldier’s, which is ambitious, nor the lawyer’s, which 
  is politic, nor the lady’s, which is nice, nor the lover’s, which is all  
  these; but it is a melancholy of mine own, compounded of many  
  simples, extracted from many objects, and indeed the sundry  
  contemplation of my travels, in which my often rumination wraps me 
  in a most humorous sadness. 
 ROSALIND A traveller! By my faith, you have great reason to be sad. I  
  fear you have sold your own lands to see other men’s.   
               (IV. 1. 8–20) 
   
Jaques’ Burtonian attempt at defining his melancholy is no less absurd then the 
relativism that Touchstone parodies in his extemporisation on the phrase ‘in respect 
that’ (III. 2. 13 ff). Tambling observes that the ‘interest in division: dividing 
existence up’ is ‘characteristic of the allegorical disposition’ that ‘works by 
soliloquy’.252  
 Certainly, Jaques tends to soliloquise and divisio is pervasive in his speech. 
But, as Touchstone is well aware in his discussion with the baffled rustic Corin, this 
melancholic desire to divide the world into watertight categories proves self-
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defeating. It leaves the audience, both on stage and off, in a muddle. Indeed, this 
interest in the pathology of this sort of madness can perhaps be seen in the elaborate 
divisions and subdivisions that Burton uses in his work, which far from clarifying 
the text become part of its copiousness, but it is perhaps most apparent in The 
hospitall of incurable fooles. This text conceives of folly neither in the 
paradoxically positive way of the Praise, nor as something that liberates one from 
the coercive strictures of sobriety, as is apparent in As You Like It. Folly, for 
Garzoni, is a privation that ‘sorely vexeth mortallmen, and holdeth in subiection 
vnder her tyrannicall empire’.253 The narrator of this peculiar text, with which 
Burton was familiar,254 shows his voyeuristic readers, who have presumably made 
the grade as sane observers, around a thirty-room hospital. In every chamber, he 
confines one type of fool; each chamber is under the auspices of a suitable pagan 
deity. In the case of the ‘infinit kinds of melancholike fooles’,255 the deity is Saturn. 
The idea that the scientific drive to categorise and control the world is already 
apparent in mythology, as Horkheimer and Adorno argue in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, is borne out in The hospitall of incurable fooles’ pathology of folly, 
which uses pagan deities as shorthand for certain experiences or emotions.   
 What is really significant, however, is that the narrator’s distinctions are at 
best arbitrary and at worst absurd. Perhaps succumbing to Folly’s venal vice of 
forgetfulness, the narrator dedicates two rooms of his institution to obstinate fools, 
and classes ‘stupid’ and divinely inspired ‘ecstatic’256 fools together, although 
admittedly telling the two apart is no mean feat. It remains unclear whether this text 
offers a subtle travesty of man’s drive to categorise and create the definite identities 
from which allegories spring, or if it simply examines the privations of folly from a 
privileged, disenchanted perspective. What I think it does expose, however, is the 
limitations of an allegorical or categorical mindset. Such a mentality does not ask 
what a thing is, but merely under what category it falls. And Garzoni shows us, 
albeit accidentally, that this mentality is discernible not only in the medical 
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confinement at the dawn of the age of reason, but also in the categorical rationality 
of polytheism.  
True, False, Other: Love’s ‘Strange Capers’ 
 
In contrast to its source, As You Like It sets the static wisdom of the serious world 
into motion. The play’s dazzling ironies subject positive knowledge, allegorical 
worldviews and any sincere endorsement of a particular standpoint or system of 
values to ridicule. For this reason, this chapter takes a very dim view of sincerity 
indeed—not least because those who are captive to sincerity equate seriousness with 
veracity, whereas all three of the plays considered imply that the opposite is true. 
Paradoxically, their seriousness lies in their essential playfulness.  
 When Touchstone deflates the rustic William’s self-satisfied assertion—‘I 
have a pretty wit’—with his comment ‘Why, thou sayst well. I do now remember a 
saying: “The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a 
fool”’ (V. 1. 27–29), any kind of self-admiration—the philautia Stultitia decries 
and, since she is praising herself, simultaneously embodies—is debunked. Crucially, 
however, William’s opinion of himself is not disproved and replaced with another 
positive proposition. Rather, arguing along the same lines as Socrates, the fool 
suggests that any estimation of one’s wisdom is an act of folly. To be sure, a 
paradoxical kind of wisdom lies in acknowledging one’s folly, but this insight 
oscillates in a state of ironic indeterminacy: the baffled rustic, William, shares his 
name with the creator of the play.    
 In eschewing the law of the excluded middle, which holds that either a 
proposition is true or the negation of it is true, Touchstone is an avatar of a non-
categorizing mindset. Early on, he speaks of a knight, who, contrary to what the 
mercurial Touchstone avows to be the truth, claims that certain pancakes ‘were 
good pancakes, and swore “by his honour” the mustard was naught’ (I. 2. 54–55), 
but is not ‘foresworn’, ‘for he never had any [honour]’ (64) to lose in the first place. 
From Touchstone’s pancake syllogism Kiernan Ryan concludes: 
 
 Truth-claims are only as secure as the assumptions on which they rest; 
 demolish these assumptions and the truth claims collapse with them, clearing 
 the way for propositions that might otherwise seem preposterous.257 
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In fact, the very notion of a wise fool gives the lie to the law of the excluded 
middle. He is a creature that is neither wholly wise nor essentially foolish, a creature 
that, by being wise in his folly, confounds any straightforward distinction between 
wisdom and folly, between being correct and being wrong. This resonates with the 
philosophical procedure of the play as a whole, which is less concerned with 
questions of truth and falsehood than with examining the ways in which such 
certainties are formed in the first place.  
 Shakespeare is recurrently critical of the conceits commonly employed in the 
aestheticization of love. Such staid commonplaces are, of course, famously satirised 
in ‘Sonnet 130’: ‘My mistress’ eyes are nothing like the sun; | Coral is far more red 
than her lips’ red’ (1–2). And early on in his career, Shakespeare has Dromio of 
Syracuse debase the staid geographical analogies of romantic verse. Of Nell, the 
kitchen wench, Dromio observes: 
 
  She is spherical, like a globe. I could find out countries in her.  
      […] 
 ANTIPHOLUS OF SYRACUSE Where is her America, the Indies?  
 DROMIO OF SYRACUSE O, sir, upon her nose, all o’er embellished 
  With rubies, carbuncles, sapphires, declining their rich aspect to the 
  hot breath of Spain, who sent whole armadas of carracks to be ballast 
  at her nose. 
 ANTIPHOLUS OF SYRACUSE Where stood Belgia, the Netherlands? 
  DROMIO OF SYRACUSE Oh, sir, I did not look so low. 
(The Comedy of Errors, III. 2. 113–114, 131–137)  
 
In this bout of repartee, the ‘Comparisons’ are indeed ‘odorous’ (Much Ado About 
Nothing, III. 5. 14)—as Dogberry’s memorable malapropism has it.   
 Such posturing is also mocked in Twelfth Night. When Viola professes 
Olivia’s singularity in thoroughly conventional terms, compelling her not to ‘leave 
the world no copy’, Olivia responds: 
 
 O sir, I will not be so hard-hearted. I will give out divers schedules of my 
 beauty. It shall be inventoried and every particular utensil labelled to my will, 
 as, item, two lips, indifferent red; item, to grey eyes with lids to them; item, 
 one neck, one chin, and so forth. 
 (I. 5. 213, 214–218) 
 
This travesties the conventional descriptive techniques of amorous poetry by 
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reducing them to a grotesque list of isolated body parts. The effect of this travesty is 
to show how an allegorical or clichéd understanding of the world fails to inquire 
into the particular features of its object of discourse.  
 In As You Like It the self-regard latent in writing sonnets to one’s lover is 
overcome through parody. But this parody eventually turns out to be a sincere 
attempt at a relationship based on a kind of reciprocity impossible for self-infatuated 
creator-lovers from Pygmalion onwards. While he refuses to be ‘cured’ (III. 2. 380) 
of his love melancholy, Orlando is more than prepared to woo Ganymede in the 
guise of what he already is, a fool for love. Undercutting expectations of how a 
lover might appear, Ganymede catalogues the ‘marks’ of a true lover; a lover, he 
contends, must have ‘A lean cheek, which you have not; a blue eye and sunken, 
which you have not; an unquestionable spirit, which you have not’ (357, 337–340). 
This tension between acting out one’s desires and these desires finding satisfaction 
is also apparent in the way that the weddings at the end are structurally pre-empted. 
Both Touchstone and Audrey and Ganymede and Orlando have already performed 
travesties of the marriage ceremony.  
 When Touchstone parodies Orlando’s verses—“Sweetest nut hath sourest 
rind,” | Such a nut is Rosalind’ (III. 2. 98–99)—his primary objection to them is not 
that they are hopelessly mannered, but that they lack technical skill. They are the 
‘very false gallop of verses’ (102). Such poetry is prone to be copious—‘I’ll rhyme 
you so eight years together, dinners and suppers, and sleeping-hours excepted. It is 
the right butter women’s rank to market’ (85–87)—but, like the proverbially 
garrulous chitchat of milkmaids, it is ultimately vacuous. As with Rosalind’s 
infatuated comment⎯‘my affection hath an unknown bottom, like the bay of 
Portugal’, which Celia inverts: ‘Or rather bottomless, that as fast as you pour your 
affection in, it runs out’ (IV. 1. 177–181)—plenitude can easily turn into scarcity.    
 In her parody of what someone outside love’s sway might say, Rosalind 
contends that love is a universal folly: ‘Love is merely a madness, and I tell you, 
deserves as well a dark house and a whip as madmen do; and the reason they are not 
so punished and cured is that the lunacy is so ordinary that the whippers are in love 
too’ (III. 3. 359–363). But in contrast to Theseus’ disenchanted comment that ‘The 
lunatic, the lover, and the poet | Are of imagination all compact’ (A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream, V. 1. 7–8), Rosalind is not peddling the kind of wisdom that 
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removes her from the other ‘country copulatives’ (V. 4. 53). Rather, she parodies 
the attitude of a disenchanted scoffer at the folly of lovers.  
 However, her treatment of Orlando’s love melancholy through playful 
substitution, which turns out to be no substitution at all, is in turn debunked by 
Touchstone. When he describes the time when he was in ‘love’ (II. 4. 41) with ‘Jane 
Smile’ (43), he offers a grotesque replay of the self-dramatisations, substitutions and 
role-playing that lovers employ—be it carving poetry on trees, the wooing of 
Ganymede, or the token of the blood stained cloth: 
 
 […] I remember the kissing of her batlet, and the cow’s dugs that her pretty 
 chapped hands had milked; and I remember the wooing of a peascod 
 instead of her from whom I took two cods, and giving her them again, said 
 with weeping tears, ‘Wear these for my sake’. We that are true lovers run 
 into strange capers. But as all is mortal in nature, so is all nature in love 
 mortal in folly.  
(43–49) 
  
As in Rabelais, the production and consumption of food and human reproduction 
are grotesquely conflated; the tautology of ‘weeping tears’ invokes the tears of 
true—or conceited—lovers like Orlando or Oliver, but this is wholly undercut by 
the fact that gift to his beloved, a ‘peascod’, possesses overt phallic connotations.     
 Touchstone’s mockery of explicit values inflects the marriage scene—not 
least because his ‘Loving voyage | Is but for two months victualled’ (V. 4. 180–
181), as Jaques puts it; Touchstone’s extemporal travesty of duelling codes defers 
the crucial moment of recognition at the end of the comedy by discussing the 
‘degrees of the lie’ (V. 4. 80):   
 
 O sir, we quarrel in print, by the book, as you have books for good manners. I 
 will name for you the degrees. The first, the Retort Courteous; the second, 
 the Quip Modest; the third, the Reply Churlish; the fourth, the Reproof 
 Valiant; the fifth, the Countercheck Quarrelsome; the sixth, the lie with 
 Circumstance; the seventh, the Lie Direct. All these you may avoid but the 
 Lie Direct; and you may avoid that too with an ‘if’ […]. Your ‘if’ is the only 
 peacemaker, much virtue in ‘if’.  
(81–92) 
 
Be it the hair-splitting of philosophical discourse, the details of love poetry or 
duelling etiquette, this professional fool has a remarkable command of the otiose 
formal signifying systems of the serious world, systems which are transmitted 
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through ‘books’. In this connection, Touchstone speaks ‘wisely what wise men do 
foolishly’.   
 Moreover, his praise of the conditional conjunction ‘if’ imbues the final 
scene with a sense of provisionality, emphasising how unlikely—even patently 
fictional—the events on stage are: 
 
 ROSALIND [to the DUKE] To you I give myself, for I am yours. 
  [to ORLANDO] To you I give myself, for I am yours. 
 DUKE  If there be truth in sight, you are my daughter. 
 ORLANDO If there by truth in sight, you are my Rosalind. 
 PHOEBE If sight and shape be true, 
  Why then my love adieu! 
(V. 4. 105–110; [my emphasis]) 
 
‘To you I give myself’, evokes self-surrender, although, as Ryan contends, this is 
not simply submission to ‘patriarchal conventions, since the premises on which 
these conventions rest have been kicked away in the course of the play’.258 The 
conditional clause in ‘If there be truth in sight’ estranges the audience. It reminds 
them that they are spectators of an ‘improbable fiction’, ‘played upon the stage’ 
(Twelfth Night, III. 4. 115, 114). What they see in the theatre is, by definition, not 
straightforwardly ‘true’, a point emphasised moments later, when the god Hymen 
introduces a note of uncertainty: he will join the characters in marriage, ‘If truth 
holds true contents’ (V. 4. 119).  
 In Arden, even the gods are uncertain. It seems as though they too are under 
the sway of that magical conjunction, “if”, which is anathema to the serious, sincere 
and dogmatic. As You Like It avoids being a ‘Lie Direct’—that is, avowing things to 
be true, when they are manifestly untrue—by using ‘if’. By not insisting on the 
veracity of its own claims, the play renders the world conditional by deftly 
submitting any sincere worldview to parody. For this reason, the most significant 
moment of the play occurs when Oliver wakes up in the forest as his brother 
wrestles with a lion: ‘in which hurtling | From miserable slumber I awakened’ (IV. 
3. 130–131). In saving his brother, albeit after some hesitation, Orlando confounds 
the logic of self-preservation, of getting by in the world. In an inversion of what 
occurs in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, which suggests that the forest outside 
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Athens was a mere dream, a theatrical illusion—‘If we shadows have offended, | 
Think but this, and all is mended: that you have but slumbered here’ (‘Epilogue’, 1–
3)—Oliver awakens from a nightmarish reality into a realm of fictional possibility. 
This realm is characterised by the possibility of generosity and reciprocity—a model 
of which is offered by Adam’s gift to Orlando of ‘five hundred crowns | The thrifty 
hire I saved’ (II. 4. 39–40)—rather than the ‘bubble reputation’ that ostensibly 
motivates both the tyrant Duke’s banishment of Rosalind, who thinks Celia ‘wilt 
show more bright and seem more virtuous | When she is gone’ (I. 3. 75–6), and 
Oliver’s jealousy of Orlando.  
  As You Like It rehearses alternative endings to the two biblical tales that 
form the bedrock of common conceptions of fallen, human nature. Adam does not 
transgress; and Cain does not murder Abel. When Oliver wakes in the forest it 
signifies neither the nadir of his insanity as it does in Chrétien de Troyes’s Yvain, 
nor a period of spiritual anguish as in Dante. The wise fool’s paradoxical comment 
to Audrey that ‘the truest poetry is the most feigning’ (III. 3. 15–16) resonates far 
beyond its immediate context. In this most manifestly fictional of plays—with its 
fragments from Ovid, romances, parables and the Praise of Folly—the injustices of 
the world as it is can be rendered risible.  
 In this respect, As You Like It epitomises a fact that Adorno formulates with 
great clarity in his essay ‘Is Art Lighthearted’: 
 
 [A]rt is a critique of the brute seriousness that reality imposes on human 
 beings. Art imagines that by naming this fateful state of affairs it is loosening 
 its hold. That is what is lighthearted in it; as a change in the existing mode of 
 consciousness, that is also, to be sure, its seriousness. 
 (NL, 2, p. 248)   
 
To indulge, for a moment, in a paradox almost worthy of a wise fool: the serious 
point of As You Like It lies in its playful exposure of the insincerity at the heart of 
the serious world. The play’s ironies clear the way for amazement—both in the 
modern sense of astonishment and the early modern sense of confusion. Although 
the resolution of this comedy is so incredible that it is compared to the art of a 
‘magician’ (V. 2. 54), the fact that the play fragments and rewrites the fictions that 
shape reality suggests that it is not wholly constrained by the ways of the world: it is 
prepared to adumbrate alternatives and embraces the hypothetical liberties of ‘if’.   
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The World Turned Upside-Down 
 
 Since, therefore, laughter is the principal sign of this frisky pleasure that we 
 like so much, which counteracts old age, is common to all, and proper to 
 man, I am most astonished that the diligent ancients, scrutinisers of causes, 
 have omitted the investigation of its origin, working a great deal more to find 
 the reasons behind the things which touch us less and in less far regard. Why 
 do we not stop to consider the familiar, common miracles that we carry 
 about, and are able to  examine them closely and at leisure? 
—Laurent Joubert.259 
 
For August Wilhelm Schlegel, folly is central to Twelfth Night. In his Lectures on 
Dramatic Art and Literature, he contends that this play contrasts the ‘idealistic 
follies’ of Orsino, Olivia and Viola, who are duped by the prevalent notion of what 
love is, with the ‘naked follies [baren Narrheiten] […] of the risible persons of the 
piece, [who are] likewise acting under the pretext of love’.260 Far from being a 
theme, folly is of considerable structural significance to this play. Sir Toby, Maria 
and the other merry-makers not only embody the spirit of celebration alluded to by 
the first of the play’s titles—the feast of the Epiphany, a ‘brief, licensed period of 
festive release and frivolity on the last eve of the holiday season’261—but they also 
suggest that the performance of the stereotypes, which the more serious-minded 
citizens of Illyria indulge in, is absurd. Unlike the Duke, Olivia and Malvolio, these 
revelers are not in thrall to an allegorical or analogical mindset.  
 Schlegel neither wrests the main action from the backstairs world, nor 
dismisses the overtly festive scenes as comic relief as Barber and Laroque do in 
their discussions of festivity in this play. Schlegel contends that ‘These scenes are as 
exquisite and significant as they are delightfully and humorously organized’.262 Not 
least because festivity can create, for a moment, an alternative world that comes far 
closer to what the characters (and audience) will than the serious world, even the 
antics of the play’s tosspot and gull cannot be discounted as insignificant. Indeed, 
the labile, grotesque world of carnival is a realm that operates, like play, according 
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to the rules of ‘if’, of “make-believe”. But it does not operate according to Barber’s 
proscriptive rubric: ‘through release to clarification’.263 The unlicensed festivity in 
the play is consistently excessive, refusing to remain within its calendrical bounds. 
  On his first entrance, Sir Toby is asked by Maria to ‘confine’ himself ‘within 
the modest limits of order’ (I. 3. 6–7). In his quibble on the word ‘confine’, he 
evokes his unruly body, a socially useless body undeterred by the self-discipline 
characteristic of the bourgeois age: ‘Confine? I’ll confine myself no finer than I am. 
These clothes are good enough to drink in, and so be these boots too’ (8–9). At the 
close of the play, when one might expect clarification, the wounded braggarts 
cannot be treated by the doctor, because he has chosen drunken torpor over facing 
up to the everyday reality of Illyria: ‘Dick Surgeon’ is ‘drunk […] an hour ago. His 
eyes were set at eight i’th’ morning’ (V. 1. 190, 191–192). Likewise, the disguised 
Viola describes her persistent courtship of Olivia on behalf of Orsino in terms of a 
violation of decorum. She will encamp herself at Olivia’s gate and ‘Write loyal 
cantons of contemnèd love, | And sing them loud even in the dead of night’ (I. 5. 
239–40; [my emphasis]).  
 Malvolio attacks the backstairs revellers precisely on the grounds that their 
levity is out of control: 
 
  My masters, are you mad? Or what are you? Have you no wit, manners nor 
 honesty, but to gabble like tinkers at this time of night? Do ye make an 
 alehouse of my lady’s house, that ye squeak out coziers’ catches without any 
 mitigation or remorse of voice? Is there no respect of place, persons, nor time 
 in you?  
(II. 3. 78–83) 
 
For the steward, who, according to Maria, is nothing ‘but a time-pleaser’ (131–
132), this ‘uncivil rule’ (111) threatens to turn the world on its head, upsetting what 
he considers the immutable hierarchy of ‘place’, ‘persons’ and ‘time’. Needless to 
say, however, the play points out that these ostensibly watertight concepts are 
scarcely more stable than the festivity that unsettles them. Earlier in this scene, for 
instance, Sir Toby solipsistically invokes the topsy-turvy temporality of festivity, an 
‘uneven element’, which does not see time as a ‘measurable quantity or a simple 
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factor in observable physical phenomena’:264 ‘To be up after midnight and to go to 
bed then is early; so that to go to bed after midnight is to go to bed betimes’ (5–7).  
 Sir Toby’s utterances are not always mere bluster. When he asks: ‘What the 
plague means my niece to take the death of her brother thus? I am sure care’s an 
enemy to life’ (I. 3. 1–2), he is not only an evangelist for the ‘God-like carelessness 
of the happy man’, which includes a healthy indifference to the workaday world’s 
edicts of time, place and person, but he also recalls the primary medical purpose of 
the fool: namely, to prolong and enrich his master’s life by ‘making his or her liege 
laugh’.265 Since ‘there was no way conceptually or discursively to separate the 
psychological from the physiological’ in Renaissance medical discourses,266 the 
laughter arising from folly and the notoriously ‘ambivalent’ laughter of the carnival 
had physical consequences. ‘Mirth’, Burton writes, ‘purgeth the blood, confirms 
health, causeth a fresh, pleasing, and fine colour, prolongues life, whets the wit, 
makes the body young, lively, and fit for any manner of employment’.267  
 Malvolio, however, is receptive to neither Sir Toby’s ‘Saturnalian creed’,268 
nor Feste’s foolery. Olivia praises the potential inherent in folly to belittle the 
privations of a hostile reality, when she reproves her steward: 
 
 O, you are sick of self-love, Malvolio, and taste with a distempered appetite. 
 To be generous, guiltless, and of free disposition is to take those things for 
 birdbolts that you deem cannon bullets. There is no slander in an allowed 
 fool, though he do nothing but rail.   
(I. 5. 77–81) 
 
By this account, the paradoxical wisdom of folly, which is later alluded to in 
Viola’s comment, ‘This fellow is wise enough to play the fool; | And to do that well 
craves a kind of wit’ (III. 1. 1–2), is a careless or indifferent wisdom. It is ‘free’ 
insofar as it is neither swayed by dominant ideas, nor given to mendacity; it is 
‘generous’ in that the fool gives without being motivated by the desire for personal 
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preferment. In a way similar to As You Like It, the logic of an instrumental reason 
grounded in getting by in the world is questioned.  
 It is Malvolio’s sanctimonious humourlessness in this scene—‘I marvel your 
ladyship takes such delight in such a barren rascal’ (I. 5. 71)—that occasions Feste’s 
involvement in his humiliation. The fool downplays this by making it the 
consequence of an abstract entity and simultaneously evokes the restorations, 
recognitions and reprisals that conclude comedies: ‘thus the whirligig of time brings 
in his revenges’ (V. 1. 364). But immuring Malvolio in ‘hideous darkness (IV. 2. 
27) is the central example of how jokes turn sour in this play. What is more, this 
seriocomic pseudo-treatment fails to cure Malvolio of his illness, his self-love. 
 Malvolio’s self-estimation is apparent in his fantasy of leaving a sexually 
exhausted Olivia asleep on a ‘daybed’ (II. 5. 43), while he castigates her dissolute 
kinsmen. His virtue, such as it is, becomes the object of his own desire. In other 
words, he does not simply yearn for coitus with Olivia. Rather, he primarily desires 
the power his sexual possession of her will give him to enforce his moral authority 
on others. He may seem at a remove from Oliva’s ritualistic excess, but for all his 
‘clear ordering of time and space’,269 he too is excessive. He has a surfeit of  ‘Self-
love’, a kind of love that, for Thomas Wright, is an ‘infected love’ from which 
‘sprung all the evils, welnie that pester the world’.270  
 For Joost Dandler, Twelfth Night is a play concerned with ‘questions of 
reality versus the imagination, though in the case of illusion the imagination is a 
positive force, while delusion is negative’, because the latter ‘depends on a serious 
distortion produced by the individual’s own mind, whereas illusion depends on what 
others do to us’.271 It is illusion that Erasmus’ Stultitia praises and delusion that she 
attacks. Similarly, the play exposes the absurdities of deluded melancholia, 
excessive mourning and self-love, while exulting in the capacity of illusion to 
debunk these delusions and rehearse an alternative world. Sebastian hopes that his 
illusion is not a delusion: ‘Let fancy still my sense in Lethe steep | If it be thus to 
dream, still let me sleep’ (IV. 1. 61–62).  
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 However, this play frustrates the desire to perceive a neat dichotomy between 
reality and imagination. The tension between two types of folly—illusion, in which 
one is, as at a magician’s act, eventually aware that one is being duped, and 
delusion, in which one is convinced by one’s own fancy—becomes most acute in 
the gulling scene, which ‘satirises’ the serious contemporary concern with ‘demonic 
possession’:272  
 
 FESTE Bonos dies, Sir Toby, for, as the old hermit of Prague, that  
  never saw pen and ink, very wittily said to a niece of King Gorboduc, 
  ‘That that is, is.’ So I, being Master Parson, am Master Parson; for  
  what is ‘that’ but ‘that’, and ‘is’ but ‘is’? 
     […] 
  MALVOLIO within 
 MALVOLIO  Who calls there? 
 FESTE Sir Topas the curate, who comes to visit Malvolio the lunatic. 
 MALVOLIO Sir Topas, Sir Topas, good Sir Topas, go to my lady. 
 FESTE Out, hyperbolical fiend, how vexest thou this man! Talkest  
  thou nothing but of ladies?  
(IV. 2. 11–14, 17–20) 
 
Feste’s catechising of the madman is the climax of a game staged by Maria and the 
others; because it is a game within a play, it is also doubly distanced from the 
spectators. Feste’s nonsensical citation of a spurious scholastic authority to justify 
his blasphemous impersonation deftly parodies the dogmatic platitudes of a naive 
realism, which denies the possibility that things might be other than they seem. 
‘That that is, is’ is an inversion of Feste’s comment, after a discussion at cross-
purposes with Sebastian, ‘Nothing that is so, is so’ (IV. 1. 6). Both of these 
comments use anadiplosis to gesture to the inherent instability of what ‘is’. Viola 
also employs this sort of repetition when she hopes for a future radically different 
from the one she had hitherto envisaged, a future which includes her brother: ‘Prove 
true, imagination, O prove true, | That I, dear brother, be now ta’en for you!’ (III. 4. 
340–341).  
 Whereas Burton observes that ‘Jacinth and Topaz, they allay anger, grief, 
diminish madness, much delight and exhilarate the mind’,273 the fictional parson, Sir 
Topas, who shares his name with a gem thought to cure melancholy, merely 
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entangles Malvolio further in the web of Maria’s illusion, delighting on-stage and 
off-stage spectators alike. Feste, however, is no absolutist monarch of misrule, since 
his persona’s name alludes to Chaucer’s ironic, self-effacing authorial persona in the 
Canterbury Tales. The ‘elvyssh’ Sir Topas contributes an inept and clichéd doggerel 
romance, but is stopped in his tracks and told: ‘Thy drasty rymyng is nat worth a 
toord! | Thou doost noght elles but despendest tyme’ (Canterbury Tales, VII, 703, 
929–30).274 His simulated religious authority is, not unlike the authority of the daft 
‘hermit’ he pedantically cites, no authority at all. But it is a dizzyingly complex 
piece of parodic intertextuality, which illustrates the epistemological consequences 
of a jester citing an authority, one that in this case turns out to be spurious. The  
‘wisdom’ Feste cites is a fragment from a bogus authority, travestied by the 
professional fool, disguised as a parson, whose name refers to the most risible 
character in the Canterbury Tales. Sir Topas’ presence serves to discredit the 
auctoritee of the speaker. It thereby makes a mockery of writers who confidently 
claim to be certain of what is the case. 
Modalities of Melancholy  
 
Olivia and Orsino find themselves in a festive space, insofar as they must neither 
work for their survival, nor submit to the inflexible will of parents, the tragic 
consequences of which Shakespeare dramatises in Romeo and Juliet. In fact, 
Twelfth Night omits the fathers who appear in its probable source, The Deceived 
(see NDSS, 3, pp. 286–342). Perhaps it is for this reason that, like Portia in The 
Merchant of Venice, these bright young things fashion their own pseudo-problems.  
The carnival imagery of ‘cakes and ale’ (II. 3. 104) and of gluttony or ‘excess’ (I. 1. 
2) runs disconcertingly throughout Orsino’s descriptions of his love melancholy, 
attesting to the difficulty of separating the serious action from the lighthearted 
interludes of Sir Toby and Co. But far from furnishing us with perceptive insights 
into his subjective state such as one might expect from a creative, melancholic 
genius, the Duke’s self-indulgent meditations about his ennui, although protracted, 
are at best superficial and at worst vacuous. Recalling his first sight of Olivia, he 
reflects, invoking Ovid’s tale of Actaeon: 
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 Methought she purged the air of pestilence;  
 That instant was I turned into a hart,  
 And my desires, like fell and cruel hounds,  
 E’er since pursue me. 
 (I. 1. 19–22) 
 
His avowed adoration of Olivia is ideologically mediated in a twofold way. First, 
he cannot express his ostensibly unique love without drawing a mythological 
analogy; second, as I shall show, Orsino’s love initially has more to do with him 
fashioning a socially recognisable identity—that of the modish melancholy lover—
than with either affection or physical desire.    
 His narcissism is especially apparent in his sententious reflections to Cesario 
on the nature of women’s love:  
 
   There’s no woman’s sides   
 Can bide the beating of so strong a passion  
 As love doth give my heart; no woman’s heart  
 So big, to hold so much. They lack retention. 
(II. 4. 91–94) 
 
Not only is the ‘hunter turned hunted’ an archetypal trope of the mundus inversus 
associated with folly and festivity,275 but also, in this particular story, Ovid makes 
much of how it might feel to be trapped in a vulnerable, alien body. In the moments 
before the hounds tear their transformed master to pieces, Actaeon  
  
  strainèd often times to speak, and was about to say,  
 ‘I am Actaeon. Know  your master, sirs, I pray’. 
 But use of words and speech did want to utter forth his mind. 
 Their cry did ring though all the wood, redoubled with the 
  wind.  
 (Book III, 276–280) 
 
In that she is forced to play the role of wooer when she would herself be wooed, 
Viola finds herself in a comparable, albeit less lethal, situation. She is unhappy 
because she must play the role her assumed identity dictates.     
 Orsino’s supposed infatuation certainly enables the clichéd posturing as an 
unrequited lover that he so excels at. He advises Cesario:  
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 ORSINO  If ever thou shalt love, 
  In the sweet pangs of it remember me;  
  For such as I am, all true lovers are, 
  Unstaid and skittish in all motions else 
  Save in the constant image of the creature  
  That is beloved.  
     (II. 4. 14–19) 
 
Orsino cannot but help taking pride in how exemplary his suffering is. He plays his 
socially sanctioned role of unrequited lover as perfectly as the shepherd Silvius in 
As You Like It. As Schlegel observes, love in Twelfth Night has much more to do 
with ‘the imagination than with the heart’.276  
 Because it objectifies his lover, Orsino’s affection might also be said to be 
fetishistic—Olivia refers to the ‘heresy’ (I. 5. 201) in his poetry, implying that his 
love is idolatrous. Such captivation of a lover by the remembrance of a mental 
image of their beloved is explicitly compared to idolatry in All’s Well That Ends 
Well. Helen reflects: ‘But now he’s gone, and my idolatrous fancy | Must sanctify 
his relics’ (I. 1. 92–3). And the same emotion is manifest in Orsino’s castigation of 
Olivia for her faithlessness:  
    You uncivil lady,  
  To whose ingrate and unauspicious alters  
  My soul the faithfull’st off’rings hath breathed out  
  That e’er devotion tendered.  
(V. 1. 107–110) 
 
Although Orsino’s brand of melancholy is brilliantly mocked by Olivia’s list of 
body parts praised in conventional love poetry, it is nonetheless significant. He fails 
to regard Olivia as a person; he misapprehends her. Like Bassinio at the end of the 
casket test in The Merchant of Venice, he venerates an ‘image’ of his lover: Orsino’s 
implication that he is more worthy of grace because he has made ‘off’rings’—an 
assumption tainted by the mercantile connotations of the word ‘tendered’ that 
further characterises him as a pagan idolater. 
  The mercurial Feste, however, emphasises the mutability of all things, 
especially thought, upbraiding Orsino thus: 
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 Now the melancholy god protect thee, and the tailor make thy doublet of 
 changeable taffeta, for thy mind is a very opal. I would have men of such 
 constancy put to sea, that their business might be everything, and their intent 
 everywhere, for that’s it that always makes a good voyage of nothing.  
(II. 4. 72–76)  
 
Orsino’s ‘constancy’ is at odds with a world characterised by constant flux. Saturn 
must protect it. So long as one unlearns the fictions of certainty, Feste argues, a 
receptive mind may have its preconceptions and expectations transformed at every 
turn.  
 What sends Malvolio mad, after all, is his determination to believe that the 
letter from Olivia is true. Sir Toby comments to Maria in at the end of the gulling 
scene: ‘Why thou hadst put him in such a dream that when the image of it leaves 
him, he must be mad’ (II. 5. 168–169)—he is bound to be bowled over by her 
fiction. But illusion is inevitable: ‘Folly’s reference to the extreme unlikelihood of 
anyone unmasking actors introduces the argument that just as everyone accepts 
illusion as the substance of theatre, so one should likewise accept that illusion and 
uncertainty are the condition of man’s existence’.277 The wisdom of Feste’s 
comment to Orsino is borne out by the rest of the play.  
 Olivia is similarly deluded. As Feste points out when he ‘proves’ her a ‘fool’ 
(I. 5. 50), she is held captive by the past, or rather, a static image projected onto the 
past from the present, one that almost prevents her from being receptive to the 
possibilities of an astonishing future. For ‘A brother’s dead love’ (I. 1. 30), she will 
deny herself the pleasures of the flesh; this is emphasised by Orsino’s peculiar 
syntax, since the adjective ‘dead’ qualifies her ‘love’ rather than the brother himself. 
Her mourning focuses on another polarity of the word ‘if’: it is fixated on what 
could have been different in the past, rather than how different things could be 
different in the future. Sir Andrew’s propensity to regret—‘O, had I but followed 
the arts!’ (I. 3. 80)—displays a regressive tendency to regret possibilities of the past 
that have been thwarted, as does his poignant reflection on his own ‘dead love’: ‘I 
was adored once too’ (II. 4. 160). The problem with perceiving the world in pre-
determined and immutable categories is that it is at odds with the nature of existence 
and, more significantly perhaps, that it makes one unhappy. All of the melancholics 
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considered in this chapter share this tendency to categorise new experiences in 
inflexible terms.  
 It comes as little surprise that Feste, a self-professed ‘corrupter of words’ (III. 
1. 32), has already underscored the instability of the words upon which fixed 
identities are predicated. He points out the incoherence of fixed ways of 
understanding. In a bout of repartee between Cesario and Feste about the fluidity of 
words, Feste assumes the identity of someone nostalgic for a time in which word 
and matter corresponded, lamenting with his tongue in his cheek: ‘To see this 
age!—A sentence is but a cheverel glove to a good wit, how quickly the wrong side 
may be turned outward’ (10–12). Although the metaphor of the ‘cheverel glove’ 
was proverbial,278 it might not be altogether fanciful to detect an echo of Erasmus’ 
Stultitia in this comment. In her attack on the ignorance of theologians, more 
interested in Scholastic authority than textual interpretation, she inveighs against the 
perverse interpretations that these wise men project onto scripture: ‘all doctours [of 
divinity] take it commenly for theyr priuilege, to stretche out heauen (that is to saie) 
holy writte lyke a cheuerell skynne’; they wrest ‘the woordes of scripture fare as if 
they were of contary senses, whereas being set in their right places, they do varie 
neuer a dele’ (PF, p. 111). In contrast to the received wisdom that words themselves 
are intrinsically deceptive or that language per se has fallen into confusion, Feste 
and Folly suggest that it is man’s use of words that has debased them. Dropping his 
nostalgic persona, Feste contends that ‘words are very rascals since bonds disgraced 
them’ (18–19); appropriately enough, he refuses to give Cesario the ‘reason’ (20) he 
demands: ‘Troth, sir, I can yield you none without words, and words are grown so 
false I am loath to prove reason with them’ (21–22). With a passing reference to 
Folly, Feste points out the impossibility of certainty. In fact, the whole play is tuned 
into Feste’s scepticism: it makes no claim to uphold dogmatic certainties, since it is 
concerned with the capacity of art to liberate people and things from petrified 
identities.   
 In fact, Feste’s interest in the mutability of all human certainties has a 
structural significance. Twelfth Night is framed by two reflections on the way that, 
as Adorno observes, art’s ‘content could be its own transitoriness [Vergänglichkeit]’ 
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(AT, p. 4). Both the content of the play and its structure therefore give the lie to 
static identities. The play opens in medias res, half way through a performance. 
Orsino desires his musicians to continue playing a song and then changes his mind:   
 
 ORSINO If music be the food of love, play on, 
  Give me excess of it that, surfeiting, 
  The appetite may sicken and so die. 
  That strain again, it had a dying fall. 
  O, it came o’er my ear like the sweet sound 
  That breathes upon a bank of violets, 
  Stealing and giving odour. Enough, no more, 
  ’Tis not so sweet now as it was before.  
(I. 1. 1–8) 
 
The first lines evoke the mutability of art’s affective significance, thereby 
suspending what follows in a space of semantic indeterminacy; furthermore, 
Orsino’s reflections echo the scornful estimation of man’s achievements in Psalm 
103, which the Geneva Bible renders thus: ‘The days of man are as grass: as a 
flower of the field, so flourisheth he. | For the wind goeth over it, and it is gone, and 
the place thereof shall know it no more’ (15–16). That the significance of a piece of 
music or the equivocal wisdom offered by a work of dramatic art is intimately 
connected to the sensibility of the audience is clear: it is as fleeting as the wind on a 
bank of flowers on a spring day. Whatever Twelfth Night says, it says equivocally 
and through motion, through the movement intrinsic to the temporal arts of music 
and drama. 
 The play does not conclude with marriages, but with Feste’s plangent song—
a fragment of which is later echoed and replayed in a demonic key in King Lear. In 
this song, the wryly detached, even ‘transcendent perspective’279 that Feste has 
espoused all along comes to the fore: 
 
 A great while ago the world begun, 
 With hey, ho, the wind and the rain, 
 But that’s all one, our play is done, 
 And we’ll strive to please you every day. 
(V. 1. 392–396) 
 
Stepping out of the final festivities to address the audience, Feste steps out of the 
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world of aesthetic semblance, in which what you will is fulfilled no matter how 
unlikely it seems. He implies that the provisional wisdom of the play is but a 
moment in history in an eternity of physical suffering and the ‘wind and rain […] 
pities neither wise man nor fools’ (King Lear, III. 2. 12). The song has a relativising 
function like that of Orsino’s meditation on music. But it also suggests that such 
material facts become irrelevant, ‘all one’, to those captivated by the illusion: the 
fleeting glimpse of a world worthy of hope that Shakespearean comedy offers.    
‘What a Fool Honesty is’ 
 
 To bathe in the Waters of Life, to wash off the Not Human, 
 I am come in Self-annihilation & the grandeur of Inspiration. 
—William Blake280  
 
In The Winter’s Tale, Camillo describes the self-begetting nature of Leontes’ 
jealousy, which is compared to an ‘infectious soare’ (NDSS, 8, p. 156) in the play’s 
principal source:  
 
 The fabric of his folly, whose foundation  
 Is piled upon his faith, and will continue  
 The standing of his body. 
  (I. 2. 429–31) 
 
Here Camillo neatly describes how ideas can become ossified. Leontes’ ideas about 
the nature of women are based on socially embedded assumptions, doxa, rather than 
his own experience. His misapprehension attests to the way in which ‘the custome 
and vse of common life overbeareth us’ (E, Book 3, Chapter 5, p. 477). Unwittingly, 
the King is led by the nose by ‘example’ (E, Book 3, Chapter 5, p. 477).  
 What the play has to say about the distinction between art and nature, I 
contend, is closely connected with the process Camillo describes.281 I say 
‘distinction’ rather than ‘opposition’ because these terms are not binary opposites—
although even readings of Shakespearean comedy as theoretically acute as Wehr’s 
oppose these terms. Such oppositions, however, prove to be part of the problem. 
Contrary to Laroque’s contention that in this play festive ‘cycles of nature win over 
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the forces of anti-nature and perversion’,282 I believe that the play confronts each of 
these concepts, art and nature, with itself and with its alleged opposite, interrogating 
and modifying their valences throughout the play. Precisely how socially embedded 
assumptions pervert relationships remains, in the final analysis, a moot point. There 
is certainly no outright victory over ‘anti-nature’.   
 Insofar as it is the consequence of human customs and institutions, which are, 
as Time’s soliloquy makes apparent, historically contingent, what humankind calls 
nature is shown to be unnatural, something manufactured. Time informs the 
audience that he can ‘o’erthrow law, and in one self-born hour | Plant and 
o’erwhelm custom’ (IV. 1. 5–9). This romance lays bare the distortions that a reified 
conception of female nature inflicts on ideas, relationships and the protagonists’ 
possible futures:  
    O thou thing, 
 Which I’ll not call a creature of thy place 
 Lest barbarism, making me the precedent, 
 Should a like language use to all degrees, 
 And mannerly distinguishment leave out 
 Betwixt the prince and beggar.  
 (II. 1. 85–9) 
 
Driven by his grotesque delusions, Leontes seeks not only to vilify his wife, but 
also to annihilate her rhetorically. Because her alleged action threatens to destroy a 
lexicon of ‘mannerly distinguishment’, her nature is too degenerate for words. 
‘When jealousie once seazeth on these silly, weake, and unresisting soules’, writes 
Montaigne, ‘’tis pitiful to see how cruelly it tormenteth, insultingly it tyrannizeth 
them’; a ‘consuming feaver blemisheth and corrupteth all that otherwise is good’ (E, 
Book 3, Chapter 5, p. 485).   
 The significance of folly in The Winter’s Tale, however, lies neither in the 
foolish misapprehension around which the play’s action revolves, nor in how 
Leontes and Autolycus are the ‘two chief manifestations of folly’.283 Not least 
because ‘no man is free’ from being ‘negligent, foolish and fearful’ (I. 2. 253, 252), 
the importance of folly is to be found in the way it suggests that conceited, positive 
knowledge should be unlearned. Paradoxically, after all, it is when he is in the 
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depths of his paranoia that Leontes considers himself to be wise, a lone, 
disenchanted, albeit somewhat voyeuristic, spectator of the sexual tribulations of 
this ‘bawdy planet’ (202):  
 
    There have been,  
  Or am I much deceived, cuckolds ere now,  
  And many a man there is, even at this present,  
  Now, while I speak this, holds his wife by th’arm, 
 That little thinks she has been sluiced in’s absence.  
(191–195) 
  
This travesties the common ‘foolishness of aspiring to inhuman clear-sightedness’, 
which Erasmus’ Stultitia also mocks.284 In this respect, ‘Leontes’ words are not the 
ravings of insanity but a careful meditation on the relation of experience to 
certitude’.285 He falls prey to a potentially lethal strain of folly that 
 
 Upon entring once into the seate of the braine, […] whirleth about a 
 thousand fopperies, some of them no lesse lamentable then ridiculous: But 
 the greatest inconuenience that springeth from her is this, that continually 
 weakening the braine, she causeth man to rmaine so blockish, and insensate, 
 that he thinketh himselfe wisest, when he is most foole.286 
 
Leontes’ action of abandoning his baby ironically makes him less humane than the 
‘creatures’ to which he refused to compare Hermione; as Antigonus observes: 
‘Wolves and bears, they say, | Casting their savageness aside, have done | Like 
offices of pity’ (II. 3. 187–89).  
 Antigonus’ comment implies that a reasonable man can be cruel or unjust in 
a way that creatures bereft of reason cannot. The potentially catastrophic 
consequences of a habit of mind that effaces difference, turning individuals into 
mere examples of a predetermined fact, is central to Othello,287 a play in which 
‘fornication’ is clearly associated with money as a ‘living element with the same 
powers of reproduction as human beings’.288 Desdemona’s corpse serves as a prop 
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in Othello’s patriarchal rhetoric. In what he nauseatingly calls his ‘sacrifice’ (V. 2. 
66), he employs the very colour symbolism that is exposed by the play as a fallacy 
and that thwarts the possibility inherent in their love’s survival: Othello associates 
whiteness with purity.289 He does not wish to ‘scar that whiter skin of hers than 
snow | And smooth as monumental alabaster— | Yet she must die, else she’ll betray 
more men’ (V. 2. 3–5). Whereas in the source Othello does not wish to leave 
obvious marks on the body for fear of ‘the inviolable justice of the Venetian 
Lords’,290 Shakespeare uses this idea to show the destructive potential of 
dehumanised perceptions of women, even as it expresses them. Essentialist 
discourses have transmuted Desdemona into an object, a piece of ‘monumental 
alabaster’. This is further emphasized when Othello reflects: ‘Cold, cold, my girl? | 
Even like thy chastity’ (274–5). The metaphorical coldness conventionally 
associated with chastity has been made horrifically literal by the fact he is holding 
the hand of a dying woman. The opinions, convictions and pseudo-certainties that 
result from ossified ideas are, in no small part, responsible for the suffering inflicted 
on real, warm bodies.  
  In The Winter’s Tale, however, it is through that most patently fictional of 
events, Hermione’s resurrection, that the play rehearses the possibility of a world no 
longer governed by obsolete ideas. The resurrection of this berated ‘thing’ is 
astonishing. As Frank Kermode observes, it ‘seems not a theatrical trick but an 
epiphany, such that those who experienced it might well seem silent, aghast’.291 
Leontes’ simple words of wonder—‘O, she’s warm! | If this be magic, let it be an art 
| Lawful as eating’ (V. 3. 109–111)—reverse both the negative connotations of his 
earlier imagery associated with bodily warmth—‘Too hot, too hot: | To mingle 
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friendship far is mingling bloods’ (I. 2. 110–111)—and the positive connotations of 
‘cold’ chastity. Since it lies in art’s power to strip away some assumptions about 
women, enabling Leontes to experience the warmth of human contact—a perfectly 
ordinary yet uncanny experience—the ‘magic’ of this piece of ‘art’ is to be found in 
how it furnishes the reader with a negative image of a reformed nature, a nature that 
will perhaps one day be possible. In other words, Leontes has washed off what 
Blake calls the ‘Not Human’: the stultifying commonplaces of popular wisdom. For 
the first time, he does not perceive his wife as an example of a preordained 
category. She is neither one of history’s numerous wronged women, nor as yet 
another example of an unfaithful wife, but a particular being, a creature warm to the 
touch. Because it strips all forms of philosophy down to the conceptual remainder of 
one body experiencing another, Leontes’ revelation of the real is astonishing. 
 Hermione’s resurrection, absent from the source, Pandosto: The Triumph of 
Time by Robert Greene, is not a foreseeable outcome of events. But far from being 
one in which, as Laroque argues, ‘The festivity which was rendered impotent or 
destroyed in the no man’s land of tragedy, miraculously re-emerges here in an 
atmosphere of freshness and innocence’,292 there are traces of darkness. There is 
both the pressing memory of the time lost and people killed by Leontes’ folly and 
the lurking implication that aesthetic semblance is partly responsible for the misery 
caused by the inhuman demands humans place on themselves. This is most apparent 
in the debate about nature and art between the disguised Polixenes and Perdita. In 
the midst of a festive celebration of nature’s plenitude, these characters discuss the 
capacity of aesthetic semblance to uncover a nature truer than that performed in the 
quotidian world—an  ‘art’ that ‘itself is nature’ (IV. 4. 97). Although Perdita advises 
Florizel that, because their love is ‘Opposed, as it must be, by th’ power of the 
King,’ she ‘must change this purpose, | Or I my life’ (IV. 4. 27; 39–40), it is her 
life—or at least her social position—that is transformed in the course of the play; his 
hope of marriage is not thwarted by being brought down to earth.  
 Polixenes contends that the grafting of less cultivated flowers onto cultivated 
ones is ‘an art | Which does mend nature—change it rather; but | The art itself is 
nature’ (IV. 4. 95–97). He suggests that human creations are dependent upon ‘great 
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creating nature’ (87) and that the inner workings of this sort of ‘nature’ can be 
fathomed only through something as manifestly unnatural as ‘art’. Perdita, in 
contrast, insists on unadulterated art: her aesthetic product, the floral ‘garlands’ (IV. 
4. 128) for the sheep-shearing festival, excludes impure flowers, ‘carnations and 
streaked gillyvors […] nature’s bastards’ (82–83). This form, an idealisation based 
on the exclusion of impurities, is at odds with the nature of the play in which it finds 
expression. The Winter’s Tale is the quintessential ‘mongrel tragi-comedy’.293 It 
also raises a problem about aesthetic form that remains unresolved at the end of the 
play: the tendency for aesthetic semblance to skate over the suffering inflicted on 
people by seriousness. The potentially destructive drive for purity and perfection is 
apparent in Othello’s murder of Desdemona and Leontes’ insanity: he considers the 
Hermione to ‘Sully the purity and whiteness of’ his marital ‘sheets’ (I. 2. 329).  
Leontes evokes the subversive ‘openness’ of the human body—in contrast to the 
completed, pure form possible in, for instance, sculpture—when he reflects that 
there is ‘No barricado for a belly. Know’t,  | It will let in and out the enemy’ (205–
6). Even at the end of the play, he displays a desire for a perfectly proportioned 
aesthetic form: ‘Hermione was not so much wrinkled, nothing | So agèd as this 
seems’  (V. 3. 27–28).  
 Leontes remains blind to the fact that the concept of the ideal human exceeds 
the bounds of possibility. In the myth of Pygmalion, from which Shakespeare may 
have drawn Hermione’s resurrection, however, Ovid emphasises how art can create 
the ideal in a way that nature simply cannot: 
 
 Now in the while by wonderous art an image he did grave 
 Of such proportion, shape and grace as nature never gave 
 Nor can to any woman give. In his work he took 
 A certain love.  
(Book 10, 265–268) 
  
Pygmalion creates, or rather gives expression to, his beloved’s ‘proportion, shape 
and grace’. The Winter’s Tale stages a tension between the complicity of mimesis in 
perpetuating discourses that figuratively and literally reduce the likes of Hermione 
and Desdemona to objects and its capacity to envisage a world in which those 
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destroyed by such discourses can return to life. Hermione’s resurrection is tempered 
not only by the fact that it is shown to be extraordinary and possible only in a play, 
but also by the implication that Leontes’ idealising aesthetics have not been 
reformed. Shakespeare’s masterstroke is that he stages Leontes’ captivation by the 
aesthetics of purity and completeness, which collude in sustaining the ossified 
opinions that threaten to plunge the spectacular events of this romance into the 
realm of tragedy.      
 Losing Eden  
 
 For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against 
 powers, against the rulers of the darkness of the world, against spiritual 
 wickedness in high places.  
 —KJV, Ephesians, 6. 12 
 
The source makes clear its intention to provide a moral edification and prove an 
adage to be correct: Pandosto is a ‘pleasant Historie, that although by the meanes of 
sinister fortune Truth may be concealed, yet by Time in spight of fortune it is most 
manifestly reuealed […] Temporis filia veritas’ (NDSS, 8, p. 156). But The Winter’s 
Tale debunks this providential account of history. It contrasts a regressive present 
with one that it is transformed by hope. After he has been persuaded to stay in Sicily 
a little longer, Polixenes recounts to Hermione his and Leontes’ fall from grace: 
 
 POLIXENES  We were as twinned lambs that did frisk i’th’ sun,  
  And bleat the one at th’other. What we changed 
  Was innocence for innocence. We knew not 
  The doctrine of ill-doing, nor dreamed 
  That any did. Had we pursued that life, 
  And our weak spirits ne’er been higher reared 
  With stronger blood, we should have answered heaven 
  Boldly ‘not guilty’, the imposition cleared, 
  Hereditary ours. 
(I. 2. 69–77) 
 
Polixenes recalls a prepubescent state, without the ‘temptations’ of desire. Because 
such innocence can only ever be reflected upon in a fallen world, post factum, the 
state of immaculate innocence, which he considers to have had the potential to wipe 
the slate clean for humanity, is essentially a state of ignorance. The association of 
his awakening sexual desire with fallen nature is theologically dubious: Adam and 
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Eve loved shamelessly in Eden; it was knowledge that undid them. Moreover, this 
comment replicates Leontes’ embedded beliefs about the debasing influence of 
women on men. In fact, the myth of the loss of Eden could be partly responsible for 
the rearward-gazing, melancholic disposition that Shakespeare is so critical of in 
these comedies. However, as his rendering of the Cain and Abel trope in As You 
Like It and his reworking and refocusing of the myth of Troy in Troilus and 
Cressida attest, even the foundational myths of western culture can be reconfigured.   
 Given what Polixenes (mis)remembers about their shared childhood, it is 
perhaps surprising that Leontes’ exchange with his son is pervaded by sexual 
imagery:  
 
 LEONTES […] Art thou my boy? 
 MAMILLIUS  Ay, my good lord. 
 LEONTES      I’ fecks, 
  Why, that’s my bawcock. What? Hast smutched thy nose? 
  They say it is a copy out of mine. Come, captain, 
  We must be neat—not neat, but cleanly, captain. 
  And yet the steer, the heifer, and the calf 
  Are all called neat.—Still virginalling 
  Upon his palm?—How now, you wanton calf! 
  Art thou my calf?  
 MAMILLIUS  Yes, if you will, my lord. 
(I. 2. 121–129) 
 
In this double-edged exchange, Leontes is an advocate of the virtue of being 
‘cleanly’, a virtue that is rendered absurd by the double meaning of ‘neat’, which, as 
a noun rather than an adjective, signifies castrated cattle.294 This prompts his 
Menippean reduction of all of the inhabitants of this ‘bawdy planet’ to the bestial, 
replacing the ‘hyper-sexuality’295 associated with the fool with the notion that all 
humans are driven by insatiable lust. His insistence on ‘cleanly’ deportment 
contrasts sharply with his narrative of the cuckolded husband holding ‘his wife by 
th’arm, | That little thinks she has been sluiced in’s absence, | And his pond fished 
by Sir Smile, his neighbour’ (194–197). Leontes’ only consolation lies in the 
obvious legitimacy of his son, whose features, like those of the daughter he denies, 
reflect his.  
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 Hermione’s alleged actions ‘Give scandal to the blood o’th’ prince, my son, | 
Who I do think is mine and love as mine’ (I. 2. 332–333). The three possessive 
pronouns make it clear that his affection for Mamillius springs from self-love. The 
love of a parent for a child is exposed, in this instance, as an unnatural infatuation 
with himself. The ‘chief mythic source for Leontes’s derangement’ is, after all, 
‘Ovid’s tale of Narcissus’.296 Contrary to Erasmus’ injunction that the ‘glory’ of a 
King ‘cannot be more truly illuminated than by being overshadowed’ (CWE, 27, p. 
207) by his son, Leontes’ hopes for the future are an inauthentic projection of the 
present, a projection of his power.  
 Kermode is not wrong to point out that ‘Leontes’ language is always 
tyrannical’;297 after all, Erasmus advises in his Education that the ‘tyrannical 
slogans “I desire this, I command this, let my will be the reason”’, so characteristic 
of Leontes’ utterance, should ‘be far removed from the mind of a prince’ (CWE, 27, 
p. 243). The Sicilian king’s conviction that he is ‘blest’ in his ‘true opinion’ (II. 1. 
38, 39) is undercut by the fact that it is an oxymoron. By definition, an ‘opinion’ 
cannot be ‘true’. The absurdity of this conviction is further emphasised in his 
statement: ‘There is no truth at all i’th’ oracle’ (138). Oracles cannot be dishonest. 
Moreover, although they can sometimes utter cryptic prophecies, which cannot be 
understood in the ignorance of the present moment, this particular prophecy is 
unambiguous.  
 Polixenes, Leontes’ double, is scarcely less tyrannical. Both men are 
characterised by their nostalgia. Polixenes’ tyrannical nature is apparent in the 
contrast between his horticultural and his social theories. Upon discovering his son’s 
betrothal to Perdita, he views his son as degenerate, threatening to ‘bar’ him ‘from 
succession, | Not hold thee of our blood, no, not our kin’ (IV. 4. 418–19). He is just 
as concerned with his family tree as his counterpart. Presumably for fear that it will 
threaten the legitimacy of other noble lineages, he threatens to deface Perdita’s 
beauty, the source of her ‘witchcraft’ (411): ‘I’ll have thy beauty scratched with 
briars and made | More homely than thy state’ (412–13). In Pandosto, not only has 
the prince been betrothed by his father ‘vpon reasonable conditions’ (NDSS, 8, p. 
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176) to the Princess of Denmark, but he has also already married without his 
father’s permission; in The Winter’s Tale Florizel has not actually married Perdita at 
this stage and insists, contrary to his father’s assumption that this ‘royal fool’ has 
copulated with the shepherdess, that his ‘desires | Run not before mine honour, nor 
my lusts | Burn hotter than my faith’ (33–34). In Pandosto, although Dorastus’ 
father becomes ‘somewhat chollericke’ (NDSS, 8, p. 177), he at least attempts to 
dissuade his son (see NDSS, 8, p. 177). Polixenes’ explosive response, in contrast, 
emphasises the irrationality of the reified opinions that even kings are governed by.  
 Even after Leontes has realized that the events of the first half of the play 
were ‘All mine own folly’ (V. 1. 134), he remains in thrall to a nostalgic mode of 
thought. Inverting the notion that ‘melancholy is the nurse of frenzy’ (The Taming 
of the Shrew, ‘Induction 2’, 128), his jealous frenzy has caused his melancholy. 
Under the influence of Paulina, he has ‘performed | A saint-like sorrow’ and ‘paid 
down | More penitence than done trespass’ (V. 1. 1–2; 3–4). The imagery of 
performance is employed throughout the play and is apparent in the king’s sustained 
and public mourning. This comment continues the imagery of finance and exchange 
associated with personal relationships from the very first scene: ‘the King of Sicilia 
means to pay Bohemia the visitation which he justly owes him’ (I. 1. 6).298 For 
Cleomenes, the king has ‘paid’ his dues. By the end, Hermione has become an 
object of nostalgic veneration, a figure of an idealised past: ‘There is none worthy | 
Respecting her that’s gone’ (34–35), says Paulina, while Leontes pities ‘not the state 
nor the remembrance | Of his most sovereign name’ (25–26), the desire for 
posterity, which motivated him in the first part of the play. Not unlike the courts in 
the Trauerspiele that Benjamin analyses, Leontes’s court of mourning represents a 
life paralysed by the past. Drained of all vitality and significance, the present is 
obliterated along with any hope for a radically different future. The eyes of the dead 
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queen appear to him as ‘Stars, stars’, while those of the living, ‘All eyes else’, are 
but ‘dead coals!’ (68–69)—just as when Henry VI sees Gloucester’s corpse: ‘seeing 
him, I see my life in death’ (2 Henry VI, III. 2. 151). Since Leontes’ comments 
arrive at a definitive judgement of the world in much the same way as when he 
meditates on the universality of cuckoldry, they drain particular lives and experience 
of any potential significance. Because it negates the role of the future in the play, 
Houston Wood’s argument that Leontes’ paranoid melancholia has its roots in 
‘conflicting temporalities, through which he reads himself into the forms of others 
in a similarly contrasting manner: that is, both nostalgically and immediately 
present’,299 is one with which I cannot concur.  
 It is no coincidence that in the scene in which the play begins to morph from 
a tragedy into a comedy, while the Clown laments Antigonus’ being eaten by the 
bear and ‘the most piteous cry of the poor souls!’ (III. 3. 84–5) of the shipwreck, the 
Shepherd responds with a concern for the future: ‘Heavy matters, heavy matters. 
But look thee here, boy. Now bless thyself. Thou mettest with things dying, I with 
things newborn’ (103–5). This openness to the future entails an awareness that 
something radically new might at any moment invade the present, opening up the 
possibility of an alternative, genuinely unpredictable, future—as, for instance, when 
Hermione’s statue returns to life. It is the utopian impulse behind truly philosophical 
thought, which goes beyond existing conceptual categories rather than being 
constrained by them. The final section of The Praise of Folly argues that it is this 
sort of hope—not inauthentic, nostalgic projections onto the future of the sort 
Leontes and Polixenes indulge in—that characterises Paul’s ‘fools for Christ’s sake’ 
(KJV, I Corinthians, 4. 10): 
 
 [T]he life of good Christians is naught els than a continuall meditacion or 
 certaine shadow as it were of that life to come, it chanceth, that they yet 
 living have for theyr coumforte permission at sometimes to discerne a taste 
 or savour of that hieghest rewarde behight vnto them. 
          (PF, p. 127) 
 
Here Erasmus’ seriocomic lauding of folly and his serious theories about the nature 
of grace, which he views as unexpected and utterly surprising (see CWE, 47, pp. 50–
60, et passim), correspond: ‘Erasmus follows Paul in casting the relation of God to 
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humanity in terms of unmotivated kindness’,300 kindness which is radically different 
from the calculated, material generosity of the two kings.  
 But Leontes even construes the statue’s silence as an accurate representation 
of his wife’s nature: ‘thou art she | In thy not chiding, for she was as tender | As 
infancy and grace’ (V. 3. 25–27). The stultifying discourses to which he still adheres 
distort his understanding of ‘grace’. Even his experience of wonder remains 
handcuffed to the past and mediated by quotidian wisdom. In striking contrast, 
however, even momentary contact with the oracle, an embodiment of the ‘grandeur 
of inspiration’, occasions an unlearning akin to Blakean ‘Self-annihilation’—what 
the Orthodox church calls kenosis:  
 
 CLEOMENES But of all, the burst 
  And the ear-deaf’ning voice o’th’ oracle, 
  Kin to Jove’s thunder, so surprised my sense 
  That I was nothing.  
(III. 1. 8–11) 
 
This baffling of ‘sense’, of the assumption that ‘I’ am something, offers a model of 
a humbled consciousness, astonished, and liberated to a certain extent, from the 
man-made inhuman demands that continue to make people unhappy.  
 As Montaigne argues, consciousness is innately orientated towards the future. 
Because consciousness is all but consumed by anxieties about the future, one never 
inhabits a unitary identity in the present:  
 
 We are never in our selves, but beyond. Feare, desire, and hope, draw us ever 
 towards that which is to come, and remove our sense and consideration from 
 that which is, to amuse us on that which shall be, yea when we shall be no 
 more.        
(E, Book 1, Chapter 3, p. 5) 
  
On the one hand, The Winter’s Tale dramatizes the dangers of being captive to 
nostalgia, a subjective inclination that relies on a consciousness that is drawn to 
what has been rather than what could be. On the other hand, in its coup de théâtre, 
this play suggests that it is at least possible for authentic, utterly unexpected, futures 
to come to fruition. But The Winter’s Tale does so unreliably. It is—as Twelfth 
Night, As You Like It and the Second Tetralogy are—self-conscious about its 
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fictional nature. Not unlike Feste’s disguise as Sir Topas, the authority of this text is 
improvised, which frustrates the establishment of any unequivocal standpoint— 
even if such a standpoint were ‘an invitation to accept the openness or, in more 
recent critical terms, indeterminacy of both art and life’.301  
 The Winter’s Tale concedes that the wonderful events of the ending are 
possible only in the make-believe realm of play. As Paulina comments: ‘That she is 
living, | Were it but told you, should be hooted at | Like an old tale. But it appears 
she lives’ (V. 3. 115–117). For Anne Barton, this comment displays a ‘desperate 
artistic honesty which could admit, now, to creating fictions, while making us 
understand why and how much we should like these fictions to be real’.302 After all, 
the very name of the play, The Winter’s Tale, like Erasmus’ Praise of Folly, is a title 
that ‘itselfe semeth to set foorth no wisedome’ (‘Introduction’, PF, pp. 3–6 [p. 3]). 
As Catherine Belsey reminds us: ‘Among the terms in circulation in the period for 
far-fetched narratives and improbable fables, one favourite was “a winter’s tale”303 
and young Mamillius unwittingly alludes to this popular tradition in his comment, 
‘A sad tale’s best for winter | Of sprites and goblins’ (The Winter’s Tale, II. 1. 25–
6). The play’s implication that it is necessary to unlearn the wisdom of the world so 
as to be open to the wonders of an incredible future is qualified by the suggestion 
that even this negative wisdom might be not be true. The play refuses to commit to 
an unequivocal epistemological standpoint. This radical scepticism, which is justly 
sceptical of its own suspicions of any sincere, universal or certain way of knowing, 
finds its most sustained expression in Hamlet and King Lear. These plays use the 
complexly ironic mode of understanding offered by the discourse of folly to give the 
lie to the reasonable world by foolishly refusing to insist upon the veracity of their 
claims. 
                                                
301 Knapp, p. 161.  
302 ‘Leontes and the Spider’ in Kiernan Ryan, ed., Shakespeare: The Last Plays (Basingstoke: Routledge, 
1999), 22–42 (p. 41) 
303 ‘Shakespeare’s Sad Tale for Winter: Hamlet and the Tradition of Fireside Ghost Stories’, SQ, 61 
(2010), 1–27 (p. 4).  
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CHAPTER 6 
AESTHETIC FOLLIES 
 
 ‘Pitiful ambition in the fool’  
 
 KNAPP VORM DRITTEN HAHNENSCHREI ZERREISST EIN NARR 
 DAS SCHELLENKLEID DES PHILOSOPHEN. 
—Heiner Müller, ‘Die Hamletmaschine’304 
 
Although Robert Bell is quite correct to argue that ‘In Shakespearean tragedy, 
fooling matters seriously and fools take centre stage’,305 Hamlet’s engagement with 
the discourse of folly is unique. Indeed, not least because the discourse of folly is 
omnipresent in the play’s language, Hamlet does not simply engage with folly, but 
is constituted by it. The play’s recurrent rhetorical tics are ‘foolish figure[s]’ (II. 2. 
198) of speech and it abounds in the circumlocutions, puns, riddles, paradoxes and 
oxymora characteristic of the loquacious patter of Shakespeare’s wise fools.  
  The play’s obsession with such rhetorical figures is manifest from the outset. 
In the first exchange between Claudius and Hamlet, the King employs an 
oxymoron—‘But now, my cousin Hamlet, and my son’ (I. 2. 64)—a figure of 
speech, meaning ‘pointedly foolish’ in Greek,306 that baffles logic by negating both 
the meanings it evokes: Hamlet cannot be the ‘son’ and ‘cousin’ of the same man. 
The Prince responds with his famous opening pun; his ‘uncle father’ (II. 2. 323) is 
‘A little more than kin, and less than kind’ (I. 2. 65). For Catherine Bates, puns 
embody in miniature what is special about art—its distance from the ordinary world: 
                                                
304 Heiner Müller: Werke 4, ed. by Frank Hörnigk (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001), pp. 551–554 (p. 553) [the 
irregular capitalisation is Müller’s]; ‘Shortly before the third cock’s crow a clown will tear the fool’s 
cap off the philosopher’ (Hamlet Machine and Other Texts for the Stage, ed. and trans. by Carl 
Webber (New York: Performing Arts Journal Publications, 1984), p. 53. 
305 Shakespeare’s Great Stage of Fools (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), p. 101.  
306 James Calderwood and Frank Kermode provide extensive analyses of the use of oxymora and puns in 
Hamlet (see To Be and Not To Be: Negation and Metadrama in Hamlet (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), pp. 64–80 and Shakespeare’s Language (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2000), 
pp. 101–108).   
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 As the smallest unit of linguistic deviation the pun was a microcosm of 
 literariness, since it contained ambiguity, polysemy, and frequently metaphor 
 all within a single word. A pun is literariness writ small, and its supposed 
 difference from ‘ordinary words’ explains why it’s traditionally been branded 
 as illegitimate and treated as a barbarian—a foreign element or exotic 
 intruder.307  
 
Because it tempts him from the high road of clear, instrumental self-expression and 
because, in that Claudius is an unkind schemer, it departs from what is acceptable to 
say in public, Hamlet’s opening pun is doubly subversive of the new King’s ‘rotten’ 
(I. 4. 90) state. To be sure, the seriousness of Hamlet lies in its lightheartedness.  
 Elsewhere, the Prince uses quibbles and puns, ‘indirections’, to discover his 
mother’s ‘directions’ (II. 1. 63), her thoroughly dishonourable intentions: 
 
 HAMLET Now, mother, what’s the matter? 
 QUEEN GERTRUDE Hamlet, thou hast thy father much offended. 
 HAMLET Mother, you have my father much offended. 
 QUEEN GERTRUDE Come, come, you answer with an idle tongue. 
 HAMLET Go, go, you question with a wicked tongue. 
 QUEEN GERTRUDE Why, how now, Hamlet! 
 HAMLET What’s the matter now? 
 QUEEN GERTRUDE Have you forgot me? 
 HAMLET No, by the rood, not so.  
  You are the Queen, your husband’s brother’s wife, 
  And, would it were not so, you are my mother. 
(III. 4. 7–15) 
 
This terse stichomythia—a rhetorical mode in the fool’s linguistic armoury from 
Aristophanes onwards—attests to Hamlet’s propensity for ‘punning equivocation’, 
which connects him with ‘those characters called fools [or] court jesters’ and 
ultimately allows him ‘to uncover the most hidden of motives’.308 The discourse of 
folly provides Hamlet with a position from which to question the values of the 
world that the powers that be would like to pass off as reasonable or natural.  
                                                
307 Play in a Godless World: The Theory and Practice of Play in Shakespeare, Nietzsche and Freud 
(London: Open Gate Press, 1999), p. 142; Kermode points out that it is an example of hendiadys, a 
figure of speech in which paired words denote a single idea that can ‘take us to the heart of the play’ 
(Shakespeare’s Language, p. 101).  
308 Jacques Lacan, ‘Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet’, YFS, 55 (1977), 30–51 (p. 33).  
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 The tragic hero’s very name in the Historiae Danicae, Amleth, ‘probably 
means fool or weakling’.309 Livy’s Roman History, a possible source for the play 
and one with which Shakespeare was certainly familiar, relates the story of Brutus, 
who resolves to ‘save himself’ by ‘counterfeit[ing] a noddie and a verie innocent’ 
(NDSS, 7, p. 80). At Delphos, Brutus presents Apollo with a Silenic offering—‘a 
‘golden rod within a staffe of cornell wood’ (NDSS, 7, p. 80)—to symbolise his 
hidden wisdom. Not only does Hamlet, like Brutus, disguise ‘his long hid wits’ out 
of ‘deep policy’ (‘The Rape of Lucrece’, 1815–1816), but he also assumes his ‘antic 
disposition’ (I. 5. 170) in order to penetrate the façade of the serious world. The 
Prince’s feigned folly or madness offers a position outside the serious world, from 
which he can examine the opinions, the doxa, that constitute it. For Richard Wilson, 
Hamlet’s creative response to his father’s death is nothing other than Shakespeare’s 
‘metadramatizing [of] his own evasion of absolutism’s neoclassical aesthetic, with 
its imperious demand for decorum, transparency, and order’.310 
 Folly’s digressive tendencies are intrinsic to the play’s dramatic structure as a 
whole. Between the Ghost’s injunction—‘remember me’ (I. 5. 91)—and the fencing 
match at the conclusion, the play’s action is hardly action at all. Hamlet postpones 
his revenge, evading the role he will eventually have to play. Hamlet is a set piece in 
the fool’s favourite art of narrative dilation. Hamlet’s diversions and digressions 
certainly give the lie to the notion that the ‘structure’ of a play must run in ‘a 
satisfactorily linear, sequential course’;311 in a certain sense, this play is one long, 
slightly farcical digression, full of quibbling, role-playing and logic-chopping. 
Because it is written in the margins of the tragedy’s main plot, Tom Stoppard’s 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead cannily registers its source’s obsession 
with digression by foregrounding the misadventures of two marginal characters.   
 While creative responses to the play are attuned to the pivotal significance of 
folly in it,312 critical analyses have, for the most part, either viewed folly as an 
                                                
309 A. D. Nuttall, Shakespeare the Thinker (London and New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 393.  
310 Free Will: Art and Power on Shakespeare’s Stage (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), p. 
207. 
311 Terence Hawkes, That Shakespeherian Rag: Essays on a Critical Process (London: Methuen, 1986), p. 
94.  
312 Dogg’s Hamlet, Tom Stoppard’s truncated Hamlet, boils the play down to a fifteen-minute sequence, 
which, according to R. A. Foakes, ‘reveals it to be a farce’ (Hamlet Versus Lear: Cultural Politics and 
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isolated phenomenon, examining it in terms of its generic implications,313 or 
considered it in connection with the play’s main protagonist.314 By and large, they 
have stuck to the ostensibly solid theoretical categories of character and genre. As 
the previous chapter argued, however, playful digression is of crucial significance to 
Shakespeare’s philosophy of folly.  
 Kiernan Ryan contends that the play’s peculiar structure and language are the 
keys to its philosophical vision: 
 
 [When] we find Hamlet scuppering its own plot and deranging its own 
 discourse to baffle and confound generations of critics, what we are feeling 
 is nothing less  than the tidal pull of the possible, of the as-yet-unrealized, 
 twisting the script into this unique convolution of language and form that 
 continues to hold us spellbound.315 
 
Precisely because of its ostensible purposelessness, digression, even the momentary 
digression of the pun, puts the serious world on hold. It lays bare the dangers 
inherent in an inflexible, purposeful seriousness, a seriousness that has led to 
Hamlet being read as a sober philosophical essay, albeit one interrupted by the 
occasional scurrility.  
                                                                                                                                     
Shakespeare’s Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 42); Heiner Müller’s 
astonishing appropriation, ‘Die Hamletmaschine’, enlists ideas of absurdity and aporia latent in the 
original in order to deconstruct conservative ideas about Hamlet; Howard Barker’s rewrite is attuned 
to the riddling ambiguities of the original and centres on Gertrude’s phatic ‘cry’ (see ‘Gertrude—The 
Cry’ in Gertrude—The Cry and Knowledge and a Girl (London: Calder, 2002), pp. 9–93).  
313 See Peter Davidson, ‘The Comedy of Hamlet’, in Hamlet: Contemporary Critical Essays, ed. by 
Martin Coyle (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1992), pp. 37–46; Ann Thompson, ‘Infinite Jest: The Comedy 
of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark’, SS, 56 (2003), 93–104; Phyllis Gorfain uses zoological theories of 
play and Bakhtin in her reading of Hamlet (see ‘Towards a Theory of Play and the Carnivalesque in 
Hamlet’, in Shakespeare and Carnival: After Bakhtin, ed. by Ronald Knowles (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
1998), pp. 152–76).  
314 Despite the promising comparison, Ivan Turgenev’s study of Hamlet and Don Quixote focuses on 
considering what universal ‘types’ each character represents and pays no direct attention to the nature 
of folly in these texts (see Hamlet and Don Quixote, trans. by Robert Nicholls (London: Hendersons, 
1930), p. 8); Robert Weimann points out that Hamlet’s madness ‘attracts suspicion’ and considers it in 
the light of theatrical traditions of staging madness (Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the 
Theater, trans. by Robert Schwartz (Baltimore, ML: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 128; 
and Tim Prenki augments these arguments, adding philosophical insights (see The Fool in European 
Theatre: Stages of Folly (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), pp. 96–110). Bell examines the Prince’s 
engagement with folly (see Great Stage, pp. 100–110); Michael Groves argues along much the same 
lines, albeit in a more measured tone (see ‘Hamlet as a Fool’, HamS, 4 (1982), 72–88); see also Harry 
Levin, ‘The Antic Disposition’, in Shakespeare: Hamlet, ed. by John Jump, Casebook Series (London: 
Macmillan, 1968), pp. 122–136 and Dimiter Daphinoff, ‘Shakespeares Narren’ in Der Narr: Beiträge 
zu einem Interdisziplinären Gespräch (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1991), pp. 57–71[p. 68]). 
315 Shakespeare, 3rd edn. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 169.  
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 The Graveyard Scene is calculated to confound the expectations brought to 
bear on it by a ‘neat and cleanly’ (1 Henry IV, II. 5. 417) aesthetics. When he 
inveighs against clowns’ tendency to extemporise, Hamlet himself adheres to such a 
serious-minded aesthetics: 
 
 […] let not those that play your clowns speak more than is set down for 
 them.  For there be of them that will themselves laugh to set on some quality 
 of barren spectators to laugh too, though in the meantime some necessary 
 question of the play be then to be considered. 
(III. 2. 36–41) 
 
Ironically, however, not only is Hamlet playing the fool, but his foolery is also what 
occludes the ‘necessary question of the play’, its serious point. By reading the main 
action out of the play’s inbuilt creative interpretation of itself, the Graveyard Scene, 
this chapter’s analysis turns such decorous interpretations of the play topsy-turvy. 
Paradoxically, it is the interruptions of the action that are important. Jacques Lacan 
contends that the key question posed by Hamlet is: ‘what happens in the Graveyard 
scene’?316 While this is something of an exaggeration, like all exaggerations, 
perhaps, it has a kernel of truth. This play’s seriousness lies in its light-heartedness; 
this is not, however, the cruelly incurious light-heartedness of blithe optimists. 
Rather, it is a darker laughter, a laughter that acts against ‘what we fear might take 
control of us’.317  
Anti-Philosophy  
 
Hamlet is full of temporally and emotionally disorientating moments of doubling, 
which offer frequently indecorous replays of what is supposed to happen. This play 
does not simply ‘hold as ’twere the mirror up to nature’ (III. 2. 20). Rather, it holds 
a distorting fairground mirror up to itself. For instance, Hamlet and the 
Gravedigger’s quibbling equivocation about who ‘liest’ (V. 2. 11) in the grave 
almost travesties the figure of the ghost and the revenge plot: this is not the first 
time that the prince has been spoken to from a grave, nor will it be the last. This 
comic exchange precludes the presence of the ‘quick’ (114) in Ophelia’s grave.  
                                                
316 ‘Desire and the Interpretation of Desire’, p. 33.  
317 Ghose, p. 1005.  
  185 
 Like The Winter’s Tale, Hamlet hinges on an event that is absent from the 
sources and only possible in the manifest ‘illusion’ (I. 1. 126) offered by mimesis. 
Stalking the battlements of Elismore, the Ghost fractures the linear notion of time 
upon which the sensible world and its systems depend: ‘The time is out of joint’ (I. 
5. 186). Its paradoxical presence as an absence, something that is neither living nor 
dead, disrupts the distinction between the ‘quick’ (V. 1. 114) and the ‘dead’ (119), 
about which Hamlet and the Gravedigger quibble. By definition, then, a Ghost is a 
non-identical element in any epistemological system or ontology: 
 
 GHOST Swear by his sword. 
 HAMLET Well said, old mole, canst work i’th’ earth so fast? 
  A worthy pioneer! Once more remove good friends. 
 HORATIO O day and night, but this is wondrous strange. 
 HAMLET And therefore as a stranger give it welcome: 
  There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, 
  Than are dreamt of in your [F, our] philosophy.  
          (I. 5. 160–166) 
 
Not least because it straddles two supposedly separate philosophical disciplines, 
challenging the division between natural philosophy and metaphysics, Hamlet 
encourages Horatio to embrace the challenge this ‘strange’ addendum poses to 
existing knowledge. This is more pronounced in the Folio’s use of the personal 
pronoun ‘our’. In this version of the play, Hamlet extols the virtues of learned 
ignorance, rather than merely questioning Horatio’s Stoic standpoint.  
 Referring to his father’s ghost as an ‘old mole’ and a ‘fellow in the cellarage’ 
(151), Hamlet does not take the ‘necessary question’ of his own play wholly 
seriously. The Ghost, who is an absolute challenge to existing systems of knowledge 
or ‘our philosophy’, is not taken without a pinch of salt. The remarkable way that 
Hamlet philosophises through irony—by holding up any unequivocal standpoint to 
playful mockery—epitomises the seriously playful, philosophically anti-
philosophical movement of this tragedy. Moreover, by comically undercutting the 
seriousness of this uncanny figure, which ‘bodes some strange eruption’ (I. 1. 68) to 
Denmark, Hamlet refuses to incorporate this absolute challenge to reason’s 
conceptual categories into the language of reason.  
 Although Hamlet has been commonly held to be Shakespeare’s most 
philosophical play, it is at pains to point out that the reasonable world is far less 
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reasonable than one might imagine. Not only is the play full of ineluctable 
complexities, curtailments, and elaborate theoretical connivances, most of which go 
disastrously wrong, but, like King Lear, it also evokes the self-destructiveness of the 
sensible and purposeful world: 
        How stand I then 
 That have a father killed, a mother stained, 
 Excitements of my reason and my blood, 
 And let all sleep; while to my shame  I see 
 The imminent death of twenty thousand men 
 That for a fantasy and trick of fame 
 Go to their graves like beds, fight for a plot 
 Whereon the numbers cannot try the cause, 
 Which is not tomb enough and continent 
 To hide the slain? O, from this time forth, 
 My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth! 
              (IV. 4. 55–65) 
 
Paradoxically, Hamlet is compelled to revenge his father by the foolish example of 
men caught up in an Hobbesian war of all against all, fighting for the sake of that 
most fickle of things, fame.  
 Reason’s self-destructive tendencies are further emphasised by Laertes’ 
peculiar response to Hamlet’s apology. This is itself incongruous, since the Prince 
claims diminished responsibility, despite the fact that his ‘madness’ (V. 2. 215, 217) 
has been a performance: 
 
    I am satisfied in nature, 
 Whose motive in this case should stir me most 
 To my revenge. But in my terms of honour 
 I stand aloof and will no reconcilement  
 Till by some elder masters of known honour  
 I have the voice and precedent of peace  
 To keep my name ungored. But all that time 
 I do receive your offered love like love 
 And will not wrong it.  
(221–228) 
 
On the one hand, Laertes must, to an extent, accept the prince’s apology in order to 
justify the fencing match, a game, rather than have an outright duel. Hamlet’s 
oxymoron—they will ‘frankly play’ (230) in their bout—is not only accidentally 
ironic, since Laertes fully intends to cheat, but it also evokes a key concern of the 
play: namely, how representation can get to the truth of things. On the other, it 
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seems to me that the statesman’s son’s equivocating answer—alongside Hamlet’s 
reflections on the war—exposes the fact that these characters act in bad faith. 
Laertes knows that what he is doing is thoroughly dishonourable, since he admits 
that cheating ‘is almost against my conscience’ (279), thereby accidentally 
rendering the absolute category of ‘conscience’ relative. Likewise, Hamlet follows 
an example of pointless self-destructiveness, even as he perceives its futility. 
Strikingly, both characters feel the urge to adhere to a system of values that they 
know to be wrong.  
 In Hamlet, Shakespeare insistently points out that theories, which have the 
potential to be self-defining, are often self-curtailing. Laertes describes himself as ‘a 
woodcock to mine own springe’ (291) and points out that: ‘The foul practice | Hath 
turned itself on me’ (301–302), while Hamlet comments on Polonius’ demise: ‘an 
’tis the sport to have the enginer | Hoist with his own petard’ (III. 4. 204–205).318 As 
in a farce, there is ‘sport’ or comic satisfaction to be had in seeing man’s 
ingenium—his unique capacity to think and to systematise—destroyed by its own 
connivance. At the end of the play, Horatio promises to relate a senseless tale of  
 
          carnal, bloody and unnatural acts,  
 Of accidental judgements, casual slaughters, 
 Of deaths put on my cunning, and for no cause, 
 And in this upshot the purposes mistook 
 Fallen on th’inventors’ heads.    
(V. 2. 365–368) 
 
Although Hamlet makes no claims to be a tragedy of high seriousness, it eloquently 
illustrates the incoherence of the sensible world’s systems and modes of speculation 
and judgement.  
 In his ostensibly inept love letter, with its ‘ill phrase’ (II. 2. 109) of 
‘beautified Ophelia’ (109), Hamlet describes his body as a ‘machine’ (121), an idea 
that Heiner Müller borrows for the title of his brilliant adaptation of the play. 
Because it imbues a human being with a mechanical inflexibility, this phrase is 
                                                
318 In early modern English, ‘engineer’ could signify both ‘a person who makes engines, structures and 
systems’ and ‘an author or designer of something; a plotter, a schemer’ (OED., definitions, nos. 1 and 
5a).  
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incongruous—as Henri Bergson observes: ‘automatism makes us laugh’.319 
Hamlet’s comment implies that people—far from possessing the mysterious 
subjective depths, which critics from Coleridge to Bloom have attributed to 
Hamlet—are actually mere functions of the historical situation and society in which 
they find themselves. This idea is apparent in modern medical parlance. A 
functioning depressive or alcoholic still operates as a cog in the social system. They 
go to work and, more importantly, buy things. Hamlet, of course, focuses on its 
protagonist’s disinclination to function, his hesitancy to play the socially scripted 
role of the avenger. Instead, he wastes time, resolving to ‘be idle’ (III. 2. 87). It is no 
coincidence, then, that one of the fragments of a play within this play offers a 
powerful vignette of a man caught between ‘desire’ and ‘performance’ (Macbeth, II. 
3. 27, 28): ‘So as a painted tyrant Pyrrhus stood | Like a neutral to his will and 
matter, | Did nothing (II. 2. 418–421), a mise en abyme that vividly evokes Hamlet’s 
paradoxical situation as an avenger, who cannot bring himself to avenge.  
 The Prince may claim to possess ‘that within which passes show’ (I. 2. 85), 
but, since he takes on a dizzying number of discrete identities, this profession of 
integrity is disingenuous. Aside from the fool, he plays a lover, a sailor, a duellist 
and a playwright—as Tim Prenki puts it, Hamlet, who ‘sees himself from his first 
appearance as an actor’, opts for ‘the suppression of any fixed identity’,320 a course 
of action that is perhaps the only one to take in a thoroughly ‘rotten’ totality. 
Although Hamlet reflects critically on such values through play, he ultimately does 
what is expected of him. Because it reflects a realisation that one is not autonomous, 
the comedy of automatism is dark.   
 The ‘pregnant’ (II. 2. 206) nonsense of Müller’s remarkable rewrite is 
sensitive to the frustration of one who is forced to play out a role they accept only in 
bad faith. His Hamlet exclaims:  
 
 WIE EINEN BUCKEL SCHLEPP ICH MEIN SCHWERES  
 GEHIRN  
                                                
319 Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. by Cloudesley Breton and Fred Rothwell 
(Rockville, MA: Manor, 2008), p. 8.  
320 Prentki, p. 98, p. 99.  
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  ZWEITER CLOWN IM KOMMUNISTISCHEN FRÜHLING  
 SOMETHING IS ROTTEN IN THIS AGE OF HOPE.321 
 
The visionary melancholic’s intelligence is comically physicalized as a clown’s 
insufferable burden. For Müller, Hamlet’s foray into the depths of his own psyche is 
clearly quixotic. By refusing to take itself seriously, exposing the self-destructive 
tendencies inherent in a purely instrumental, purposeful form of reason, and 
foregrounding the objective limitations of the knowing subject, Hamlet clears the 
way for the radically new modes of understanding furnished by the discourse of 
folly. Paradoxically, in this play, thought liberates itself from the received account 
of what is rational through a discourse that is located on the extreme edge of the 
reasonable world, the discourse of folly.   
‘Here’s fine revolution’    
 
With the possible exception of the balcony scene in Romeo and Juliet, the 
Graveyard scene is the most frequently invoked and commonly parodied scene in 
the whole of Shakespeare.322 Because it offers an interlude in which plebeian 
characters reflect on the dominant values of society, includes the skull of a dead 
jester, and quite probably employs images drawn from Erasmus’ Praise of Folly,323 
folly takes centre stage in this culturally ubiquitous scene. If the Ghost might be said 
to act as a Chorus, or a  ‘a retributory voice of conscience’  (‘Introduction’, NDSS, 
7, p. 26)—one which peddles an account of what should happen—here workers 
provide an alternative history, rooted in non-intentional forms of discourse, a history 
that puts what should happen on hold.  
 This scene in particular enacts the question that Ernesto Grassi and Marisella 
Lorch consider to be one of the key questions posed by fool-literature from Erasmus 
to Cervantes: namely, is not ‘the formal thought of analytical philosophy nothing 
                                                
321 Heiner Müller: Werke 4, p. 542. Müller writes in capitals, does not punctuate, and starts writing in 
English as quoted; the full translation is:  ‘I’M LUGGING MY HEAVY | BRAIN | LIKE A 
HUNCHBACKED CLOWN | NUMBER TWO IN THE SPRING OF COMMUNISM | SOMETHING 
IS ROTTEN IN THIS AGE OF HOPE’ (Webber, p. 53 [translation modified]).  
322 See Ghose, pp. 1004–6.  
323 Ibid., pp. 1003–1018.  
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but insanity […] since it involves an absolute removal from objective reality’?324 
Hamlet casts a critical gaze over everyday conceptions of rationality; in this scene, 
as in the play as a whole, time-wasting discourse offers a deft parody of the 
language of intention, which foregrounds the similarities between comical quibbling 
and philosophical disputation, between the serious and the comic: ‘How absolute the 
knave is!’ (V. 1. 129–134) exclaims Hamlet. The Gravedigger turns out to be 
something of a Socratic questioner: 
 
 We must speak by the card or equivocation will undo us. By the Lord, 
 Horatio, this three years I have took note of it, the age is grown so picked that 
 the toe of the peasant comes so near the courtier he galls his kibe. 
(129–134) 
 
Voltaire’s categorisation of Hamlet as one of literary history’s ‘monstrous farces’ 
on the grounds that ‘[A] grave is dug on the stage; some gravediggers, holding 
skulls in their hands, make bad puns worthy of their sort; to their abominable 
scurrilities, Prince Hamlet makes nonsensical replies that are no less disgusting’ is 
inaccurate in one crucial respect.325 Although there are certainly plenty of puns and 
scurrilities in this scene, these peasants, Hamlet implies, use hair-splitting 
distinctions and detect evasive ambiguities of utterance just as well as any 
‘courtier’.  
 The patter between the two workmen, a mock-philosophical dialogue, makes 
the paradox of reason’s desire for clear-cut analytical truths manifest; such 
definitions, they imply, are at odds with the messiness of reality:326 
 
SECOND MAN […] The crowner hath sat on her and finds it Christian 
burial 
 GRAVEDIGGER How can that be unless she drowned herself in her  
  own defence? 
 SECOND  MAN Why ’tis found so. 
                                                
324 Folly and Insanity in Renaissance Literature (New York: Centre for Medieval and Early Renaissance 
Studies, 1986), p. 86.  
325 ‘Dissertation sur la trágedie ancienne et moderne’, quoted in Ghose, p. 1003.  
326 Philip Sidney argues that for all the ‘largesse’ of moral philosophers’ ‘distinctions’ and ‘divisions’ they 
only teach what virtue is; they do not enact it (An Apology for Poetry: or the Defense of Poetry, ed. by 
R. W. Maslen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 88). 
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 GRAVEDIGGER It must be se offendendo. It cannot be else. For here  
  lies the point: if I drown myself wittingly, it argues an act, and an act 
  hath three branches — it is to act, to do, to perform. Argal, she  
  drowned herself wittingly.            
(V. 1. 4–12) 
 
As in a revenge tragedy in which the act of revenge is delayed, the facts of the 
matter do not correspond with the official version of events. ‘Is this [the] Law?’ 
(21), asks the Second (or straight) man, evidently unconvinced by the Gravedigger’s 
mock-legal disputation, to which the latter knowingly replies: ‘Ay, marry is’t. 
Crowner’s ’quest law’ (22). The only ‘truth’ to be extrapolated from this corrupt 
version of the law is the fact that the rich have the privilege or ‘countenance’ (27) to 
do what they will. The Gravedigger inappropriately appropriates both legalistic 
discourse and its formal ‘quiddities’ (V. 1. 94)—the play, after all, blurs any 
possible distinction between acting, doing and performing. He makes divisions 
where there are none. His malapropisms—‘se offendendo’ and ‘Argal’ (for se 
defendendo [self-defence] and ergo, respectively—make a mockery of what George 
Puttenham calls the legal profession’s ‘peevish affectation of words’,327 and so does 
the grotesque implication that the has coroner literally sat ‘on’ Ophelia’s corpse.  
 Shakespeare puts the rhetorical tendency to divide the world into 
conceptually palatable chunks into the mouths of ‘good man delver’ (14) and his 
mate; and these plebeian characters gall the ‘kibe’ of the great humanist rhetoricians 
as well as the courtiers. As Walter Kaiser contends, what ‘the humanist spirit hated 
most was divisions and distinctions’; ‘partition’, he continues, ‘was most commonly 
attacked or avoided in humanist oratory’.328 But rather than refusing to follow 
‘common sophmisters and rhetoritians’ and ‘shew by definition what I am’ (PF, p. 
10), as Stultitia does, Shakespeare subverts the authority of otiose divisions and 
distinctions by travestying them.  
 Hamlet furnishes us with the most famous mockery of partition in 
Renaissance literature. Polonius comments that the players are: 
                                                
327 The Arte of English Poesie, ed. by Gladys Dodge Willcock and Alice Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1935), p. 141.  
328 Praisers of Folly: Erasmus, Rabelais, Shakespeare (London: Victor Gollancz, 1964), p. 42.  
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 The best actors in the world, either for tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, 
 pastoral-comical, historical-pastoral, scene indivisible or poem unlimited. 
 Seneca cannot be too heavy nor Plautus too light for the law of writ and the 
 liberty.    
(II. 2. 333–336) 
    
Although uttered with the punctilious earnestness that has become synonymous 
with this character, these divisions are every bit as absurd as Touchstone’s. What 
Polonius is attempting to say—that the actors are very capable—is obscured by his 
very attempt at precise definition. The idea that they can adeptly play both classical 
tragedy and comedy emphasizes the fluidity of acting, which contrasts with the 
pointless formalism of his partition; the inclusion of the unclassifiable forms—
‘poem unlimited’ and ‘scene indivisible’—further undermines his attempts at 
classification.  
 Polonius problematises the paradoxical wisdom of folly, which is so integral 
to the play. After Hamlet informs him of the content of the satirical work he is 
reading,329 which says that ‘old men have grey beards, that their faces are wrinkled, 
their eyes purging amber and plumtree gum, and that they have a plentiful lack of 
wit’ (II. 2. 193–196), he riddles: ‘I hold it not honesty to have it thus set down. For 
yourself, sir, shall grow old as I am—if, like a crab, you could go backward’ (298–
301), Polonius comments in an aside: ‘Though this be madness yet there is method 
in’t’ (201–202); he discerns ‘a happiness that often madness hits on, which reason 
and sanity could not so prosperously be delivered of’ (207–208).  
 Because he takes a profound pride in his own sententious wisdom, Polonius 
is himself a fool in a pejorative sense, but it is he who utters this perfectly 
reasonable insight about the paradoxical wisdom of folly. In other words, Hamlet’s 
alienation from (and of) sensible values undermines the wisdom that the only thing 
one can know is that one knows nothing. As A. D. Nuttall writes of Hamlet and 
Polonius’s digression on the imagined shapes of a certain cloud—one of the 
                                                
329 Peter G. Bietenholz has speculated that this is a reference to Erasmus’s Praise of Folly, which 
describes old age in comparable terms; see Encounters with a Radical Erasmus: Erasmus’ Work as a 
Source of Radical Thought in Early Modern Europe (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2009), p. 
260.  
  193 
numerous ‘tiny fool’s plays’ in the play, which Bell entitles ‘The Clown Prince and 
Foolonius’:330  
 
 Hamlet cruelly draws Polonius into warm, positive agreement and then hits 
 him with the emergent truth that a cloud can be made to resemble anything 
 we like. […] So Polonius is made a fool of, as the play Hamlet makes a fool 
 of any critic who offers a single positive interpretation.331  
 
The play suggests neither that folly provides a straightforward alternative to 
wisdom, nor that all philosophical ideas are void from the outset. Rather, as Ryan 
writes:  
 
 To grasp a Shakespeare play as fully as possible at any point in time is to 
 recognize that its gaze is bent upon a vanishing point at which no reader or 
 spectator can hope to arrive. Like the hat that the circus clown kicks out of 
 reach every time he steps forward to pick it up, final comprehension of the 
 play is indefinitely postponed by each act of interpretation.332 
 
Due to the way in which Hamlet makes a mockery of any unequivocal standpoint—
even the view that folly harbours a paradoxical wisdom—it audaciously implies that 
the serious world is nothing other than a game. And yet, like The Winter’s Tale, it 
prefers not to endorse even this wisdom too seriously.   
 Like the rituals of quotidian life, games are time-limited and dependent upon 
repetition, which for Bates is ‘one of the defining characteristics of play’.333 
Because they conspicuously refuse to play by the rules—murdering the rightful 
king; proceeding ‘To post | with such dexterity to incestuous sheets’ (I. 2. 156–157); 
transgressing the rules of primogeniture; and interring Polonius in a ‘hugger-
mugger’ (IV. 5. 84) fashion—Gertrude and Claudius are outrageous. Hamlet 
contends that his stepfather’s authority is assumed by comparing him to a mock 
king. Claudius is an actor in a pageant, ‘A vice of kings’ (96) and ‘A king of shreds 
and patches’ (99), who has stolen a prop; he is ‘A cutpurse of the empire and the 
rule | That from a shelf the precious diadem stole | And put it in his pocket’ (96–99). 
                                                
330 Bell, p. 102.  
331 Shakespeare the Thinker, p. 201.  
332 Shakespeare, p. 175.  
333 Bates, p. 171.  
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The Prince’s mother has been duped. Her ‘hasty marriage’ (II. 2. 57) to someone 
inferior is akin to an amateur gambler being deceived by a card counter: ‘What devil 
was’t | That thus hath cozened you at hoodman blind? (III. 4. 74–75), the Prince 
asks Gertrude.  
 This imagery of card-play continues when Claudius says to Laertes that ‘with 
a little shuffling, you may choose | A sword unbated and in a pass of practice | 
Requite him for your father’ (IV. 7. 134–137). As with the related concern about the 
sort of veracity mimesis can create, the ironies generated by Claudius’s attempts to 
literally ‘poison in jest’ (III. 2. 228) are as ambivalent as they are paradoxical. 
Shakespeare dramatizes the transgression of the rules of a game, since every player 
or performer of a game must have knowledge of the game’s limits and what is at 
stake. He thereby implies that it is desirable to play by the rules, while, 
simultaneously, estranging the everyday world by laying bare the fact that everyday 
life consists in the performance of certain roles.  Perhaps with the Globe’s motto in 
mind, Nietzsche writes: ‘We have to improvise—all the world improvises its day. 
Let us proceed today as all the world does’.334    
Parasites and Revolutionaries   
 
Hamlet dramatises two models of human relations. The first sort consists of 
knowing one’s place. In their prolix and grovelling acquiescence in the betrayal of 
their erstwhile friend, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern invoke the body politic, a 
notion that was already central to the Elizabethan World Picture and the burgeoning 
theories of absolutism: 
 
 GUILDENSTERN We will ourselves provide. 
  Most holy and religious fear it is 
  To keep those many bodies safe 
  That live and feed upon your majesty. 
 ROSENCRANTZ The single and peculiar life is bound 
  With all the strength and armour of the mind 
  To keep itself from noyance; but much more 
  That spirit upon whose weal depends and rests 
  The lives of many. The cess of majesty 
                                                
334 The Gay Science With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, trans. by Walter Kaufmann 
(New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 95. 
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  Dies not alone, but like a gulf doth draw 
  What’s near it with it; or it is a massy wheel 
  Fixed on the summit of the highest mount 
  To whose huge spokes ten thousand lesser things 
  Are mortised and adjoined, which when it falls 
  Each small annexment, petty consequence, 
  Attends the boisterous ruin. Never alone 
  Did the king sigh but with a general groan. 
(III. 3. 6–23)  
 
The assumption that those in authority have a natural, physical relation to their 
subjects is reconceived to imply that such a relationship is parasitical. The flatly 
conventional sentiment of this verse illustrates the dishonesty of decorous language. 
The allegorical figure of Fortune, scurrilously debased in Rosencrantz’s and 
Guildernstern’s opening repartee with Hamlet, is invoked insincerely with 
ostensible sincerity. Under the (unconvincing) guise of concern for their fellow 
subjects—they wish to ‘keep those many bodies safe | That live and feed upon your 
majesty’—Rosencrantz and Guildenstern simply pursue their own advancement.   
 The second model of relations is based on the fact that death is a radical 
leveller, a fact not lost on the medieval painters and sculptors of Totentanzen.335 
Shakespeare’s Richard II invokes this tradition when he realises, aghast, that  
 
   […] within the hollow crown  
 That rounds the mortal temples of a king  
 Keeps death his court, and there the antic sits,  
 Scoffing at his state and grinning at his pomp.   
(III. 2. 160–163) 
 
All creations, systems, people and societies end up as just as they start out—as the 
Anglican funeral service curtly puts it, they progress from ‘earth to earth, ashes to 
ashes, dust to dust’; ‘But age with his stealing steps’, intones the Gravedigger in his 
cheerful appropriation of a courtly lyric,336 ‘[…] hath shipped me into the land | As 
if I had never been such’ (67, 69–70 [my emphasis]). His language is not only 
                                                
335 For a thorough analysis of Hamlet and the iconographic and literary tradition of the danse macrbre in 
late medieval and early modern Europe, see Sophie Oosterwijk, “Alas, poor Yorick’: Death, the fool 
and the danse macabre’ in Stefanie Knöll, ed., Narren—Masken—Karneval: Meisterwerke von Dürer 
bis Kubin aus der Düsseldorfer Graphiksammlung: Mensch und Tod (Regensburg: Schnell and 
Steiner, 2009), pp. 20–33.  
336 Annabel Patterson, Shakespeare and the Popular Voice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 103.  
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without an instrumental purpose, but it is also pointless in the strongest sense of the 
word: it registers that all identity is transient. Since it suggests that all the systems, 
discourses and institutions that mould man’s innermost desires and hopes are 
mutable, this cheerful lyric harbours nothing other than a potentially revolutionary 
realisation.  
 Since it articulates an alternative to the logic of inheritance that governs 
Hamlet’s actions in favour of a shared or common root, the earth, the Gravedigger’s 
boast—‘There is no ancient gentlemen but gardeners, ditchers, and gravemakers; 
they hold up Adam’s profession’ (V. 1. 28–29)—is perhaps the most explicit 
formulation of the revolutionary conception of human relations. It alludes to John 
Ball’s question: ‘When Adam delved and Eve span | Who was then the gentleman’? 
It seems that man comes from dust as well as returning to it; in the face of this fact, 
social divisions and class distinctions are absurd. Indeed, this sort of cyclical 
relationship between humans and matter, between worm and man, is already evident 
in Livy. The oracle predicts: ‘WHICH OF YOU […] SHALL FIRST KISSE YOUR 
MOTHER, HE SHAL BEARE CHIEFE AND SOVERAIGNE RULE IN ROME’ 
(NDSS, 7, p. 81 [irregular capitalization in the original]). Despite his foolish 
appearance, Brutus interprets this comment correctly and ‘kiss[es] the earth, 
thinking with himself, that she was the common mother of all mortall men’ (NDSS, 
7, p. 81); it is he who later rules Rome.   
 Hamlet is astonished that, for all their decisive action, the military heroes of 
yesteryear have been reduced to earth: ‘Why may not imagination trace the noble 
dust  of Alexander till ’a find it stopping a bung-hole?’ (192–3), to which Horatio 
replies: ‘’Twere to consider too curiously to consider so’ (195). Hamlet then 
rephrases his realisation in seriocomic couplets: 
 
 Imperious Caesar, dead and turned to clay, 
 Might stop a hole to keep the wind away 
 O, that that earth which kept the world in awe 
 Should patch a wall t’expel the winter’s flaw.    
(V. 1. 201–5) 
 
By repeating his philosophical considerations in nonsensical rhymes, to a certain 
extent Hamlet makes a mockery of death. For Indira Ghose, this sort of laughter is 
characteristic of ‘the medieval mind’, for which it ‘marked one’s triumph over the 
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specious threat of evil and the illusion of death. It was a defence strategy against the 
human fear of dying, intended to expose its absurdity’.337 Ironically, the harbinger 
of modern subjectivity has a decidedly old-fashioned theory of laughter, but it is 
precisely this sort of humour that furnishes him with the estranged perspective 
required for philosophical speculation.   
 Discussing Hamlet’s comment in the graveyard—‘And now my Lady 
Worm’s—chapless and knocked about the mazard with a sexton’s spade. Here’s 
fine revolution an we had the trick to see’t’ (V. 1. 83–86)—Ryan contends: 
 
 The strict historicist scholar will hasten to point out that the word 
 ‘revolution’ must be construed here as a reference to the wheel of fortune or 
 the whirligig of time, and that to impute our modern political meaning to it 
 would be anachronistic. It would indeed, but it would also be perfectly in 
 keeping with Shakespeare’s profoundly anachronistic imagination.338  
 
This type of future-orientated thought about the revolution of the times already has 
traces of the modern understanding of revolution in it. It acknowledges that all the 
structures, values and systems of the serious world are not set in stone, but rather 
that they are embodied in that most perishable of things, human flesh.  
 This is apparent in Hamlet’s subversion of the King’s straightforward 
questions about the location of Polonius’s corpse: 
   
 KING   Now, Hamlet, where’s Polonius? 
 HAMLET At supper. 
 KING  At Supper! Where? 
 HAMLET Not where he eats but where ’a is eaten. A certain convocation 
  of politic worms are e’en at him. Your worm is your only emperor for 
  diet. We fat all creatures else to fat us, and we fat ourselves for  
  maggots. Your fat king and your lean beggar is but variable service, 
  two dishes but to one table. That’s the end! 
 KING  Alas, alas.  
 HAMLET A man may fish with the worm that hath eat of a king  
  and eat of the fish that hath fed of that worm. 
 KING  What dost thou mean by this? 
 HAMLET  Nothing but to show you how a king may go a progress  
  through the guts of a beggar.     
(IV. 3. 26–31)  
                                                
337 Ghose, p. 1004. 
338 ‘Here’s fine revolution’: Shakespeare’s Philosophy of the Future’, Essays in Criticism, 63 (2013), 105–
126 (p. 124).   
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Hamlet’s outlandish image of politically savvy worms eating the verbose statesman 
is humorous precisely because of its absurdity. It perhaps inverts an analogous 
image in Montaigne: ‘the heart and life of a mighty and triumphant emperor is but 
the break-fast of a seely little worme’ (E, Book 2, Chapter 8, p. 258). Through the 
pun on ‘progress’ Hamlet compares the elaborate ritual of a monarch’s movement 
around the country houses of the nobility to the digestion and excreting of a fish by 
a beggar, while another pun serves to conflate the archaic sense of ‘diet’, which 
meant a meeting frequently of national importance between members of the 
aristocracy and royalty, with the familiar sense of ‘diet’ meaning the type of food 
one eats.339 In his explanation of his riddle, he parodies syllogistic thought, a logical 
mode that is employed ironically by many of Shakespeare’s wise fools.340 The 
structure of a syllogism is, after all, premised on an account of straightforward 
causality to which the play does not adhere.  
 Hamlet’s attempts at individuating the skulls—‘This might be the pate of a 
politician’ (73–74) / ‘This might be my Lord Such-a-One’ (78)—are a little more 
than the ‘pompous platitudes’ based on ‘the fear of the negation of identity in death’ 
that Ghose considers them to be.341 As the use of the indefinite article and the mock-
title, ‘Lord Such-a-One’, implies, Hamlet’s experience among the skulls involves a 
reductio ad absurdum—or, possibly, ad nauseam (‘Dost thou think Alexander 
looked o’this fashion i’th’ earth? […] And smelt so? Pah!’ [187–88, 190])—of the 
compulsion to create clear-cut identities. Even when he is faced with something 
literally faceless, a skull conspicuously bereft of any distinguishing features, Hamlet 
assigns an identity and a profession to it.   
 Of course, the character that Hamlet fleshes out most vividly is the former 
Court Jester, Yorrik. While the countless appropriations and parodies may have 
numbed the effect this moment, its sheer strangeness should be emphasized:  
 
 HAMLET Alas, poor Yorrik. I knew him, Horatio. A fellow of  
  infinite jest, of most excellent fancy. He hath bore me on his back a 
                                                
339 OED.  
340 The syllogism is a figure of analytic reason that Stultitia finds distasteful; see PF, p. 48. 
341 ‘Jesting with Death’, p. 1011.  
  199 
  thousand times, and now how abhorred in my imagination it is. My 
  gorge rises at it. Here hung those lips that I have kissed I know not  
  how oft. Where be your jibes now—your gambols, your songs, your  
  flashes of merriment, that were wont to set the table on a roar? 
  Not one now to mock your own grinning, quite chapfallen.  
         (V. 1. 174–84) 
  
This astonishing moment, in which the ever-dead Yorrik is vividly resurrected, 
offers an antic pastiche of the dramatist’s profession of fleshing out historical or 
imaginary figures. Bates contends that in his tragedies, Shakespeare ‘brings 
characters on to the stage who speculate on the denial of death that is implicit in any 
representation of it and on the fact that tragedy’s consolatory power rests upon a 
falsification of life’s grim realities’.342 Put another way, what is so disarming about 
Shakespeare’s tragedies and, as this thesis has shown, many of his other plays too is 
their mimetic impurity: they refuse to forget that they are fictions, which impart 
meaning and coherence to a confusing and meaningless reality.  
 When he ‘abjures’ his ‘potent art’ (50), Prospero observes that ‘graves at my 
command | Have waked their sleepers’ (The Tempest, V. 1. 49), but Hamlet admits 
its own lack of mastery over its material. The play’s admission of representation’s 
impotence, however, is expressed indeterminately, through its digressive, riddling 
seriocomic idiom, so that even Hamlet’s awareness of art’s inability to affect the 
brute facts of existence is rendered lighthearted. This moment of mimetic 
vulnerability, in which an actor holds a skull by an open grave, has become iconic; 
paradoxically, it has endured.  
‘This prophecy Merlin shall make’ 
 
 We assume unto our selves imaginarie and fantasticall goods, future and 
 absent goods, which humane capacitie can no way warrant unto her selfe; or 
 some other, which by the overweening of our owne opinion we falsely 
 ascribe unto our selves; as reason, honour, and knowledge. 
—Montaigne (E, Book 2, Chapter 7, p. 270) 
 
In contrast to many of the plays considered so far, folly has been central to the 
critical afterlife of King Lear. Eschewing historicist and textual approaches, this 
might be very broadly and provisionally divided into two main types. On the one 
                                                
342 Bates, p. 210.  
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hand, absurdist readings and productions use the pervasive presence of folly to 
bolster their argument that the play prefigures the meaningless universe of 
existentialism. Although this line of argument is most dominant in cold war 
readings and performances of the play,343 it is by no means new. August Wilhelm 
Schlegel describes the play as wiping ‘away all of humanity’s outer and inner 
virtues, exposing its naked helplessness’.344 On the other hand, Bradleyan or 
redemptive readings are underpinned by a grander theological conception of 
folly.345 When Lear becomes aware of his own folly and Cordelia’s immense 
sacrifice—in the final count, it is she who gives him ‘all’ (II. 2. 248)—he is 
humbled. As R. V. Young writes:  
 Interpreters have generally sought to show either that the tragic close evinces 
 a redemptive possibility, notwithstanding its horror, or that Tate was right, 
 that King Lear in facts subverts a Christian or even Enlightenment world 
                                                
343 Jan Kott’s influential existentialist reading of the play (‘King Lear or Endgame’, in Shakespeare: An 
Anthology of Criticism, 1945–2000, ed. by Russ McDonald (London: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 174–191), 
along with the cold war productions of Grigori Kozintsev (Korol Lir 1971) and Peter Brook (1962), 
established the idea that Lear is an absurdist masterpiece avant la lettre; for an analysis of Lear in Jean 
Paul Sartre’s criticism, see Hazel E. Barnes, ‘Flaubert and Sartre on Madness in King Lear’, 
Philosophy and Literature, 10 (1986), 211–21; and in light of the existentialist concept of an 
individual’s self-determining “choice” see Jagannath Chakravorty, ‘King Lear’s ‘Choice’: An 
Existentialist Approach’, Poetica, 4 (1976), 97–110. Stephen Booth emphasises the play’s refusal to 
‘fulfil the generic promise inherent in a story’ and argues that it implies that ‘perception of pattern is 
folly’ (King Lear, Macbeth, Indefinition and Tragedy (London: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 14, p. 
22), while R. A. Foakes argues that the increasing popularity of Lear in the second half of the 
twentieth century can be partly attributed to the bleak Zeitgeist of the Cold War era: see Hamlet Versus 
Lear: Cultural Politics and Shakespeare’s Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), esp. p. 
42.  
344 Kritische Schriften und Briefe, ed. by Edgar Lohner, 7 vols (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1967–75), VI, 
p. 176.  
345 Bradley famously writes: ‘Should we not be at least as near the truth if we called this poem The 
Redemption of King Lear, and declared that the business of “the gods” with him was neither to torment 
him, nor to teach him a “noble anger”, but to lead him to attain through apparently hopeless failure the 
very end and aim of life?’ (Shakespearean Tragedy, 2nd edn. (London: Macmillian, 1919 [1904]), p. 
286); John Danby follows Bradley and reads the play in terms of a contrast between the Machiavellian 
idea of nature, invoked by Edmund, and a benevolent natural order, (see Shakespeare’s Doctrine of 
Nature: A Study of King Lear (London: Faber and Faber, 1948; repr. 1982)). Although Jonathan Bate’s 
reading of Lear’s anti-stoicism in the light of Montaigne goes some way to establishing the centrality 
of the ‘wise fool’ in Shakespeare’s mature philosophical vision, it ultimately falls back on a 
redemptive reading, albeit a redemption though scepticism: ‘it seems to me that in Shakespeare’s 
strand of “wise fooling,” a kind of divine history is smuggled back into the raw natural world of Lear’ 
(‘Shakespeare’s Foolosophy’, in Shakespeare Performed: Essays in Honor of R. A. Foakes, ed. by 
Grace Ioppolo (Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 2000), pp. 17–33 [p. 26]); John X., Evans 
argues along comparable lines in ‘Erasmus’s Folly and Shakespeare’s King Lear: A Study in 
Humanist Intertextuality’, Moreana, 27 (1990), 3–23.  
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 view and anticipates the absurd universe of existentialism or postmodern 
 materialism.346 
 
But both of these readings ultimately fail to perceive that Lear is, more any other 
Shakespearean tragedy, a play concerned with how meaning is generated.  
 The central paradox at work in the play is that the very institutions, 
discourses and ideas that have the potential to liberate humankind from its ‘naked 
helplessness’ can reduce them to a ‘poor, bare, forked animal’ (III. 4. 105–106).  
Part of what Frank Kermode terms the play’s ‘authorial savagery’,347 or what Jan 
Kott describes as its ‘philosophical cruelty’,348 is connected with the realisation that, 
as Marlowe’s Mephistopheles puts it, ‘this is hell, nor am I out of it’.349 While evil 
in Lear is ‘inextricably enmeshed in collective human experience’,350 the play does 
not allow the reader the luxury of forgetting that evil is a direct consequence of 
social values, discourses and institutions. 
 Edgar, after all, is not possessed by devils because of a malign, supernatural 
agent. Rather, because of his bastard brother’s Machiavellian guile, this ‘good, but 
dull boy’351 is forced to play the role of a possessed man, a ‘bedlam’ beggar (II. 2. 
185). Indeed, it is characteristic of Lear’s bleak irony that Edgar simulates demonic 
possession in order to escape human evil. His haunting lament, ‘Tom’s a-cold’ (III. 
4. 57, 81, 143, 169; IV. 1. 55),352 however, is true, for it voices the physical 
suffering of the insane, ‘whipped from tithing to tithing, and stocked, punished, and 
imprisoned’ (III. 4. 129–30). It evokes the mad brutality of the serious, supposedly 
reasonable world.  
                                                
346 ‘Hope and Despair in King Lear: The Gospel and the Crisis of Natural Law’, in Jeffrey Kahan, ed., 
King Lear: New Critical Essays, Shakespeare Criticism, 33 (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 253–277 
(p. 253).  
347 Kermode, p. 195.  
348 Kott, p. 113.  
349 Christopher Marlowe, Dr Faustus in Christopher Marlowe: The Complete Plays, ed. by Frank Romany 
and Robert Lindsey (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2003), p. 356 [Scene 3, 78].  
350 John Carey, ‘Milton’s Satan’, in The Cambridge Companion to Milton, ed. by Dennis Danielson, 
Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 160–74 (p. 162).  
351 The Demonic: Literature and Experience (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 224.  
352 The word ‘cold’ occurs more times in Lear than in any other play by Shakespeare; it and its variants 
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 As Jonathan Bate shows, the play dramatically embodies Montaigne’s 
sceptical attack on the stoic denial of human suffering and its concomitant belief 
that ‘reason is our highest faculty and a sign of the power of the human […] 
subject’.353 The monsters in Lear are human. The ‘[v]ast universal powers working 
in the world of individual fates and passions’ that Bradley discerns are wholly 
absent.354 Conversely, Jan Kott’s argument that ‘The theme of King Lear is the 
decay and the fall of the world’355 misses the point, for he assumes that the ‘world’ 
corresponds to what humankind wants the world to be. Lear, however, exposes the 
‘decay and fall’ of the systems with which humans explain and control the world. 
This analysis illustrates Shakespeare’s anti-philosophical attack on the structures of 
calculation, philosophy and law, concurring with Bate’s astute reflection that ‘The 
compound word [Morosophos] may, it seems to me, be attached most aptly to the 
Shakespeare who wrote King Lear. He was not a historian. He was not a 
philosopher. He was a FOOLOSOPHER’.356 .  
 Deformity, Thomas Hobbes and Laurent Joubert agree,357 is funny. But what 
the former calls the ‘sudden glory’358 of laughter occasioned by the realisation of 
one’s superiority to someone or something deformed cannot be said to apply to the 
dark humour of Lear. For in this play, as Adorno writes of Beckett’s Endgame, 
‘humour is salvaged […] because [it] infect[s] the spectator with laughter about the 
absurdity of laughter and laughter about despair’ (NL, 2, p. 253). As G. Wilson 
Knight writes, ‘there is humour that treads the brink of tears, and tragedy which 
needs but an infinitesimal shift of perspective to disclose the varied riches of 
comedy’;359 such is the laughter when, after his blinded father staggers on stage, 
Edgar finds stoic consolation in the fact that ‘worse I may be yet; the worst is not | 
So long as we can say “This is the worst”’ (IV. 1. 29–30). This black humour 
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frustrates any assessment of the play that might consider it beautiful or sublime—
not least because, if ‘Sublime carries in it such a noble vigour, such a resistless 
strength, which ravishes away the hearer’s soul against his consent’,360 then the 
language of Lear is the language of earth-bound weakness. In this play, grand style 
is at best absurd and at worst grotesque.  
 In his defence of ugly art, Adorno echoes a sentiment not entirely dissimilar 
to Edgar’s pyrrhic self-consolation, suggesting that people view images of ‘starving 
children […] as documents of that beneficent heart that beats even in the face of the 
worst [Ärgsten], thereby promising that it is not the worst [Ärgste]’ (AT, p. 64; ÄT, 
p. 79). Shortly before this reflection, he argues: 
 
 Art must take up the cause of what is proscribed as ugly, though no longer in 
 order to instigate it, mitigate it, or to reconcile it with its own existence 
 through humour that is more offensive than anything repulsive. Rather, in the 
 ugly, art must denounce the world that creates and reproduces the ugly in  its 
 own image, even if in this too the possibility persists that sympathy with the 
 degraded will reverse the concurrence with degradation.  
(AT, p. 64; ÄT, p. 79) 
 
Lear is concerned with the paradoxical way in which man can generate evils that go 
far beyond his capacity to explain or express them. But far from attesting to 
Shakespeare’s inhumanity or his ‘savagery’, the play’s ugliness shows a proleptic 
sort of humanity: ugly art becomes a way of denouncing rather than forgetting an 
ugly reality. The problem with a redemptive conception of representation is that it 
implies that life can always ‘be embellished, straightened or improved by art’, 
which risks inculcating ‘an invidious irresponsibility if not a callously laissez faire 
attitude towards suffering’.361 In this respect, poetry is a Silenic form. Grand style, 
untouched by the agonies of existence, is ugly. Lear’s tortured nonsense and 
demotic discourse are neither perfectly proportioned, nor sublime, but they are at 
least humane.  
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Stop making sense! 
 
Part of the reason why Lear is ugly is because of its refusal to pass pain off as 
anything other than pain; as Kott writes, the ‘grotesque is a criticism of the absolute 
in the name of frail human experience’.362 Consider Lear’s encounter with Poor 
Tom, an encounter that epitomises the fact that ‘biology is an affront to rationalizing 
philosophy’:363 
  
 KING LEAR Why, thou wert better in a grave than to answer with thy  
  uncovered body this extremity of the skies. Is man no more than this? 
  Consider him well. Thou ow’st the worm no silk, the beast no hide, 
  the sheep no wool, the cat no perfume. Ha? Here’s three on’s are  
  sophisticated; thou art the thing itself: unaccommodated man is no  
  more but such a poor bare, forked animal as thou art. Off, off, you  
  lendings: come unbutton here. 
 [Tearing at his clothes, he is restrained by Kent and the Fool] 
 Enter GLOUCESTER, with a torch 
 FOOL Prithee, nuncle, be contented; ’tis a naughty night to swim in. Now a 
  little fire in a wild field were like an old lecher’s heart; a small spark, 
  all the rest on’s body cold: look, here comes a walking fire. 
(III. 4. 99–107) 
 
Although Lear’s insight that man’s mastery of the world is a consequence of his 
physical vulnerability is a fine example of how ‘true things’ may be conceived ‘by 
what their mock’ries be’ (Henry V, IV, 0, 53), that Edgar is only playing at being the 
‘thing itself’ (not to mention, that he is playing this role within a drama) should not 
be forgotten.  
 Lear’s realisation of the ostensibly authentic nature of ‘unaccommodated 
man’, the universal corporal vulnerability of humankind, is a consequence of an 
artful deception, which Edgar, doing his histrionic skills a disservice, later compares 
to a poorly executed painting, a ‘daub’ (IV. 1. 55).  The crucial paradox is that even 
in this realisation Lear remains, to a certain degree, in error: his error is to assume 
that ‘something must lie beneath the surface of appearance when surface was all 
there ever was’.364 For this reason and others that shall become apparent, the 
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discourse of folly in this play cannot be wholly reduced to the comment that ‘King 
Lear states the basic ontological distinction of Erasmus’ two follies: folly as true, 
genuine perception of the inner nature of human things, and madness as the false, 
distorted perception of it’.365  
 Rephrasing Folly’s contention that man is endowed with infinitely more 
‘Affection, than reason’ (PF, p. 23) in a demonic key, the Fool counters Lear’s 
pseudo-realisation with the suggestion that people are sustained by carnality alone. 
He ‘presents an extraordinary image of the world as a dead body and of the life that 
survives as feebly posthumous flickerings of lust’.366 The notion that suffering 
enables insight—‘When the mind’s free, | The body’s delicate’ (III. 4. 11–12)—may 
be reassuring in a world characterised by plainly intolerable physical conditions, 
but, for two reasons, it is a misapprehension. First, it skates over the fact that all 
ratiocination is contingent upon bodily needs—something that even Lear realises 
when he reflects: ‘they are not men o’their words: they told me I was everything; 
’tis a lie, I am not ague-proof’ (IV. 6. 103–105); second, it implies that man is 
animated by reason rather than the animal drives that the Fool believes to govern 
human behaviour.  
 Poor Tom’s nonsense appeals to the King more than the reasonable advice of 
the Fool, Kent and Gloucester. To Lear’s mind, he is a ‘good Athenian’ (III. 4. 176) 
and a ‘Noble philosopher’ (168): 
 
 KING LEAR First let me talk with this philosopher: 
  [To Edgar] What is the cause of thunder? 
 KENT   Good my lord,  
  Take his offer, go into the house. 
 KING LEAR I’ll talk a word with this same learned Theban: 
  What is your study? 
 EDGAR  How to prevent the fiend, and to kill vermin. 
(150–155) 
 
A recurrent humanist criticism of scholastic philosophy was that it pursued 
pointless pseudo-problems; rather than attempting to fathom the ‘common miracles’ 
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of life, such as the cause of ‘laughter’,367 men of theory, as Erasmus’ Folly 
seriocomically puts it, vainly seek to ‘expounde the causes of thunder, of wyndes, of 
eclipses, and suche other inexplicable thynges, nothying doubting, as if they had 
crepte into natures bosome, or were of counsaile with the Goddes’ (PF, p. 77 [my 
emphasis]).368 
 The irony at work in this scene, however, is that posing this hitherto 
theoretical question about the ‘cause of thunder’ is manifestly relevant to those 
stranded on the heath. The desire to make sense of the universe by causal logic and 
to control it by creating conceptual systems is of pressing importance to the play as 
a whole. At the close of Lear’s mock trial of his daughters, playing the role of the 
judge, he rules: ‘let them anatomize Regan; see what breeds about her heart. Is there 
any cause in nature that makes these hard hearts?’ (III. 6. 73–75). Paradoxically, 
Lear’s fantasy of scientific certainty through the vivisection of Regan to find out the 
‘cause’ of her and Goneril’s cruelty characterises him as insane. Such an inquiry is 
every bit as hardhearted as philosophies that exalt the rational at the expense of the 
passions. Even in his perverse fantasy of being imprisoned with his virtuous 
daughter, Lear envisages an impossible separation of thought from the body, 
aspiring to a god-like clear-sightedness. He tells Cordelia that ‘we’ will ‘take upon’s 
the mystery of things | As if we were God’s spies. And we’ll wear out | In a walled 
prison packs and sects of great ones’ (V. 3. 16–19). His acceptance that they cannot 
aspire to absolute knowledge remains parasitical on the intentional forms of reason, 
premised on the kind of self-preservation that ultimately destroys the major 
characters of the play.  
 Cordelia’s words of forgiveness are a denial of thinking in terms of cause and 
consequence. ‘I know you do not love me, for your sisters | Have, as I remember, 
done me wrong. | You have some cause, they have not’ (IV. 7. 72–74), says the 
semi-conscious King, to whom she ‘lies beautifully and generously’:369 ‘No cause, 
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no cause’ (75).370 The implication is clear: what is remarkable in human nature is 
not icy reason’s ability to fashion systems with which to gain imaginary mastery 
over things. Rather, it is the ability to go beyond this logic. What is remarkable in 
human nature is the ability to love inexplicably and stupidly. Indeed, Gloucester 
memorably deflates the mastery of intention, when he wryly observes of Poor Tom 
that ‘He has some reason, else he could not beg’ (IV. 1. 34).   
  In The Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia, from which Shakespeare drew the 
Gloucester plot, the virtuous Pamela inveighs against the seeming ‘knowledge’ of 
mankind, with which he ‘puffeth’ himself ‘up’ (KJV, I Corinthians 8. 1). She points 
to the paradox that ‘while by pregancie of his imagination [man] strives for things 
supernaturall, [he] meanwhile he loose[s] his own naturall felicitie’ (NDSS, 7, p. 
412). In Lear, the way in which man’s faith in his own systems blinds him to the 
way things are is evidenced by Gloucester’s bizarre response to Edgar’s supposed 
attempt at parricide. He immediately invokes the supernatural as a way of 
explaining what turns out to be Edmund’s all too natural act of self-preservation:  
 
 These late eclipses in the sun and moon portend no good to us. Though the 
 wisdom of Nature can reason it thus and thus, yet nature finds itself scourged 
 by sequent effects.  
(I. 2. 103–106)  
 
Gloucester ascribes cosmic causality, a providential significance, to what is actually 
Edmund’s manipulation of this tendency of thought: ‘This is the excellent foppery 
of the world, that when we are sick in fortune, often the surfeits of our own 
behaviour, we make guilty of our disasters of the sun, the moon and the stars (118–
121). Like the astronomer satirized in Sidney’s Apolog for Poetry, who falls into a 
‘ditch’ because he is looking at the stars,371 Gloucester’s stargazing causes him to 
fall flat on his face. But what is really disarming about this is that Edmund’s insights 
are eminently sensible: one of the main perpetrators of evil in the play offers an 
entirely rational self-justification.  
 It is perhaps surprising that the providential reading of Lear has had such 
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mileage, since attempts in the play to ascribe divine purpose to this ‘great stage of 
fools’ (IV. 6. 179) are exposed as mere platitudes. When he reveals his identity to 
his brother, Edgar invokes the principle of an ordered universe: 
 
 My name is Edgar and thy father’s son.  
 The gods are just and of our pleasant vices 
 Make instruments to plague us: 
 The dark and vicious place where thee he got 
 Cost him his eyes. 
(V. 3. 167–171) 
 
But, once again, he has got it entirely wrong. For Edgar, his father’s blinding attests 
to the way in which human law ultimately reflects the will of the divine. Although 
his idea that the ‘gods are just’ is borne out by Goneril’s and Regan’s deaths 
moments later, this attempt to impose a theory on mere contingencies contributes to 
what Albany calls the ‘Great thing of us forgot’ (235): the pressing danger Lear and 
Cordelia are in. She is hanged partly because of bad timing and partly because of 
Albany and Edgar’s protracted discussion, a consequence, perhaps, of their desire to 
foreclose a game in which all is still left to play for. After Cordelia’s death, it is 
impossible to concur with his assessment that ‘The gods are just’. It exemplifies, 
with savage irony, what Bates means when she writes: ‘The fact that men wanted—
even needed—to attribute meaning to the world didn’t in the least make it 
meaningful’.372 As Montaigne observes: ‘Presumption is our naturall and originall 
infirmitie’ (E, Book 2, Chapter 7, p. 250)—presuming that a meaning is fixed has 
dire consequences in King Lear.  
 The primary way in which homo economicus has lent meaning to the 
universe is through quantification, numeration and calculation. Although it is not 
possible to say what something is, numeration means that it is always possible to 
measure it and thus bring it within the compass of theory. Folly mocks natural 
philosophers who: ‘take vpon [themselves] to measure the sonne, the moon, the 
planets and theyr compasses, as it were by ynchmeale, or drawne with a line’ (PF, 
p. 77). While quantification is necessary in the business of self-preservation, the 
action of the play is at pains to point out that when one attempts to quantify abstract 
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factors in human relations—love, for instance—the consequences are disastrous. 
Demanding an objective measure of affection, Lear asks his daughters: ‘Which of 
you shall we say doth love us most?’ (I. 1. 51) and is blind to the fact that ‘There’s 
beggary in the love that can be reckoned’ (Anthony and Cleopatra, I. 1.  15). This 
objectifying tendency of thought is made manifest when he refers to his youngest 
daughter as his ‘best object’ (I. 1. 215), a comment that, because of its blindness, 
exposes a pernicious ideology which falsely aligns love with possession.  
 Despite the way in which the two elder sisters use the same quantification 
against him, whittling down the number of his attendant knights, even when he is on 
the heath, delivering his vain incantation to the Fool and the thunder, Lear still 
figures affection in pecuniary terms:  
 I tax not you, you elements, with unkindness.  
 I never gave you kingdom, called you children;  
 You owe me no subscription. 
 (III. 2. 16–19) 
 
 This comment is not only ugly because of the sentiments it expresses, but also in 
the way in which it expresses them: ‘Low and vulgar expressions extremely darken 
the beauty of sublimity’.373 Cordelia’s famous response to his test, ‘nothing, my 
Lord’, gives the lie to reckoning the love between parent and child, a ‘bond’ (I. 4. 
93) that is absolute.  
  Like Touchstone, the Fool grasps the formal systems of the sensible world. 
He points out that the number zero is a cipher, requiring other numbers to signify: 
‘nothing will come of nothing’ (I. 1. 90). Castigating the King’s ‘hideous rashness’ 
(I. 4. 152), he comments: ‘Now thou art an 0 without a figure; I am better than thou 
art now. I am a fool, thou art nothing’ (I. 4. 182–4). He turns quantification against 
itself by mathematically proving that Lear has made a dire error in thinking of love 
as something that can be quantified. What the Fool formulates explicitly is implicit 
in Lear’s demand that Goneril and Regan ‘part betwixt’ them his ‘coronet’ (I. 1. 
140), since it is as physically impossible to split one ‘coronet’ into two and for it to 
remain a usable crown as it is mathematically impossible to divide an ‘0 without a 
figure’ and get a result of anything other than zero. The Fool reiterates this point 
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moments later, suggesting that Lear is a ‘shelled peascod’ (190). On the one hand, 
this grotesque image colloquially evokes the King’s impotence, his physical 
vulnerability; and on the other, it presages the important idea that ‘Robes and furred 
gowns hide all’ (IV. 6. 161). There is always a frail body beneath the insignia of 
temporal authority.     
 Lear’s response to Cordelia’s ‘nothing’ is proverbial—‘nothing will come of 
nothing’, a fact emphasised when he reuses it in his terse dialogue with the fool (I. 
4. 130). Rather than suggesting, as Erasmus does in the introduction to his Adages, 
that, owing to their ubiquity, there is some ‘native power of truth’ in ‘proverbs’ 
(CWE, 31, p. 17), Lear, along with The Winter’s Tale, implies that proverbial 
expressions can blind people to the particulars of their situation, providing a way of 
forcing the contingencies of experience into a predetermined formula. Instead of 
reflecting on what Cordelia means, he immediately resorts to the ossified wisdom of 
the ancients. Far from being a folksy alternative to the grand theories of the 
intellectuals, proverbial wisdom is further attacked when, in an attempt to justify her 
treatment of her father, Goneril says  ‘Old fools are babes again’ (I. 3. 20).374  
 The repetition of the word ‘nothing’, however, not only gives the lie to 
proverbial wisdom, but also sets the play’s dominant pattern of imagery, circularity, 
in motion, a pattern that plays a significant role in the play’s exposure of the 
limitations of ratiocination. Noughts, crowns, wheels—not to mention, spectacles, 
eye-sockets, the ‘operation of the orbs’ (I. 1. 112) and female genitalia—are 
evocative of circles, a geometrical form that symbolises the whole and possess a 
formal coherence that is at odds with life. In the context of Lear, Booth contends 
that the ‘image of the Wheel is, above all, finite’; and it is, therefore, a ‘deliberately 
inappropriate’375 symbol in a play that conspicuously lacks the sense of an ending.  
 It is the Fool who first invokes Fortune’s Wheel, advising Kent to ‘Let go thy 
hold when a great wheel runs down a hill lest it break thy neck with following it; but 
the great one that goes up the hill, let him draw thee after’ (II. 2. 261–263), which is 
clearly echoed by Edmund’s dying comment: ‘The wheel is come full circle, I am 
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here’ (V. 3. 172). Because the Fool has already invoked this commonplace idea, it 
becomes unfixed and acquires the vital semantic indeterminacy characteristic of the 
discourse of folly. His comment dialogises the providential account of history. To 
make sense of the senseless, Lear, Gloucester and Edgar all sincerely invoke a 
narrative that the Fool holds at a playful distance. Both Edmund’s capitulation to the 
feeble determinism that he earlier ridicules and Lear’s reflection on his tragic 
predicament—that he is ‘bound | Upon a wheel of fire that mine own tears | Do 
scald like moulten lead’ (IV. 7. 46–49)—are subject to structural irony. Lear is 
denied the dignity that might make such an observation profound. His moment of 
self-reflection cannot help but sound uncannily like a bombastic invocation of the 
Fool’s insight.  
 The Fool’s prophecy—like the Porter scene in Macbeth and the Graveyard 
Scene in Hamlet—displays an uncanny grasp of the themes, ideas, and images 
present in the play’s serious action. It ‘pulls into focus the battle between utopian 
possibilities and dystopian realities that rages at the heart of the tragedy’:376  
 
 When priests are more in word than matter, 
 When brewers mar their malt with water, 
 When nobles are their tailors’ tutors, 
 No heretics burned but wenches’ suitors: 
 When every case in law is right  
 No Squire in debt, nor no poor Knight; 
 When slanders do not live in tongues, 
 Nor cut-purses come not to throngs 
 When usurers tell their Gold in the field, 
 And bawds and whores do churches build, 
 Then shall the realm of Albion  
 Come to great confusion: 
 Then comes the time, who lives to see’t, 
 That going shall be used with feet. 
This prophecy Merlin shall make, for I live before his time.   
 (III. 2. 79–96) 
 
The notion of being ‘more in word than matter’ recalls two central concerns of the 
play: first, the discrepancy between what Goneril and Regan ‘profess’ (I. 1. 72) and 
how they treat their father; second, the King’s folly, his desire to ‘retain the name 
and all th’addition to a king’ (I. 1. 136), which makes him recall the proverbial 
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‘Tragedy King’, an expression which Erasmus glosses as applying to ‘a proud and 
pompous man, or to one who is a king in name alone but has little power’ (CWE, 33, 
p. 26). Next, the image of inversion, ‘when nobles are their tailors’ tutors’, reiterates 
the suggestions made by Poor Tom, Kent and Lear, which evoke the histrionic 
nature of the normal world, where everyday clothing is nothing other than a costume 
or disguise.   
 Moreover, when Kent insults Oswald by saying ‘a tailor made thee’ (II. 2. 
53–54), what he means is that Oswald’s authority is improvised—no less than the 
authority of the Justice Lear rails against, or the judicial clout of the Fool and 
Madman in the mock-trial in the hovel. The imagery of ‘wenches’ suitors’ being 
‘burnt’ by venereal disease prefigures both Lear’s misogynistic description of 
female genitalia—‘there is the sulphurous pit, burning, scalding, stench, 
consumption!’ (IV. 6. 124–125)—and Edgar’s comments about the ‘vicious place’, 
from whence his brother came.   
 In short, the Fool builds the concerns of the sensible, intentional world into 
his nonsense prophecy. This soliloquy, found only in the Folio, ultimately subverts 
its ostensible function: it fails to let the audience know what the Fool really thinks. 
But it does generate dialogism, for it offers an interlude that sets the play’s 
ostensibly solid and serious ideas and identities spinning, dissolving their 
significance in comic indeterminacy. It philosophises through paradox. As Prentki 
writes: ‘It is in the contradiction between what humanity is and what it has the 
capacity to imagine that the fool finds the space in which to play with the irony 
inherent in the human condition’.377 It operates in a way not altogether different 
from Cordelia’s, Kent’s and Edgar’s recurrent asides, which use the liberties of 
mimesis to comment upon the action in which they are embroiled. It thereby holds 
the ‘horror’ (V. 3. 262) of the action at arm’s length for a moment.  
 Allen R. Shickman convincingly shows that the Fool would originally have 
delivered this prophecy to a mirror. Not only does this make a visual gag about the 
ability of representation to ‘hold as ’twere the mirror up to nature’, and recall the 
prevalent imagery of circularity, but it also invokes the ‘iconography of Prudence, 
who, in addition to bearing a glass, often wears the mask of an old man behind her 
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head to signify the wisdom of the years with its ability to look both forward and 
backwards’.378 While the irony of the Fool invoking the allegorical figure of 
Prudence is lost on Shickman, the way in which the prophecy looks both forwards 
and backwards warrants comment.  
 The prophecy avoids talking about the madness of the intentional world in 
the systematic language of reason, for it uses material from the world of reason, 
which is so obviously dangerously irrational, to create a prophecy of a prophecy, 
which remains impossible to grasp in today’s terms. It is detached from the world, 
but fashioned out of material drawn from its historical situation. In this respect it is 
realistic. It would be too reassuring to suggest that it is a consequence of the supra-
rational ‘metaphysical inspiration’379 of Christian ecstasy, since the play operates by 
‘interpolat[ing] into a universe that’s beyond man’s control little worlds of his own 
devising, and it is this which confers on the play the power of a god’.380 For all its 
purposefulness without purpose, even representation is predicated on a drive for 
mastery over contingencies.  
 But this nonsense prophecy liberates the play from the argument that it 
exhibits the same drive for mastery over things as the intentional discourses to 
which Lear gives the lie. With caustic irony on the part of the playwright, murder is, 
after all, referred to as ‘man’s work’ (V. 3. 40). The prophecy offers an enigmatic 
glimpse of a future in which life is not at the mercy of reason’s dishonourable 
intentions, evoking a time of ‘confusion’ in which reason is reconciled with the 
senselessness of its compulsion to make sense of things. Despite being narrated by a 
spouter of nonsense, More’s Utopia is clearly ordered; like the Fool’s prophecy, its 
constitutive contrast is between the world as it is and the world as it could be, 
although this realm of ‘if’ is, of course, a utopia or ‘no-place’. Even this sort of 
conceptual coherence is absent from the Fool’s prophecy. From a time in the distant 
past, he predicts a prophecy that ‘Merlin shall make’ in the mythological past of an 
equivocal future of ‘great confusion’, a future, in other words, that is different, but 
not perfect; a few years after Lear was first performed, the King James Bible 
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annotates Chapter 2 of Isaiah as depicting ‘The great confusion which commeth by 
sin’. In any case, the fool predicts his future utopia or dystopia in a performance. 
This prophecy of a prophecy actually happens in the present; and because it is 
voiced on stage, in the here and now, there is always the implicit suggestion that it 
will be reiterated in future performances.  
 Ultimately, this anachronistic jumbling of timescapes unfixes the linear 
perceptions of clock-time, upon which theoretical man’s systems and the world of 
work depend. It simultaneously gives the lie to the cyclical account of time, with its 
emblems of Fortune’s Wheel and its recurrent festivals, which Barber, Laroque and 
Bakhtin are wont to sentimentalise. Not least because it is ‘dreaming on things to 
come’ (‘Sonnet 107’, 2) in a play that otherwise implies that objective 
circumstances dictate characters’ innermost desires—‘Men are as the time is’ (V. 3. 
31–32)—the Fool’s prophecy is, like all great poetry, revolutionary nonsense. Far 
from being ‘without hope’,381 the Fool, amidst the horrors of the heath, hopes for a 
radically new, absolutely unpredictable future—an enigmatic and tantalising future 
(or rather, future of a future), which is viewed as much through a darkened glass 
now as it was when it was first performed. Paradoxically, while the revolutionary 
and revelatory potential of his nonsense dies with him, this thwarting of the 
possibility that things could be different—that ‘Humanity’ may one day not 
‘perforce prey on itself | Like monsters of the deep’ (IV. 2. 50–51)—is performed 
over and over again.  
 The final aspect of this play’s pervasive attack on systems and the 
assumptions they create is King Lear’s attack on the law. What Paul A. Cantor 
writes in his detailed consideration of the relationship between natural law and 
human law resonates with what I have argued about the dangers of trying to force 
things to make sense: ‘In Lear’s monumental self-assurance as a reigning monarch, 
he had always assumed that the political order is rooted in the natural, that nature 
supports human justice’.382 For Nietzsche, as for Montaigne, the central 
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misapprehension that underlies systematic knowledge is precisely this ‘self-
assurance’:383 the assumption that the way things are corresponds to the way that 
human theories order them; as Folly puts it: ‘eche man is made a foole in his own 
wisdome’ (PF, p. 107).   
 That ‘the play is structured around four attempted acts of justice’ is nothing 
new,384 but the relation of folly to this structural and thematic trope has not been 
considered, despite the fact that the opening love-trial is pure folly. Not only does 
Lear stage ‘an interlude with himself as the chief actor’,385 but this serious scenario 
also has a decidedly ‘comic aspect’.386 Lear’s second trial of his daughters, found 
only in the Quarto, is full of bitterly ironic comic incongruity. To his mind, the 
naked and shivering Poor Tom is a ‘robed man of justice’ (III. 6. 36) and the Fool 
his ‘yoke-fellow of equity’ (37). They both play along with his second interlude: 
 
 EDGAR    Let us deal justly. 
  Sleepest or wakest thou, jolly shepherd? 
  Thy sheep be in the corn; 
  And for one blast of thy minikin mouth, 
  Thy sheep shall take no harm. 
  Pur, the cat is gray. 
 KING LEAR   Arraign her first; ’tis Goneril—I here take my oath  
  before  this honourable assembly—she kicked the poor King her  
  father. 
 FOOL  Come hither, mistress: is your name Goneril? 
                                                                                                                                     
  For with good reason I can thee confute. 
  If they, which first by nature’s sacred law, 
  Do owe me tribute of their lives; 
  If they to whom I always have bin kinde, 
  And bountiful beyond comparison; 
  If they, for whom I have undone myself, 
  And brought my age into extreme want, 
  Do now reject, contemne, despise, abhor me, 
  What reason moveth thee to sorrow for me?  
(NDSS, 7, p. 359) 
383 See Bates, esp. pp. 42–83.  
384 Cantor, p. 239.  
385 Wilson Knight, p. 161.  
386 Ibid., p. 161.  
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 KING LEAR  She cannot deny it. 
 FOOL  Cry you mercy, I took you for a joint-stool. 
 KING LEAR  And here’s another, whose warped looks proclaim what store 
  her heart is made on. Stop her there! Arms, arms, sword, fire!  
  Corruption in the place! False justicer, why hast thou let her ’scape? 
 EDGAR Bless thy five wits! 
(III. 6. 40–56) 
 
Only a madman could think it possible to impose order (‘deal justly’) in this 
situation. Perhaps this is why Poor Tom’s pregnant nonsense is interspersed with the 
performative utterances—blessing, taking oaths and dealing impartially—of the 
rational world. Lear’s ridiculous accusation that the mock-court is corrupt is later 
echoed in his encounter with Gloucester, in which he realises that the ‘authority’ he 
had thought to be innate is not the consequence of natural laws, but an expedient 
fiction perpetuated by those in power for purely self-serving ends: ‘A dog’s obeyed 
in office’ (IV. 6. 150, 152–155). The time when human and natural law correspond, 
‘When every case in law is right’ (III. 1. 85), must remain for the present an 
unlikely hope in a foolish tale. What is darkly comic is that Lear views the abject 
beggar, one wronged by the law, as one who has corrupted the ideal of law, abusing 
his power out of self-interest.  
 In this respect, the scene is a microcosm of the play as a whole. By staging a 
system in extremis, it exposes the fact that conceptual systems do not so much make 
sense of how things are, but rather how things can be theorised. But the pragmatic 
argument that these systems are necessary fictions is evident in the text. After his 
daughters have whittled the number of his knights down to nothing, Lear justifies 
their existence on purely theoretical grounds:  
 
 O, reason not the need! Our basest beggars  
 Are in the poorest thing superfluous;  
 Allow not nature more than nature needs,  
 Man’s life is cheap as beast’s.  
(II. 2. 452–456) 
 
He implies that fictions of certainty constitute what is special about man, what 
makes him different from a ‘beast’. Although Cantor argues that humans ‘need to 
establish conventions in order to fulfil their natures’,387 the play implies that what is 
                                                
387 ‘The Cause of Thunder’, p. 245.  
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important is to retain a critical awareness of the holes in even the most watertight 
systems; to retain, in other words, something of the wise fool’s dazzling detachment 
from explicit values.  
  Insofar as Lear substitutes inanimate objects for people and empty words for 
feeling, this trial is child’s play—as the Fool’s ironic apology to the ‘joint-stall’ 
implies. Goneril is tried for subjecting her father to slapstick indignity. He swears—
quite contrary to what has been dramatised—that ‘she kicked the poor King her 
father’. This actually denigrates his suffering, reimagining her callous indifference 
as a festive inversion gone too far—such carnivalesque violence is present in the 
sources. Her greatest crime is that she has violated the rules of his earlier game, 
which allowed him to play at being a king. This is not the only place in the play 
where something of the comic violence of The Comedy of Errors resurfaces and 
frustrates any sort of tragic grandeur: Kent trips up Oswald and then suffers the 
indignity of the stocks; Goneril plucks the defenceless Gloucester’s beard, adding 
insult to the injury of the blinding that is about to take place. This is compounded by 
the cruel humour derived from Gloucester’s blinding. Goneril quips, ‘let him smell | 
His way to Dover’ (III. 7. 92–93); on Dover beach, Lear pseudo-foolosophically 
quibbles to the blind man: ‘Your eyes are in a heavy case, your purse in a light, yet 
you see how this world goes’ (IV. 6. 143–144). 
Fort, da, … fort?  
 
The blinded Earl’s pratfall is by far the most gleefully inappropriate moment of 
‘sudden glory’. Any sort of dignity, gleaned from this paradoxically self-
determining action of self-annihilation, is denied him. His attempted suicide, a 
demonic inversion of the idea of a leap of faith, is a piece of ill-timed slapstick, 
which Kott aptly describes as a ‘pantomime’.388 Assuming the persona of a peasant, 
Edgar insists to his father that he was tempted by a devil to jump. He describes it 
thus: 
 
 As I stood here below methought his eyes 
 Were two full moons. He had a thousand noses, 
 Horns welked and waved like the enraged sea.  
                                                
388 ‘King Lear or Endgame’, p. 113.  
  218 
 It was some fiend.    
(IV. 6. 69–71) 
 
What Gloucester’s fall and resurrection make clear is that actors are an author’s 
automatons; as Bates argues, drama, like Freud’s grandson, plays the ‘fort, da!’ 
game. Characters are killed, their fictive existence obliterated, only to be resurrected 
and to take their final bows and do it all again in the next performance—a fact 
famously acknowledged in Julius Caesar when Brutus asks: ‘How many times shall 
Caesar bleed in sport?’ (III. 1. 115).  
 The ‘fiend’ to which Edgar refers, a monster capable of creating and 
destroying, could be seen as a demonic double of the author. A far cry from the 
urbane haplessness of Chaucer’s Sir Topas, Shakespeare’s phantasmagorical alter 
ego is monstrously ugly, like something out of Revelations. The mirthless irony is, 
of course, that although Gloucester is convinced that his ‘life’s a miracle’ (IV. 6. 
55), his heart nonetheless ‘Burst[s] smilingly’ (V. 3. 198), when Edgar reveals his 
true identity to his father later in the act. Gloucester may have come to realise the 
error of his ways, and the absurdity of the values that he had hitherto cherished, but 
this makes no difference. He dies.  
 Moreover, it is no ‘miracle’ that he is revived onstage, since, like Prospero, 
the playwright possesses the capacity to resurrect the dead. But this magic is a 
consequence of the dramatist’s control over his materials—an absolute control over 
things that man can only ever have in that most artificial of things: art. Lear’s 
searing response to what appears to be the cosmic injustice of it all, the brute fact 
that ‘in this world there is no poetic justice’, underscores this:389  
 
 And my poor fool is hanged. No, no, no life! 
 Why should a dog, a horse, a rat have life 
 And thou no breath at all? O thou’lt come no more, 
 Never, never, never, never. 
(V. 3. 304–307) 
 
Lear’s dying hope, ‘Look there, look there!’ (309), is an illusion. For all his 
demands, injunctions and conjurations, he cannot bring his daughter back to life. 
 Adorno contends that ‘great artworks, as destructive works, have also 
                                                
389 Enid Welsford, The Fool: His Social and Literary History (London: Faber and Faber, 1935; repr. 
1968), p. 265.  
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retained the power to destroy the authority of their success. Their radiance is dark; 
the beautiful permeates the negativity, which appears to have mastered it’ (AT, p. 
66). This idea is borne out in Lear. Its power lies in the way that its ugly elements, 
intimately bound to the discourse of folly, ‘destroy’ the ‘success’ of an aesthetics 
based on mastery and decorum, on the idea that man’s ability to shape things into 
pleasing forms is an unequivocally positive thing. The ugly is a dynamic category 
that is indivisible from its opposite; and as Karl Rosencrantz argues, it occupies the 
‘middle between that which is beautiful and that which is comical’.390 The 
prevalence of the ugly in King Lear belies the affirmative footings of Bradley’s rapt 
assessment of the play: 
 
 The final and total result is one in which pity and terror, carried perhaps to 
 the extreme limits of art, are so blended with a sense of law and beauty 
 that we feel at last, not depression and much less despair, but a 
 consciousness of greatness in pain, and of solemnity in the mystery we 
 cannot fathom.391  
 
Not least through the love-test motif, the play lays bare the dangers inherent in a 
tendency of thought that attempts to classify, quantify and measure objects in order 
to make them palatable to conceptual schema, a tendency of thought that is also 
characteristic of aesthetic judgments. Lear is an aesthetic artefact, removed from the 
everyday, only insofar as it is anti-aesthetic, a work of ‘utopian realism’.392  
 In order to examine its inner nature, I have been guilty of classifying the play 
as ugly. In truth, of course, such gestures of rigid identification are useful only 
insofar as they ultimately belie themselves and expose their concept’s constitutive 
paradoxes. But I have emphasised Lear’s ugliness so as to show how the discourse 
of folly shapes its anti-aesthetic aesthetic. I imply what Adorno states with 
admirable—although uncharacteristic—clarity in his unpublished lecture series, 
Ästhetik, which were delivered in 1961: namely, that ‘art is the way of 
                                                
390 Karl Rosencrantz, Ästhetik des Haßlichen, ed. by Dieter Kliche (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1990; repr. 2007 
[1853]), p. 5.  
391 Bradley, p. 279.  
392 See Kiernan Ryan, Shakespeare’s Universality: Here’s Fine Revolution (London: Bloomsbury, 2015) 
[forthcoming].  
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understanding, not an object to be understood’.393 Folly offers us an insight into 
Lear’s ‘way of knowing’, a mode of knowing that is essentially negative, both in its 
sustained, sceptical assault on the theories with which man attempts to make sense 
of things and in its recognition that the way that drama understands is always 
transitory—drama is a phenomenon, not a theory about the world. Lear ultimately 
baffles any interpretation that views it as an object that must be defined, categorised, 
fixed and possessed. If the play says anything explicitly, it is that the all too human 
tendency to grasp for certainties is, more often than not, merely clutching at straws.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
393 Berlin, Walter Benjamin Archiv, Akademie der Künste (AdK), MS 440, ‘Ästhetik’ (1961), p. 35.  
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EPILOGUE: SAPERE AUDE?  
 
 Good sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction 
 (sens); but paradox is the affirmation of both senses or directions at the same 
 time.394  
—Gilles Deleuze  
 
A frustrating and, at times, productive tension at the heart of this thesis is how to 
provide a coherent account of Shakespeare’s folly, without reducing this ephemeral 
phenomenon to the blandly coherent terms of good sense, of which it is devoutly and 
consistently critical. While this study has sought to establish that there is a sustained 
philosophy of folly in Shakespeare’s works, it has not been possible to consider 
closely its role in every play, although it is not difficult to perceive how a reading of 
Troilus and Cressida might corroborate my analysis of Shakespeare’s 
historiography, or how his use of the grotesque in Romeo and Juliet presages the 
aesthetics of deformity with which my final chapter is concerned.  
 Moreover, the significance of folly in Shakespeare’s collaborative plays, 
which, in recent years, have become a focal point of critical attention, is neither 
confined to Erasmus’ walk-on role in Sir Thomas More, nor to the fact that Double 
Falsehood is based on Don Quixote. Rather, the discourse of folly is intrinsically 
bound both to Shakespeare’s disconcerting disavowal of authority and his famous 
capacity for negative capability; the paradoxical wisdom of folly could, therefore, 
provide a theoretical basis from which to analyse the problems of authorial authority 
that Shakespeare’s considerable collaborative output brings to the fore. 
  As my readings of selected histories, comedies and tragedies has established, 
Shakespeare’s philosophy of folly—like Montaigne’s Essays—proceeds without a 
methodology. This ‘way of understanding’395 lacks a predetermined formal structure. 
In fact, the plays make a mockery of the very footings upon which conventional, 
positivistic methodologies depend—not least because the discourse of folly 
conspicuously lacks the rigorously delineated concepts, causal logic and clearly 
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defined ends that one might associate with serious thought. Shakespeare’s ‘true and 
lively knowledge’396 consists of a sustained attack on, and estrangement of, 
philosophical and everyday certainties alike. Primarily through folly’s paradoxes and 
ironies, Shakespeare dissolves the crude dichotomies upon which received wisdom 
depends. Folly sets static identities, fixed categories and watertight concepts into 
play, exposing the contradictions inherent in conventional ideas and traditional 
modes of understanding.  
 As I argued in Chapter 3, it is in this playful estrangement that true 
philosophy inheres. For Shakespeare, the very notion of conventional wisdom is an 
oxymoron. Since it goes beyond the given and takes the audience para-doxa, the 
discourse of folly is necessarily unconventional and, concomitantly, unsure of itself. 
It retains a playful awareness that its peculiar wisdom might, after all, be mere 
nonsense. The paradoxical wisdom of folly in Shakespeare is neither limited to 
specific characters, nor is it simply a theme in the plays. Rather, mapping folly’s 
erratic movement furnishes the reader with insights into how these plays know. Not 
only does this give us access to the ways in which Shakespeare philosophises, but it 
also raises the question of literature’s singularity, of the ways in which literature—in 
contrast to the ostensibly rational discipline of philosophy—understands the world 
and humankind’s place within it.  
 My analysis of folly in Shakespeare’s drama suggests that there are four 
prevalent modes of understanding—or ways of engagement with the world—at work 
in literature: ways of knowing that confound the certainties conventional 
philosophical methods seek to establish. First, folly is keyed into the innately utopian 
inclination of cognition, the perennial tendency of ‘imagination’ to body ‘forth | The 
forms of things unknown’ (Midsummer Night’s Dream, V. 1. 14–15), whereas 
philosophy has generally concerned itself with the interpretation of either the past or 
the present.397 Second, an awareness of folly fosters an appreciation of literature’s 
affective power, a stubbornly pre-theoretical remainder that is nonetheless close to 
the core of literature’s appeal. Inhabiting the realm of folly frees the critic from the 
                                                
396 Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry: or the Defence of Poetry, ed. by R. W. Maslen (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 90.  
397 See Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, 3 vols (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1959; repr, 1985), esp. I, pp.   1–
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demand to make sense of a literary work in coldly analytical terms. One can, for 
instance, ask why Lear’s distraught observation that Cordelia will ‘come no more, | 
Never, never, never, never’ (King Lear, V. 3. 306–307) expresses the desolation of 
immense personal loss with a primal eloquence and dramatic urgency impossible to 
match in philosophy. Third, literature is comfortable with the fool’s knowledge that 
even the grandest conceptual systems are transient. Furthermore, as I argued in 
connection with Twelfth Night, literature itself frequently implies that art—especially 
the temporal art of drama—is best understood by fathoming its laws of motion. 
Finally, an appreciation of Shakespeare’s folly makes possible a fuller understanding 
of how for him—as for Socrates, Erasmus, Montaigne and Nietzsche—irony 
provides a way of perceiving and engaging with the world.  
 Although the concepts of hope, affect, transience and irony are of manifest 
importance to experience, they have, generally speaking, been ill-served by serious 
philosophy. As I established in chapters 2 and 3, however, these concepts are key 
intellectual preoccupations and modes of thinking and writing both for Shakespeare 
and for Erasmus, More and Montaigne. Because literary knowledge offers insights 
that a scientific understanding of the world—one that seeks to quantify and 
categorise—cannot, a more comprehensive mapping of how the great texts of 
European humanism know is urgently required.  
 ‘No epilogue, I pray you; for your play needs no excuse’ (A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream, V. 1. 340): to conclude anything too conclusive about Shakespeare’s 
folly would be an act of folly. It would gravely misconceive the vital indeterminacy 
of its paradoxical subject matter. Paradox is both a complex rhetorical figure and a 
sort of negative dialectics in miniature, since it does not seek to sublate two discrete 
identities into one sense or ‘direction’. Indeed, this thesis has been recurrently drawn 
to the way that Shakespeare philosophises through paradox. Quite apart from either 
the countless paradoxes associated with wise folly, which were considered in 
chapters 1 and 3, or the rich contemporary context of thinking through paradox, 
which I examined in Chapter 2, my analysis of the plays in the final three chapters of 
this thesis revolves around three paradoxes. Shakespeare’s paradoxical 
historiography retells historical events, even as it criticises the representation of 
history; the comedies, considered in Chapter 5, imply that one should, paradoxically, 
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hope for a thoroughly unexpected and radically new future; while in Hamlet and 
King Lear Shakespeare fashions an anti-aesthetic aesthetics. 
 Thus, rather than concluding with results and a clear-cut direction of study, I 
will draw to a close with a paradox, which attests to the way that paradoxes pull in 
two directions and how they beget other paradoxes. If one understands the process of 
enlightenment to consist of  ‘the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred 
minority’,398 then Shakespeare, paradoxically, enlightens his audience through the 
discourse of folly. It is through this discourse that he frees his audience from their 
enthralment to conventional ideas and to established modes of reasoning. First and 
foremost, however, the paradoxical wisdom of folly lies in its sceptical refusal to 
trust itself, to assert either that its implications are straightforwardly true, or that its 
ways of perceiving the world are unequivocally right. Therefore, folly does not teach 
one to trust one’s own understanding. It does something far more important and 
ultimately more enlightening. The paradoxical wisdom of folly teaches us to distrust 
our own wisdom.   
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